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INTRODUCTION 
On 21st December 1973 the Commission issued a Press 
Statement 1 ) the text of which r1as as follows : 
11 Investigations by the .9.~mmission in the oil sector 
In the present circumstances of the oil products market, 
the Commission is disturbed about the supply position of oil products 
~distributing firms independent of the integrated groups ~vhich have 
their ovm refining facilities. These independent fi:cms often encounter 
grave supply difficulties in connection tvith the common market · 
refineries and some are in an alarming situation. 
The Commission considers that arrangements should be made 
to ensure that the present circumstances do not give rise to the 
elimination of independent trading or its absorption by the big companies. 
Refusal b! the big companies to supply the independent 
distributors in an equitable manner may give rise to an application of 
the competition rules of the IJ.'reaty and in particular .Article 86 
thereof. 
The same holds good for practices uhich consist in the big 
companies applying to their trad.ing partners different conditions for 
the provision of equivalent services or subjecting the signature of 
contracts to the acceptance by their partners of extra services. 
The Commission has decided to make the requisi-te investi-
gations with the firms "• 
The circumstances to which the Commission referred uere 
those Hhich resulted from the events follmdng the Har bet\'leen Israel 
and Arab countries of 6th to 16th October, 1973 and vhich completely 
disrupted the international oil market. 
1) Information for Press (IP 226/73 of 21.12.1973) 
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This report contains the results of the enquiry undertaken 
by the Commission and. provides at the sane time information 
requested by the European Parliament. 
In no v1a:y does the report replace a:."!y procedures vrhich 
the Commission has commenced, or rn<;y commence ,in application of 
the rllles of competition of the 'I1reaty, after he.vinG pursued onqui:rics 
into the behaviour of compa.YJ.ies in tho market for certain oil prorlucts. 
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PART I 
THE ENQUIRY BY r.PHE CGr-11HS~ 
A. SCOPE AND OBJECTS OF THE ENQUIRY 
The Commission's intention to commence investigations 
was widely reported particularly since public interest in the oil 
companies had,since before the crisistbeen whetted by several 
enquiries pursued in other countries. Particular mention may be 
made of the hearings before a Senate Cow~ittee in the United 
States on the market performance and competition in the petroleum 
industry t the enquiry by a French parliamentary conuni ttee into oil 
companies operating in France and enquiries underta.lcen by the 
Swisc .Commission on Cartels. However, the only enquiry which 
was concerned directly with events during the oil crisis was that 
underta..l<en in Germany by the Bundeskartellamt 7 v1hich conducted 
public hearings on the activities of oil compru1ies in Germany. 
Even before Decerflber 1973 ho-v.-ever, the Commission hau. 
observed in the Second Report on Competition Policy (l) when dealing 
with the price trends of crude oil and petroleum products and the 
competitive situation in that market, that it -vras -vmtching carefully 
a very unstable situation. In the Third Report on Competition Policy(2 ~ 
the Commission referred to its decision to open the necessary 
investigations into producer companies and dealers in the oil 
industry end expressed its concern that the price trends would give 
rise to circumstances in which anti-competitive practices might 
develop. It mentioned particularly the danger of the application by 
member states of national regulations concerning prices of oil 
products. Althoueh effective in 
slowing down the tendency of prices for such products to rise, these 
regulations might nevertheless open up possibilities of some national 
markets becoming more profitable,thus-making it attractive for 
operators of refining capacity to treat these markets adva'1tageously 
at the expense of controlled markets. The Commission drew attention 
to the d.ifficul ties facing· independent dealers a:::.d stressed that 
(1) Second Report on Competition Policy 
(2) Third Report on Competition Policy 
. I . 
April 1973; Sec 62. 
May 1974; Sec. 2. 
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it would be able, in particular, to apply Al~icles 85 and 86 of 
the Treaty of Rome, in any cases of distortion of competition or 
anticompetitiye practices. 
The aims of the general series of investigations 
initiated by the Commission in December 1973 were to allow it 
to obtain data and other information concerning a numl)er of 
companies l·d thin the oil industry which would enable the Commission 
to determine \ihether the comportment of companies was compatible or 
not \iith the provisions of Article 85 or 86 of the Treaty of Rome. 
Because of the special circumstances of, and its concern for 
the position of _ independent dealers, the Commission ensured 
that such firms were i1icluded in the planning and conducting of 
the enquiries. 
So far as Article 85 is concerned, the enquiries were 
to seek evidence of the existence of agreements betucen underta.kincs, 
decisions by associations of m1dertakings and concerted practices 
which might aff~ct, or had affected, trade between member states 
and which had as their object or effect, the prevention, restriction 
or distortion of competition vlithin the common market during the 
period of the crisis. 
Particularly in mind \"IRS the possible existence of agreements or 
concerted practices between oil companies concerning the sharing 
of markets or the fixing of prices or other conditions for 
transactions concluded by the parties concerned. 
The enquiries by the Commission were also aimed at 
examining the compatibility of the comportment of oil companies 
with Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome which forbids abuses of a 
dominant position. The general reliance of the Community on oil 
products for the supply of a considerable proportion of its 
energy needs contributed to the view that during the oil crisis, 
the position of oil companies was reinforced in respect of individual 
customers, for example, the smaller independent distributors, t·1ho had 
been a-ccustomed to relying on one major oil company for their supplies, 
or in respect of a national market or other significant paxt of the 
corn..rnon maJ.'ket whose supplies of oil products vere largely dependent 
upon a fel.,r of the major oil companies. It was therefore possible to 
conceive the existence of dominant positions occupied by oil companies 
collectively or individually in specific markets. 
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The Commission was concerned at the possibility that 
major oil companies which occupied a dominant position in respect 
of a customer might have either restricted their deliveries or 
imposed prices for continued supplies of oil products which were 
unfair, even taking into account the spiralling costs of· crude 
oil, or might have been able to make the conclusion of supply 
contracts subject to the acceptance by the customer of supplementary 
obligations which were unconnected with the object of the contracts. 
Where oil companies were likely to occupy a dominant position collective-
ly, the Commission was anxious to ensure that markets, production or 
prices had not been manipulated in a w~ which would prejudice the 
interests of consumers. 
... 
The various possibilities of abuse of a dominant position 
arising out of the structure and economics of the oil markets during 
the crisis period were given special attention by the Commission. The 
first one concerned the survival of the independent distributors. In 
most cases, these ~ndependent distributors obtained, and indeed relied 
on, supplies from major oil companies riho themselves operated distri-
bution or retail networks in competition with the independents. It was 
therefore possible that because of shortage of supplies these major 
companies might have restricted supplies to independent companies, 
either by direct refusal to. supply or by the imposition of purchase 
prices which,because of the maxiMum retail prices imposed by the 
governments of the countries concerned,did not allow a viable margin 
for the independents. Although the oil complll1.ies might have been able 
to act in this w~ to ensure the maintenance of adequate supplies to 
their O\~ networks, this would have been done at the expense of 
independent enterprises whose continued existence was threatened. 
Another aspect which drew the attention of the Commissj.on 
ti'aS the fact that during the crisis, certain member states had . 
introduced various forms of price ·control, whilst others,such as 
Germany, had not. This meant that the possibility of higher profit 
margins from sales in a member state rrithout maximum price control 
might have attracted oil comp~1ies (and1 in this case, perhaps not 
only the major oil companies) to direct supplies to su.ch markets 
to the detriment of other member states. 
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B. ORGANISATION OF THE ENQUIRY 
a) Choice of countries and COIJU2anies 
The Commission decided to commence its enquiries in those 
countries which had excess refining capacity and which accordingly 
were sources of supply to countries with insufficient refining capacity. 
In the years 1972 and 1973 ;the Netherlands, Italy and to a lesser 
extent Belgium and France showed positive export bal~~ces. Exports 
from the Netherlands for ex~nple went mainly to other countries of the 
Community and especially to Germany. According to tho energy statistics 
in Eurostat ?/75-r--, pages 61 and 63, Germany imported in 1973 _about 3Cffo 
of its domestic consumption of oil products ~~d the quru1tity 
involved was equivalent to tho total exports of such products from 
the Netherlands. 
In the Netherlands besides member companies of the large 
international groups such as EXXON, SHI'::LL t 13. P. and CHEvRON (which 
belongs to the group of enterprises of the Standard Oil Company of 
California), independent oil companies who were leading exporters 
of light fuel oil to Germany were included in the investigations. 
In Belgium the investigations covered two refineries : 
Albatros and the Societe Industrielle Belge des Petroles (SIBP), 
both of which undertook process refining of crude oil made available 
to them by other companies, uho were either shareholders of these 
refineries or hirers of refining capacity. Other Belgian companies 
were investigated, among them Elf (Belgique). 
In Italy and France besides the large international_ 
companies, enquiries v1ere undertal::en at the national companies 
Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli (AGIP) and Comp~ie Fra.n9aise 
des Petroles (C.F.P.) \vhose operations, although internationa.l,are 
less so than those of the former companies. 
Esso Italia.na and tt'IO independent Italian refineries uere also 
investigate d. 
( *) Eurostat = Statistical Office of the Communities : Luxel!lbourg 
- 9-
In li'rance, besides C.F.P., the Societe Frangaise des 
Petroles B. P. and several independent companies were included 
in the investigations. 
In the United Kingdom, B. P. Trading Ltd. rrhich handles 
the international commercial interests of the B.P. Group was 
inves·t igat e d. 
Investigations were not pursued at that time in Germany 
in view of the enquiries and public hearings v~hich \iere then beint; 
carried out by the Bundeskartellamt into "suspicions of abusive 
advantage of dominant positions in prices sought for petrol, diesel 
fuel and light fuel oil". 
/ 
The main oil companies operating in Germany were invited 
to these hearings v1hich took place in the period 22 f.Iarch to 
4 April 197 4. In ~ievJ of the special situation concerning the 
market for oil products in Germany and considering particularly 
the shortae;e of refinery capacity in that country, the Commission 
estimated that their appraisal of the position in Germany should be 
based principa~ly on information obtained in other member states 
where oil products were produced for export to Germa~y. Information 
in respect of refining operations carried out in Germany was supplied 
by the companies or groups who operated those refineries. 
The investigations, and the discussions \ihich took place 
\vith the companies were generally conducted in an atmosphere of 
cooperation, and considerable efforts were made to produce promptly 
the various documents and inform~tion requested by the Commission's 
investigators. 
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£) Choice of Eeriod 
The enquiries were concerned with the activities 
of the companies from October 1972. 
The first investigations took place in January 1974 
at which time the average F. O.B. price for crude oil from 
the Persian Gulf had reached its highest point. 
. st st The perwd from 1 October 1973 to 31 March 1974 
was more precisely analysed by comparison \'lith the corresponding 
•' 
period of the previous year • 
.£) Choj_ce of ~')rodu~ 
The following produc-ts lvere covered by the enquiries : 
- crude oil 
- petrol - normal 
- petrol super 
- naphtha 
- middle distillates diesel oil, gas-oil, light fuel oils. 
- residual fuel oils. 
The enquiry was extended to cover aviation jet fuel 
by the supplementary questionnaire referred to belOI'l• This 
enquiry therefore covered the principal mineral oil products 
(other than those in saseous form ), l..rhich constitute a 
si&nifica.."lt percen·tage of the products derived per tonne of 
crude oil in an average refinery in Europe. 
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The information received in the course of the e~quiry 
suggested the need to focus further attention on some particular 
aspects of the activities of the oil companies. It was 
decided that this supplementary information should be requested 
from companies under the provisions of Article 11 of Regulation 17. 
The questionnaire was aimed at covering the movements of 
crude oil and oil products between refineries and affiliates of 
each company on the one hand and, on the other, bet~veen these 
and third-companies. It contained a section on sales prices 
practised by that company_on the German market. This information 
was obtained from companies established within the Community as 
well as from parent companies in third countries. 
This is the first time that an enquiry of this magnitude 
has been undertaken by the Commission in respect of oil companies 
in connection with the rules of competition of the Treaty of Rome. 
It is also the first time that a report has been published 
following such an enquiry. The Commission considered that it would 
be useful to recall some background information concerning the 
European oil industry and accordingly one part of the report 
examines the structure and organization of the oil industry in the 
- 12-
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/ 
Community and outlines the events leading up to the oil crisis. 
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PART II 
A. S'rRUCTURE OF THE OIL HIDUSTRY IN EUROPE 
1. Classification of. _oil compani.£:2. 
The oil industry in Europe is made up of oil companies of 
varyine sizes v1hose structures are often very different but which 
can be grouped into various categories. 
Traditionally the oil industry is divided into two parts: 
the seven international companies - often referred to as the seven 
majors - with their su1)Sidiary companies throughout the v.wrld,o·n the 
one part, and, on the ·other part, those companies which e..re not 
attached to these and which might therefore be described generally 
•' 
as independents. 
However this division is arbitrary and no lancer reflects 
the present structure of the o:Ll industry, especially in Europe. 
In a collliilU.hica:tion to the Council dated 18 DecE~mber 1968, 
entitled 11The First Guidelines for a Community Energy Policy" from 
the Commission, the Con;mir;sion attempted to d0volop a classifica.tion 
which migh-t correspond more closely Hith the actual situation of the 
oil industry in Europe. Under this clp.ssification, the enterprises Hhich 
operate on the European oil market fall into three principal categories 
as follovvs : 
(a) The l.,;y_g:e intern~ti_o_nal .. ~.n.t_eE;:_t::;':!;t.~d co_~lE;ic>:..s .. 2.P.2ratt'!G' 'lvorlcli-;:i._cl!;: • 
In this category are placed seven fully integrated compru1ies : 
five American - Strutdard Oil Company of NeH Jersey (Esso or Exxon), 
Texaco Inc. (Texaco) , Gulf Oil Corporation (Gulf) , St ?..ndard Oil 
Company of California (Chevron) and Mobil O:i.l Corporation (l.Iobil) 
- and two European : Royal Dutch Shell (Shell) and British 
Petroleum Company (B. P.) 
(b) ~£te integTated oil companies of 1vhich the activities are to a 
greater or lesser degree concentrated in one or several member 
states. There are in this category t\-JO French companies : Comp,gnie 
Fran9aisc des Pet roles ( CF'P/Total) 1-.rhich j_s often included a-:;c~ne: 
the large international companies and the Enterprise de Recherches 
et d' Activites Petrolieres (Iaf/ERAP); one Italian company : Ente 
Nazionalc Idrocarburi (ENI) i one German cor.1pany : Veba Aktient;esell-
schaft and one Belgian comp~1:ny : Petrofina S. A. (Fina). 
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With the exception of the last-named, all these companies 
belong totally or partly to the corresponding member state. 
(c) Smaller companies i-hlch imuort and distribute oil products wd 
of VThich some have their mm refineries • Oil companies of 
this type may be further divided into three groups from the 
point of viei·T of size and the extent of their operations. 
In the first group one could place certain international 
cor.1panies most of which are of United States origin and vThich 
operate refineries and distribution netvwrks, such as the 
Marathon Oil Company (U.s. ) , CONOCO (U.S.), the Burmah Oil 
Company Ltd. (U.K.) and Philips Petrolewn CompG.ny (u.s.). 
Besides these international companies one. finds European 
compani'es whose activities are largt:-J.y limited to one country 
in the EEC. In this group is Anonima Petroli Italiana - API (Italy) 
which has a refinery and distribution nd1·10rk. 
The third group might include a very larc.;e number of smc:dl 
or medium-sized oil companies i..rhich speciaJ.ise in the wholesale 
or retail distribution of oil products and vthich have no refineries 
(Commission of the European Communities : 11 Small and medium-nized 
oil companies in the Europea11 Communi ties 11 , XVII/ 415/7 4 -
19 December, 1974). 
In each country of the EEC, about ten of the large oil 
companies from the above three categories (a) (b) &~d (c) are active, 
each possessing one or more refineries and/or a dense distribution 
netivork. Alongside these larger companies the majority of the nma.ll 
or medium-sized oil companies are concentrated at the level of dintribution. 
Their importance is usually regional or even more local. Altogether, 
however, they hold about 20 '{a of the market for oil products in the 
ECC (See Part V ). 
What has just been said points to the heterogeneous nature 
of the structure of the oil companies opel'ating on th0 market in the EEC. 
This heterogeneity is primarily a function of the extent to ;..rhich the 
various oil companies have access to supplies of crude oil but also 
stems froL1 the degree of integraLion Hhic;h is extensive in certain 
undertakings but minimal in others. 
The folloHing table (Table 1) shov;s the principal financial 
and operu:tional statistics in respect of the cornp2..nien in the first 
category of enterprise mentioned above 
I 
Annual results f the lar-. 1.ntemational integrated CO!JIQ!llll.es 
--·------------------------~-------.--------.---------r-----·-·fr-------,--------,--------.--------.r---------r-----~T·="r1"~1-----
.,reciatio Capital ex--~ Long tem Value of I Retum on Product Natural Gas Name of Oil Group Net income Amount (a) distr1.buted Amount retained penditure (b)l debt (c) fu:ed assets I shares (d) Ref1.ning runs (e) sales sales {f) 
ESSO (Exxorr) 1968 
Chcvro!l ( Socal) 
Oulf 
Texaco 
1971 
1972 
1913 
1914 
% increase 1'171/1912 
1972/1973 
1973/1974 
1968 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1971 
% increase 1?71/1972 
1972/1973 
1973/1974 
1903 
1971 
1972 
1973 
'l 1974 % incNase 1?71/1972 
1972/19"13 
1973/1974 
l?C8 
1971 
1972 
19!J 
19711-
% 1.ncrease 1971/1972 
1972/1973 
19'(3/1971,. 
1<"158 
1'1'71 1972 
1973 
1~1.; 
% increase ".')':'1/191" 
1972/1'"173 
l9B/19i·i-
Ro.ra1 Dutch 3hell 1963 
1~71 
1972 
i~iz, 
% 1.ncrease 1?71/1972 
1972/1973 
1973/1974 
Br1.tl.sh Petro1e-wn 1968 
1971 
1972 
19n 
1n11. 
% increase lTil/1912 
1')7:/19i3 
1?73/1974 
'l'otal of' the seven large 1;JU3 
1.ntemational integrated 1q7: 
comparnes 19"2 
1T3 
1974 
% mcreaae 1r•i:i./l'J';"2 
1)7~/1973 
1973/1?74 
1.,277 
1.462 
1.532 
2.443 
3.1.12 
5% 
59 % 
29 ~ 
452 
511 
547 
844 
970 
7 ·f., 
54/· 
15% 
626 
561 
197 
800 
1.065 
- 65 ~~ 
306 '£ 
33% 
431 
541 
'574 
n,fJ 
1.047 
') ·.~ 
48 f. 
03 ~ 
~ ?0 
C)O ~ 
"'9 
1.?92 
l.5&:i 
:>-;:, 
45 ~: 
23% 
365 
901 
735 
2.114 
3.361 
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188% 
59% 
31-:tl 
404 
185 
953 
1.410 
- Jtl- }' 
41) ';b 
·18 ;.. 
~:~~~ 
..,.6'"·9 
9o2?'5 
12.581 
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1CO 
35 
785 
851 
852 
952 
1.119 
0 
12 ;~ 
18 ;~ 
218 
237 
246 
263 
327 
4% 
7 ·.: 
24 ~~ 
291 
312 
311 
29G 
307 
0 
-5% 
4 % 
208 
259 
269 
285 
326 
4% 
c ' 
14 
370 
454 
456 
620 
727 
0 
36 % 
17 % 
173 
196 
162 
171 
191 
- 17 ~~ 
6 /o 
12 i't 
Milhon Y, - % 
4?2 
611 
680 
1.1,91 
2.023 
1g ;~ 
36% 
234 
274 
301 
581 
543 
10% 
'l' 
--7;;, 
335 
249 
(-114) 
SO.f 
1)8 
- 154 ;~ 
5.121G 
so% 
7:'1 
8 ~~ 
'''"• ''. 
"D ,;!, 
1.Cl'l 
- 7 .. 
~R ;~ 
23 ~ 
495 
4:7 
279 
lo494 
2,634 
- 38 ~~ 
435 ~~ 
76/o 
137 
208 
23 
7'32 
1.:2~~ ;~ 
::.,3('(.-' , 
~<i .~ 
349 
1.060 
1.136 
1.26') 
7 .~ 
11 ·;~ 
314 
3'7 
."06 
510 
5?6 
610 
609 
6 
0 
6'(0 
1.0311 
1,257 
1.320 
22% 
5% 
223 
315 
394 
475 
25 % 
21 ·,;i, 
,.. ~:::.3 
"~,'"( 
'),395 
is ~,~ 
11 ~: 
1. ~44 
1.~'11 
1.934 
2.23'3 
2.910 
~~ ~ 
30% 
~g 
597 
739 
1,1' 1. 
- ~7 '(, 
?4 :c 
55% 
1.064 
908 
718 
823 
l.t,oG 
- ?1. I~ 
.,,: 
~1 ~~ 
603 
911 
1.030 
Ll36 
1.450 
13fo 
1'1 ~ 
?2 :·; 
1ol\)r, 
1.0"{ 
:.1~3 
1.:::.+1 
:,,'3?~ 
- ~ ;, 
50% 
511 
955 
868 
1.115 
1. 737 
- 9 .• 
28 ;:. 
56 :~ 
.3<3 
qo ~0 I 
1'";.3') 
0 
{a) Net revenueavallable for dJ.stribution, after except1.onal profits and losses and other exPenses. 
(b) Only for the plants and equipment owned by the companies. 
(c) At the close of the year. 
{d) Figul'9& giviiA- iJI, the reports ahowing the net revenue{before excenhonal rev~ a.a ~ 
average percentage of the value of the shares in the trading year. 
(e) In certain oases, processing agreements with other companies are included. 
(f) For Mobil, the gross production of natural gas is inoluded. 
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2.679 
2.617 
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3.052 
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2 ~r. 
u;:, 
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1.054 
1.032 
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1.015 
- 2 ;·~ 
3 '); 
- 5 ;l 
1._05 
2.100 
1o941 
1.608 
1.471 
- 8 )'~ 
- 17 )'~ 
- 9 ~~ 
'748 
1.13·1 
1.033 
1,087 
1.729 
- 4 :; 
0 
59,: 
.C)~ 
1.:::')0 
; ,;6o 
1.77'3 
1.897 
sf.-
31% 
7 ~b 
1.447 
2.461 
3.~83 
3.990 
4o140 
46 % 
11% 
4% 
607 
993 
969 
1.~65 
1.4;6 
- 2 ·t 
31 ;~ 
15% 
--r.r;'9 
11.7:1 
12.5~•5 
13.L)J3 
11.70~ ~ 
lb ;~ 
10.077 
11.930 
12.645 
13.462 
Ho837 
6 f., 
6% 
10 7; 
4.622 
'5.?93 
5.418 
5.468 
6.035 
- 6 % 
1 % 
10 ~~ 
3.389 
4.425 
.~.971 
s.os 
C.3ll 
13 "~ 
13 ;~ 
12 :~ 
n% 
8.159 
10.360 
11.436 
12.826 
14.042 
10% 
12% 
9% 
2.080 
2.911 
3o354 
4.103 
'1,060 
15% 
22 ~~ 
23 :~ 
:7.778 
1rt.o::2 
')0.;:'13 
51!.£02 
61.207 
7 
9 
" 
13 i~ 
14 % 
13 ~~ 
19 '% 
21.% 
n$G 
11~ 
11~ 
15 ~ 
16 ·,~ 
14% 
10 ;.; 
B% 
15% 
18% 
11/b 
12% 
12% 
16 % 
17 ,1, 
12% 
10% 
7 % 
17 % 
24% 
9>~ 
10% 
5% 
16 'f, 
20% 
M1.1lion to - '1-
231 
258 
257 
283 
259 
0 
12 'f, 
- 10 ~~ 
73 
?5 
105 
ll2 
10"1 
11 ~~ 
-} 1 
74 
82 
97 
~9 
98 
18% 
'% 
- 1 ~~ 
83 
95 
110 
ll8 
107 
16 
7 
- 9 
120 
144 
148 
I<;) 
133 
3 :~ 
3/i. 
219 
251 
258 
278 
244 
3% 
8% 
- 12% 
91 
100 
114 
108 
97 
14 ~ 
- 5 ~~ 
10 ~ 
PS.l 
1.02~ 
1.081 
1.1~0 
1.0:'55 
~ ~ 3 ·~ 
2.4 
2"9 
235 
Yl? 
2'5 
~ ;~ 
-:a% 
"'4 
l~ ~ 
1'0 
lli 
7 ~ 
3 ;~ 
- J ·' 
223 
260 
272 
2°0 
256 
5% 
7% 
- 12% 
BJ 
103 
115 
llO 
~i 
)'> 
K1.l~1on mJ 
53-988 
36.925 
95.040 
')9.')65 
100,332 
9;{, 
s;, 
1 ~~ 
15. :B<:i 
17,004 
17.034 
I<:';.OGf 
l:J.322 
0 
- ') ;: 
- 5 I~ 
30.521 
36.077 
~li.454 
34.110 
j0.205 
1 ~~ 
- 6 ~ 
- 11 ~~ 
27.3·i0 
36,11A 
'3G,648 
37.535 
}6.505 
1 ,'!:, 
::' f, 
- 3 ·;~ 
3)."":3 
~".::; "l 
',/.759 
.:;o,0~7 
1;,--:n 
12/o 
- 4 ~·~ 
- 4% 
2.457 
3.507 
4o:J83 
4.129 
3.1115 
25<j; 
- 6 % 
-17 ;rr, 
g~:~n 
2)'7.~('0 
3C':'. '::16 
~99.239 
~ :.~ 
- ::_ ~-.. 
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This report is not concerned with the financial results 
of the large oil groups and 1·lill limit itself here to some comments 
relevant to the results given in the table. 
It must first be stressed that these are consolidated results 
1-1hich include all the operations of the companies in the various 
industrial sectors and in the different parts of the world \';here 
they are active. 
In 1973, the economic expansion and the resulting pressure 
on the market for oil products gave rise to increased demand aMl an 
increase in the comp~<ies' profit margins. After four years of 
stagnation, the increase in the net revenue of the large inte'rna;tional 
companies of American origin from 1972 to 1973 was 66. 6 fo. '.Phis 
improverne?t Has due to their operations outside the U.S.A. and, in 
particular, in ~urope. The large Europea~ comp~~ies enjoyed spectacular 
increases in their revenues but reduced the sums distributed to permit 
investments v!ithout unduly increasing their long term debt. 
In 1974, the net revenues increased on average by 25.4% 
compared vJith 1973 for the five American majors and by 59 7; and 48 % 
respectively for Shell and B. P. The results are all the more 
strikinG because, in the same period, the sales of products of rJ.l 
these companies diminished; in the case of the two Europeru1 majors 
the rec;rcssion v-iaS more pronounced, 11.8 % and 10. 9 'fo. This increase , 
unlike that in 1973, stemmed mainly from operations in the U.S.A. 
and from very favourable results in the chemical sector. 
Nevertheless, despite the increase in net revenues, the 
long term debt of companies of w-rhich the grol·rth had been generally 
halted in 1973, again s-vwlled significantly. 
According to company reports, the situation reversed during 
the third quarter of 1974 and in the fourth quarter the losses 1vere 
replaced by profits. 
The development of profits in 1973 was therefore not 
continued in 1974: the margin of profit on concession oil (see Page 57) 
rms red1..~ced. 'l'he considerable incn:ase in the prices of products 
curbed consumption. The weather was favorable to fuel economy. 
The under-employment of transport and refining capacity increased 
costs. 
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2. The role of companies in oil production 
Until the middle of the 1950's practically all the 
production of crude oil in the world, less China, the USSR and 
Eastern Europe, \vas produced by the large international companies 
which were accordingly in a position to determine prices. Since 
about 1955 hoivever, the structure of the oil industry has been 
modified slightly. Attracted by the considerable increase in the 
demand for oil, and by the advantageous conditions of concession 
agreements granted by new producing countries (l), several nevrcomers 
have entered the business at the production stage, particularly in 
the Middle East and in Africa: Occidental Oil, Continental Oil, 
Phillips Petroleum, :Marathon and l'::NI are examples of such enterprises. 
Advantageous conditions of access to production agreed by producing 
countries for light crude oil, giving a higher yield, allowed these 
•' 
companies to break into th:e European market for the sale of light 
products - petrol end gas oil - without big investments. 
Ten years after the creation in September 1960 of the 
Organization of Petroleum Expor-ting Countries (OPEC), e collection 
of circwnstances brought an end to a long period of abundance of cheap 
oil and permitted the producing countries to join together in 
controlling production and prices. Among these circumstances were 
an exceptionally high and maintained increase in the demand for oil 
in Europe and in J·apan and the factors \vhich arose, in the sectors 
concerned, from the future energy supply in the United States,and, 
from the aspect of supply, the temporary withdrawal from service 
of Taplinc (the trans-Arabian pipeline from the Persian Gulf to 
Sidon on the Mediterranean) and the reductions of production in Libya 
and in Nigeria. 
The pressure on the oil market at this period \vas temporary. 
Nevertheless it was sufficient to change the balance of pO\-ler in favour 
of the oil producing countries. Since then the oil companies have had 
to concede to the oil producing countries on several issues in the 
·course of the series of conferences called by these colmtries concerning 
proposawfor increasing their revenues as well as their participation 
in concessions : Slilong these conferences \·Icre those hold at Caracan, 
December 1970; 'l'eheran, Febr1.<.ary 1971; Tripoli, J.Iarch 1971; 
. I . 
(1) Libya, particularly, had grru1ted concessions o~ very 
advantageous terms in order to break into markets. For several y~ars, 
taxes uere calculated on the actual price instead of the P?stea. 
price \see Page 76) and rc"tates were granted which were part~ally 
subsidized by the state. 
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Algiers, June 1971 and Geneva, 1972. However, until 1973 this 
process of evolution of power had been somevrhat slow because of 
the differences in the economic situation of the oil producing 
countries. The further turmoil between Israel and the Arab countries 
had injected a fresh political solidarity into the relationship 
betiieen the oil-producing countries in the Middle East -vrhich served 
to accelerate this process of change and which attempts by the oil 
companies ~~d consumers were unable to curb. 
Nevertheless, in 1973 the large oil companies still 
controlled 60 % of the oil production in the world, less China, the 
USSR a.11d Eastern Europe. This percentage \vas greater - reaching as 
much as 100 % in some instances - in most of the I•liddle East 
countries. and in Africa, vlhich areas -v;ere of particular importance 
for the supplies to Europe (see Table 2). 
- 20-
'l'ota1 production of cruda oil by the seven major oil companies 
19_11 1000 t 
--Crude oil production of tho seven maJor oil co1:1panies 
I 
(o) as a : 
Country-·or origin Total ' (1) 
production of Total 
crude oil Esso Chevron Gulf Mobil Texaco Zhell B.P, 2- 8 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (G) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
---- ------------- -----
Je~t~x:n Eurone 15.042 2.204 28 151 1.035 1.417 1.886 81 6.802 45,2 
Austria 2.578 
- - -
183 
-
183 
-
366 14,2 
France 1.255 520 
-
151 
- -
19 
-
690 55,0 
Holland lo494 747 
- - - -
747 
-
1.494 100,0 Norway lo579 
- - - - - - - - -Spain ; 111 
-
28 
- -
28 
- -
56 50,5 
United Klngdom 93 
- - - - - -
80 80 86,0 
Fed. Rep. of Germany 6.711 937 
- -
852 1.389 937 1 4.116 61,3 
~ 276-795 10.921 202 25.462 14.664 259 45,847 32.794 130.149 47,0 
Anco1~ 8.112 - - 7·276 - 57 - - 7.333 90,4 Gabon 8.889 
- - - - -
2.590 
-
2.590 29,1 
Libya 101.496 10.921 
- -
3.814 
-
10.463 
-
25.193 24,8 
Nigeria lClO. '167 
-
202 18.186 10.850 202 32.794 32,'[94 95o028 94,3 
)Iiddle East 1.029.958 109.389 102,531 71-598 55·073 103.092 81.565 199·952 723.200 70,2 
Abu Dhabi 61.708 4.461 
- -
4·461 
-
8.922 17.775 35.619 57,7 
llahrain 3.396 
-
1.698 
- -
1.698 
- -
3·396 100,0 
Dubai 5.608 
- - - -
561 
- -
561 10,0 
Iran. 293-908 18.845 18.845 18.845 18.845 18.845 37.690 107,687 239.602 81,5 
Ira.k 92.586 3.036 
- -
3.036 
-
6.072 6.072 18.216 19.7 
Kuwait 119.053 
- -
52·753 
- - -
66.300 119.053 100,0 
Oman 14.421 
- - - - -
12,258 
-
12.258 85,0 Qatar 27·491 1.059 
- -
1.059 
-
14.605 2.118 18.841 68,5 
Saudi Arabia 364.392 81.988 81.988 
-
27.329 81.988 
- -
273.293 75,0 
Turkey 3·553 
- - -
343 
-
2,018 
-
2.361 66,5 
-
Far East/Oce~a 
113.152 9.729 23.990 
-
1.586 24-540 16.068 
-
75·913 67,1 
Australia 18.380 8.143 
- - -
550 550 
-
9-243 50,3 
l!runei n.lil3 
- - - - -
11.183 
-
11.183 100,0 
Indonesia 69.934 1.586 23.990 
-
1.586 23.990 
- -
51.152 73,1 
Xalaysia 4·335 
- - - - -
4·335 
-
4.335 100,0 
Latin America/ 
CaribbeM 262.934 82,029 3o242 10.944 5·890 16.665 46.174 127 165.071 62,8 
Are-entina 21.961 
- - - - -
90 
-
90 014 
Colombia 9.339 891 992 
- -
2,860 889 127 5·759 61,7 
Ecuador 10.626 
- - - -
5-241 
- -
5-241 49,3 
Poru 4·178 
- - - -
9 
- -
9 0,2 
Trinided 7·656 
- - - -
2.259 371 
-
2.630 3<1,4 
Venezuela 174·769 81.138 2,250 
I 
10.944 5·890 6.296 44.824 
-
151.342 86,6 
!forth America 613.043 70.291 31.222 33.651 24.822 52.292 40.637 1,600 254-515 41,5 
World total (a) .310.924 I 284.563 161.215 I 141.806 103.crro 198.265 232.177 1 234.55411.355·650 58,7 
= .... 
r 
== "!ttT 
,"'S ·~ -
(a) Excluding China, the U,S,S.R. and Eastern Europe. The total production of this group is approxicately 500 million to~~as. 
~: Petrole= Times, July 26, 1974. 
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J.• Structure of refining and distribution in the Community 
It will be seen from 'l1able 3 that the oil companies 
belonging to the first tt-lO categories mentioned in Paragraph 1 
above control a large share of the refining capacity of the Community. 
Table 4 sets out the refining capacities in Western Europe 
of v~rious categories of enterprises. 
T;·w characteristics which are noticeable in respect of the 
refining capacity of the :EEC are the geographical concentration of 
the refineries and the existence of a number of refineries which are 
shared by several oil groups. The refineries of the oil companies are 
situated in particular regions of the Community vihich are advantageous 
for the receipt of crude oil and the omrard flow inland of oil products, 
such as the areus of Rotterdam, Antwerp, the valley of the Seine and 
the region of Bcr-re,near Marseilles. At the same time, other regions, 
such as Ireland, Denmark and. the south of Germany have insufficient 
refining capacity t6 meet their domestic needs. 
The ownership of some refineries is shared by several oil 
groups: for example, the refinery operuted by S. I.B. P. at Antvierp is 
Oimed by B. P. and Petrofina and the Cal tex refinery at Rotterdam is 
0\-med jointly by Texaco and Chevron. In addition, extensive arrangements 
exist bet1-1een oil companies for the exchange of refining capacity. 
This joint operation of refineries by some oil companies and the 
exchange of refining capacity cannot be 11ithout effect on the solidarity 
of the oil companies concerned. 
The exchanges of refining capacity bcti·reen companies occur 
particularly bot-r.:een regions v1here excess refining capacity exists in 
large facilities (10 million tonnes and above) 9 they alloiv economies 
of scale in refining costs and avoid the costs of cross-transporting 
oil products. 
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So far as exchanges of products are concerned, which 
also illustrate the solidarity bet-vwen companies, these are usually 
complementary to exchanges of refining capacity. They allow companies, 
particularly those which have no refineries in a particular region,. 
to avoid the burden of transport in making available products from 
their own refineries. Petrofina, for example, has developed 
particularly such a network of excha..l"lge agreements in respect of its 
share of the products of SIJ3P at .AntvTerp and of other refineries in 
·the common market. 
I 
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Teb1e 3 a 
List of refineries 
1000 t. 
-
n,eorctica1 crude oil processing capacity (at the cni of the year) 
Compa.ny Location 
1970 1971 1972 1973 cha.-1ges I 'f, l9731F72 • 
GERMJJIY I 120.263 126.508 1)3.160 145· 610 + 12 .t50 + 9,3 
Sehl e aWl g-Eo l st e1 n 3.550 3.550 3.550 6,000 + 2.450 +69,0 
. 
He>de/Holsteln +t6,7 Deutsche Texaco A,G, 3,000 3.000 3.000 5.600 + 2.600 
Occ>dental Oel G,m, b,H, Brunsbtitte1 550 550 550 400 
-
150 -27,3 
~ 12,560 13 .)EO 15.300 15.300 - -
BP Benzin und Petroleum A.G. Ha."nburg-F1nkenwerder 4.300 5.100 5.100 5.100 
- -
Deutsche Shell A.a. Ha:n bure-Har burg 4.300 4.)00 4.300 4.300 
- -
Esso A.a. Hamburg-Harburg 3.600 3.600 5·500 5.500 
- -
01werke Ju1>us Sch1ndler Hamburg 360 380 400 400 
- -
~f.Obll 011 A.G. 
' 
Bremen 1,800 l.EOO 1.800 1.800 
- -
lhedcrs"lchsen 9.053 9.078 10,060 10.060 - -
-------
Gew.ErdOl-R.:1ff .Deurag-Uerag M1 s burg/Hannover 2.550 2.550 2.550 2.550 
- -
Y..1neralblwerke Pe1ne Pe1ne 18 18 
- - - -
Wintershall A.a. Sa1zbergen 335 360 360 360 
- -
illntcrshall A. G. Llngcn/Uns 3.750 ), 750 4.750 4.7)0 - -
Erdblwerke ii'r1s1a A.a. :Elnden 2,400 2.400 2.400 2.400 
- -
Kordrhe1n-;·!es t falen 39.550 43.E50 43.850 51.350 7.500 +17,1 
Gelsenbere Aktlencesollach. Gelsenk1rchen 7.000 7 .ooo 7.000 7.000 
- -
Un1on Kraftstoff ~lessellr.g/Koln 5.600 6.000 6.000 6.000 
- -
Deutsche Shell A.a. Y.onhclm/illieln 400 500 500 500 
- -
Occldental Oel a.m.b,H, Esf'.en 750 750 750 750 - -
Fu1.a ih twre:1werke a.m. b.H. Kulhe>m/Ruhr 500 500 500 500 - -
VF.DA-<:heme A.a. GelsenY~rchen-Buer 4.400 7.400 7.400 10,000 + 2.6co +35,1 
Esso A.G. Kliln 5.600 5· 700 5.700 5.700 - -
Erdol Raff,l;o1sburg a.m. b.H, Du1sburg 2,000 2.000 2.000 2,000 - -
EP Benz1n und Petroleum A. G. D1nalaken 5,0CO 5.000 5.000 9.9CO + 4.900 +eo,o 
Deutsche Shell A.a. Godorf 8,)00 9.000 9.000 9.000 - -
~ Caltex Deutsch!, a.m,b.l!, Raunhe1m 4.500 4.500 4.500 4.500 - -
1.\he>nland-Pfalz 5.800 6.0)0 6.300 6.300 
- ----------
Elf M1~eralbl G.m.b.H. Speyer 2.300 2.550 2.Eoo 2,800 - -)!obll Oil Raff, f,'orth a.m. b,ll, Worth/Rhe>n 3.500 3.500 ),500 3.500 - -
!l.o1.den·-t:Hrt tf'mber§' 19.250 19.600 21.600 21.600 
- -
Esso A. c. Karlsruhe 8.900 9.000 9.000 9.000 
- -Oberrh. ~:1neralOlwerke a.m. b,H, Karlsruhe 6. 750 7.000 7.000 7.000 -
-
ErdOl raff1ner 1 e l·iannhc1m Y.=nbe1m 3.600 3.600 5.600 5.600 
- -
Bayern 21.900 22.400 23.800 26.300 + 2.500 +10,5 
Deutsche Snell A.a. lnf;Olstadt 3.000 ),000 3.000 3.000 
- -
Esco A.a. lngo1cto.dt 4.eoo 4.900 5.000 5.000 
- -
ErdOlraff1ner1e Ingolstadt A.a. Ingolstadt 3,200 3.200 3.000 3,000 
- -
ErdOlraff .],t;!ll;;,tddt G.m. b,H. & Co, 1;eus tadtjBayern 3.500 3.500 5.000 7.000 + 2.000 +40,0 
BP Benz1n und Petroleum A. G. Vohburg;Donau 4.400 4.800 4.800 5.100 + 300 + 6,3 
Deutsche }l~arathon Petr, C,m,b,H, Burghausen 3,000 3.000 3.000 ).200 + 200 + 6, 7 
Saarland Saarle-r..d-Raff. a.m. b,l!, Klurenthal 2.300 2.300 2.400 2.400 - -
----
ID."'l'III:KLA!IDS 68,472 77.697 99.130 99.130 - -
West (liooro.l- en Zuld-Holland) 68.472 77.697 99:130 99.130 -
-
Asphalt- en chem1schc fabr1eken Amsterdam 300 300 200 200 
- -
Mob11 011 N. V. Amsterdam 4.000 6,000 6.500 6.500 
- -
Chevron Petrole~ (Calte:x:) Perms-Rotterdam 12.900 12.900 15.900 15.900 
- -
Esso 1:ederland Rotterdam Botlek 16,000 16,000 16.000 16.000 
- -
Shell Nederland Pern~s-Rotterda.11 24.500 21.725 30.000 30.000 
- -
Gulf Rottcrdzun Europoort 4.972 4.972 4·730 4.730 - -
British Petroleum Rotterdam Europoort 5.8oo 15.1'00 25.E00 25.!'00 -
-
Compruzy 
FRAifCE 
~ 
U,G,P, et U,I,P, 
E1f-\Jruon . 
Hau te-:!'ionna."ld.i e 
Compagnie Franc;a19e do Raffinage 
Esso Standard S,A,F, 
·Compagnie de Raff1nage Shell Berre 
)!obil Oll Franc;a1Ee S,A, 
Societe Franc;aise des Petro1es B.P, 
Nord 
--
Societe Franc;aise des Petro1es B.P, 
An tar 
~ Antar 
Loire An tar 
---
~ 
Societe de 1a Raffineric-de Lorraine 
A1sace 
Compagnie RhE!nane de Rafflnage 
Societe de Rafflnae• de Strasbourg 
Aqu1taine 
Compagnie de Raffin,ee Shell Berre 
Union lndustr1e11e dec Petroles 
Eseo Standard S,A,F, 
Rhone-Alpes 
Union pour le Raffinage et la 
Petrochim. 
Languedoc Mobil Oil Franc;aise S,A. 
Provence 
----Compa;;nie Franc;aise de Raffi~~~e 
Compaenie de P.afflnuge Shell Berro 
Societe Franc;a1se des Ntrolea B.P. 
Eeao Standard S.A,F, 
BELGIUM 
IWh. 
Albatros 
International 011 Ref1ne17(Albatros) 
Eeso Belgium S,A. 
Raffiner1e Belge des Petroles 
Societe·Industrielle Belge dee 
Fetroles 
S.A. Anglo-Be1ge des Petrolea 
Belgian Shell S.A, 
Texaco Belgium S,A, 
..§9.lillL 
Chevron Oil Belgium S,A, 
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List of refineries 
1000 t. 
'lbeoretical 
Location 
1970 
116.485 
7.300 
Grandpuits 3.600 
GargcnviHe 3.100 
37.300 
Gonfrevi 11 e 14.300 
Port-J er6me 7.200 
Petl t-{;ouronne 9.200 
Gravenchon 3.600 
Vernon 3.000 
9.000 
Dunkerque 5·500 
Valenciennes 3.500 
Vern s/Seiche 1.450 
Donges 4.550 
Hauconcourt 4.000 
8,100 
Reichstett 3.700 
Herrl~the1m 4.400 
9.400 
Pauillac 4.500 
Ambes 2.100 
Bordeaux 2.800 
Feyzin 6.250 
Frontignan 4.000 
25.135 
La Made 10,235 
Berre-l'Etang 7.500 
La vera 4.400 
Foe a/Mer 3.000 
35.885 
35.885 
Antwerpen-l!oord 2.700 
Antwerpen-Zuid 1.750 
Antwerpen-Noord 4.130 
Antwerpen-Noord 5.000 
Antwerpen-Noord 15.500 
Antwerpen-Zuid 40 
Gent 540 
Gent 5.625 
Feluy 
-
crude oil processing capacity (at the end of th~ year) 
1911 1972 1973 changes <J, 197 J/1972 
121.045 145.410 153.885 + 8,475 ~ 
7.300 9.600 9.600 
- -
3.600 3.600 3.600 
- -
! 3.100 6,000 6.000 - -37.300 46.300 46.300 - -
14.300 23.300 23.300 
- -7.200 7.200 7.200 
- -
9.200 9.200 9.200 
- -
3.600 3.600 3.600 
- -
3.000 3.000 3.000 
- -
9.000 9.000 9.000 
- - I 5·500 5.500 5·500 - -
3,500 3.500 3.500 
- -
I 
1.450 1.450 1.450 
- -
8.000 8.000 8.300 + 300 + 3,8 
4.400 4.400 4.500 + 100 + 2,3 
I 8,100 8.200 8.200 - -3.700 3.700 3.700 
- -
4.400 4.500 4.500 
- - I 
9.400 9.500 9.000 - 500 - 5,3 I I 
4·500 4.500 4.000 
-
500 - 11,1 
2.100 2.100 2.100 
- -
2.800 2.900 2.900 - -
6.960 7.225 8.800 + 1. 575 + 21,8 
4.000 4.000 6,000 + 2.000 + 50,0 
·-
25.135 37.135 42.735 + 5.000 + 13,3 
10.235 10.235 10,235 
- -
7.500 13.500 13.500 
- -
4.400 n.ooo 11.000 
- -3.000 3,000 8.000 + 5.000 +166,7 
41.700 42.284 43.084 + eoo + 1,9 I 
---
36.700 37.284 38.084 + 800 + 2,1 
3.200 3.500 ),500 
- -
1.750 
- - - -
4.130 4.130 4.130 
- -
5.000 s.ooo 5.000 
- -
15.500 16,200 17.000 ~ 800 + 4,9 
40 40 40 
- -
540 544 544 - -
5·940 7.270 7.270 
- -
5.000 5.000 5.000 
- -
__, 
Con:pany 
ITALY 
Pl.ernonte 
' 
Sarpom S.p,a. 
Ro1 
B.P. Italiana 
Liguria 
Garrone Raff, Petrol1 
San Qu1r~co S,p,a, 
Fina Ital1ana S,p,a, 
lplom 
Shell It. 
SPI S.p.a. 
Delle plane 
Lombardi a 
J.GIP S.p.a. 
Amoco Ital1a S,p,a, 
Anic S,p.a, 
Shell It. 
C"J.lf Ital1~na S,p,a. 
Fl.na Italul.!la S,p,a, 
I.c.I.P. S.p.a. 
Lisea S,p,a, 
Lo.,Larda Petroli S,p,a, 
Venet~ Ir0m S,p.a, 
f.:_:uli-Ve~_zla C1ul1a Aqu.1la 
~llia-Rorr.a.gna. 
Sarom 
)~onteca.t1ui Ed.J.son 
Toscal"..a Stanic S,p,a, 
!Iarche Ap1 
~ 
Raffln€'ria di Roma 
Gdty 0>1 Ital1ana 
Camp.:.1.nia Nob11 011 I tali ana 
Puglia 
Stanic S,p,.a, 
Montec-?.tlni E!lieon 
Shell It. 
~iha 
Medtterranea S,p,a, 
A,B,C,D, S,p,a, 
A.nic Gcla Ihnerar1a S,p,a, 
Esao Ras1om 
S~nca't S,p,a, 
~degr.a 
Sara a 
Sardoil 
1) 1 .Tuly, 1973 
S,p,a, 
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List of refineries 
1000 t. 
Theoretical 
Location 
1970 
Treoate 
V>suzzolo 
Vol piano 
GE>nova 
Genova 
Genova 
Busalla 
La Spez1a 
Arcola 
Genova 
Cortemaggiore 
Cremona 
Sannazzaro 
Rho 
Bertoni co 
)tilano 
Y.antova 
Valmadrera 
Villa santa 
Venez1a. 
Tr1este 
Ravenna 
Ferrara 
Livorno 
Falconara 
-- -
Pantano dJ. Grano 
Gaeta 
llapo1i 
llari 
Brindisi 
Taranto 
Milazzo 
Rag>.tsa 
Ge1a 
Augusta 
Priolo 
Sarroch 
Porto Torres 
Table 3 c 
crudo oil processing capacity (at the end of the year) 
1971 1972 19731 ) var1at1ons % 197 3/1972 
169.820 113.780 178.650 ~ ~ 
12.850 12.850 12.850 
- -
7.800 7.8oo 7.800 -
-
50 50 50 - -
5.000 5.000 5.000 
- -
16.650 16.650 16.700 + 50 + 0,3 
6.700 6.700 6. 750 + 50 + 0,7 
1."{00 1. 700 1.700 
- -
- - - - -1.600 1.600 1.600 
- -5.700 5.700 5·700 
- -
650 850 &50 
- -
100 100 100 
- -
21.820 25.720 28.390 + 2.670 + 10,4 
140 140 140 
- -
5·000 5.000 s.ooo - -
6.500 6.500 6.500 
- -
5.700 5.700 5· 700 
- -
-
3.900 5.800 + 1.900 + 48,7 
330 330 
- -
330 -100,0 
2.600 2.600 3.500 + 900 + 34,6 
~50 ~50 450 - -
1.100 1.100 1.300 + 200 + 18,2 
5·300 5.300 5·300 
-
' 
-
3.000 3.000 3.000 
- -
7.960 7.96o 7.960 
- -
7. 700 7.700 7.700 
- -
260 260 260 
- -
4.600 4.600 7.400 + 2.800 + 60,9 
3.300 3.300 3.300 
- -
6.000 6.ooo 6.450 + _.450 + 7,5 
4.000 4.000 4.000 
- -2.('()0 2.000 2.450 + 4~0 + 22,5 
7.300 7.300 7.300 
- -
10.360 10.360 9.260 
-
1.100 
- 10,6 
3.800 3.eoo 3.eoo 
- -
1.560 1.560 1.560 
- -
5.000 5.000 3.900 
-
1.100 - 22,0 
47.010 47.010 47.010 
- -
18.000 18.000 18.000 
- -
200 200 200 
- -
5.040 5.040 5·040 
- -
10.710 10.770 10.710 
- -
13.000 13.000 13.000 
- -
23.730 23.730 23.730 
- -
18.000 18.000 18.000 
- -
5.730 5.730 5·730 
- -
Compeey 
tml'l'Eil nNCD0!4 
~ 
British Petroleum Co,Ltc!. 
Shell U,K, Ltd, 
Esso Petroleum Co, Ltd, 
Lindsey Oil Refinery Ltd, 
Mobil Oil Co, Ltd, 
Philips-Impcrial Petroleum Ltd, 
Continental Oil Co, Ltd, 
Burma Oil Trading Ltd, 
Berry Wiggins and Co, Ltd, 
Philmae Oils Ltd, 
Wales 
--
Britieh Petroleum Co, Ltd, 
Esso Petroleum Co, Ltd, 
'l'exaco Ref1ning Co. Ltd. 
Culf Oil Rehmng Co, Ltd, 
AMOCO (U,K,) Ltd, 
Scotland 
British Petroleum Co, Ltd, 
Shell U.K. Ltd, 
Win, Brlggs and Sons Ltd, 
~ British Petroleum Co, Ltd, 
IRELAND 
Irish Refining Co, Ltd, 
DE:NMARK 
Danek Esso A/S 
Culf Oil A/S 
A/S Shell Raffinaderiet 
Source 1 Energy Statistics 
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List or refineries 
1000 t, 
Theoretical 
Location 
1910 
.114.809 
79.192 
Kent 10,160 
Stsnlow 10.700 
Shell haven 10,200 
1'eesport 5.400 
Heysham 2,000 
Fawley 16,400 
South Killingholme 7.000 
Coryton 6.750 
Nonth Tees 5,080 
Killingholme 4,064 
Ellesmere Port 300 
Barton 173 
Kingsnorth 320 
Weaete 188 
Eastham 457 
24.630 
Liandarcy 8.130 
Y.il ford Haven 6,100 
Pembroke 5.900 
Milford l'.aven 4.500 
lhlford Haven 
-
9.467 
Grangemouth 9.144 
ArdrosGan 200 
Dundee (Campendown) 123 
Belfast 1,520 
~/hi te Gate (Cork) 2.966 
10.800 
Kalundborg 3.500 
Culf l!avn (Stigsr.as) 4.500 
Fredericia 2.800 
-Eurostat, Luxemburg 
crude oil 
1971 
121.936 
85.073 
11.500 
10.700 
10.200 
5o400 
2.000 
19.400 
7.200 
6,760 
5.080 
4.064 
1,626 
173 
300 
1"{0 
500 
25.830 
8.330 
6,100 
6.900 
4.500 
-
9.403 
9.040 
200 
163 
1.630 
2.966 
10.900 
3.500 
4.500 
2.900 
Table 3 d 
processing capacity (at the end of \he year) 
1972 1973 1913/1972 % 
124.222 141.970 + 17.748 
..:t:...._!hl. 
86.559 89.545 + 2.986 + 3,4 
10.900 10.900 
- -
10.?00 10.700 
- -10.200 10,200 
- -6,100 6.400 + 300 + 4,9 
2.000 2,000 
- -
19.800 19.400 
-
400 
-
2,0 
8.460 9.600 + 1,140 + 13,5 
6.760 8,600 + 1,840 + 27,2 
5.000 5.000 
- -
3.940 4o300 + 360 + 9,1 
1.626 1.445 - 181 
-
11,1 
1'13 
- -
173 - 100,0 
300 300 
- -
- - - -
600 700 + 100 + 16,1 
27.000 41.750 + 14.740 + 54,6 
8.300 8,300 
- -6.300 15.400 + 9.100 + 144,4 I 
7.250 8,900 + 1,650 + 22,6 I I 
5·150 5,150 
-
> -
-
4.000 + 4.000 
-
9.163 9.175 + 12 + o,1 
8.1300 s.eoo 
- -200 200 
- -
163 175 + 12 + 7,4 
1.500 1,500 
- -
- l 
2.966 2.966 
- -
-· 
10.992 10. 99_3_ 
-
-
3.500 3.500 - -
4·592 4.592 - -
2.900 2.900 - -
- 27- Table 4 
~fi11jng capaciti~s of op rrroups in v/estern 1'urop~ 
(M t/an - en %) 
r-------------------~--------·-------------·-------------------~ Capac:Li.ies e..t year end 1------ -;~ 1972 1973 - -- ·-· M t/an % total :M t/an _, ;o 
Esso 
Chevron 
Gulf 
Mobil 
126,4 
22,9 
25,6 
38,4 
28,9 
~~ 
·-
14,6 
2,7 
3,0 
142,7 
24,8 
20,4 
-· ~~ 
:·: I 2,2 
4,4 42,6 
Texaco 3,3 34,3 
~-~-- .. ---- ·--= 
Total U.S. majors 242,2 
1---·-·-~------ ~---- ·----_r=~~·-~~= ~;~:~--c 
Shell 
B. P. 
Total European majors 
133,4 
110,5 
243,9 
15,4 
12,8 
·-
... _____ __, 
28,2 
__ =<'" _______ ---~ ~ ..... --..-. 
·-· -~-5 .. 
CFP/Tota1 
Ji!LF /Ant ar 
ENI 
Petrofina 
49~6 
37,6 
19,6 
16,1 
5,7 
4,4 
2,3 
1,9 
"""~'--~-,-· ----·-·----~--+---·--~ 
_I_. ~ 1~~~--T t 1 £;uropea..n integr:Jt d 122 9 0 a comp::unes - ' 
----·-· - r-----
u.s. independents 1 33,8 3,9 
German independents (a) 60,4 7,0 
9,9 
8,7 
133,9 
121,1 
·---"·~ 
255,0 
-~----... 
50(7 
40,0 
33,0 
18,0 
070"...--«.o I -• ... ,..._., 
141,7 
·-----........... -~ 
36,9 
65,0 
78,0 
74,0 
- __ ..... ___ .u.o<_..._.._ ..... __...., .. ~..-:c-• ...--.--~- .. -
(a) detailo for VEBA 26,8 3,1 29,4 
NB.: The expression VEBA refers to the VEBA GBAG group which carne 
into being during the crisis. 
:---
-~· 
---
~...-.. , 
Source : Statistics published by the Direction des Carbura11ts 1 France. 
4,7 
3,8 
29,0 
14,6 
13,2 
27,8 
_)j 5 
4,4 
3,6 
2,0 
.:.5 ~~~~· ~-,~ 
4,0 
7,1 
3,2 
•' 
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B. THE OIL CRISIS 
1. Trends in the demands for en~ry in the Communit;y betvreen 1260 e"Ll2,11 
During the period 1960 to 1973 the gross domestic energy 
consumption of the nine countries of the Community increased at an 
annual rate of 4. 7 %. But whilst the consumption of hydrocarbons 
(oil and natural gas) increased at an avera,,3'e rate of annual gro~-rth 
0f almost 13 %, the consmnpt ion of solid fuels (coals and lignite) 
reduced at a rate of about 3.4% per annum. 
The disparity between theBe rates led to a distinct change 
in the pattern of depej1dance on the various sources for the energy 
consumption of the Community. In 1960 solid. fuels still accounted for 
about 67. 4 % of the total energy consumption as compared •d th 26. 9 % 
for hydrocarbons. In 1973 the situation \'laC reversed. Hydrocarbons then 
accounted for 71.9 '% of the total ener[:,'Y consumption, whilst solid 
fuels accounted for no m~re than 23.7 % (See rrable 5 ). 
-
. 19731 1960 19'(0 19'{1 1972 
En e!:JS:! source_~L I'i ";a J ~ }1 '/v 1.1 I % M c~ 70 r.I ?j tee total tee total tee total tee total tee total 
--- 1--r--
al Co 
Li 
Oil 
and equivalents 
gnite and equiva1e:1t:::: 
and equivalents 
ural eas Nat 
o-th er fuels 
463 62.9 
33 4·5, 
185 25.1 
13 1.8 
1 0.1 
--- -
333 28.0 
35 2.9 
674 56.7 
88 1·4 
2 0.2 
-~- ,---·· 
299 24.8 271 21.5 280 20.5 
34 2.8 35 2.8 37 2.c 
704 58.4 750 59·4 793 
114 9.4 147 11.6 168 12. 
2 0.2 2 0.2 2 0.1 
59·~ 
ectrical energy 41 5·6 57 4.8 53 4·4 57 4·5 57 4•j 
1 I al 736 100.0 1.189 100.0 l.tDG 100.0 1.262 100.0 1.337 xo.c 
El 
r:I.'ot 
-=::::= ===========~========-===~== 1::=:::=:=:.:= ======--'====== ========~==============~~========J 
~ = tonnes of coal equivalent 
Source Bulletin of Energy Statistics - EUROSTAT, Luxembourg. 
The explanation of this development lies in the fact that 
durin~; the decade 1960 to 1970, oil \·las abundant and cheap. This 
situation had the effect of accelerating the shrinkage of the cod 
industry and. slo1-ring down the development of nuclear energy in the 
Community. 
A. 
i.B. 
c. 
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As a result, in 1973 almost 60 % of the energy needs of the 
Community \vas covered by oil of which about 98% \'laS imported (sef.:l 
Table 6). Almost 95 % of this oil came from the Middle East and frc•ra 
Africa : Table 6 shows clearly the dependence of the energy requirements 
of the Community on the countries in these regions of the \vorld. 
Oil supplies of the European Economic Community 
-·· 
Oriein of 
1970 1971 1972 
~ 
1973 197 4 
·-cr--· 
crude oil 70 ~.J I!J.jt 
cl 
M/t III/t 1~/t N/t ;o total total total total 
jO 
total 
·--· 
Production of 
the Community 13 2.4 12 2.2 11 1.9 11 1.8 10 
Imports from 
the Near and 265 49·9 321 58.5 360 63.0 421 6'{.8 415 Middle East 71·4 
Africa 219 41.3 183 33.3 170 29.8 161 25.9 137 23.6 
Rest of the 
world 34 6.4 33 6.0 30 5·3 28 4·5 19 
Total imports 518 97.6 537 97.8 560 98.1 610 98.2 571 
- 100.0 157111~0.0-'rOT..AJJ supplies 531 100.0 549 621 100.0 581 
"("'.A+B) 
Source : Bulletin of Energy Statistics EUROSTAT, Luxembourg. 
The countries vlho, in 1973 depended least on oil for their 
energy requirements, uere the Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
where, in both cases, dependence on oil was below 50 %: in the case 
of the Netherlands this is attributable to their resources 
of natural gas which has been extensively developed as an alternative 
fuel whilst the economy of the United Kingdom is strongly and 
traditionally related to coal. The countries most dependent on oil 
were Italy, Ireland and Denmark : in the first two cases 75 % and in 
the third case almost 90 % of the domestic consumption of pl'ime 
energy was satisfied by oil (see Table 7). 
.. 
Domestic consunption of primary energy in the European Economic Community - 1973 
I Hard coal I Lignite 
Country I 11 I % 1vi ,. 1b tee tec_l total total 
. Germa.."lY 85 30,5 34 89,5 
France 40 14,3 1 2,6 
Italy 11 3,9 1 2,6 
netherlands 4 1,4 0 0 
Belgium · 17 6,1 0 0 
Luxemt>Ju.:.:·g 3 1,1 0 0 
Uni"ted Kingdom 115 41,2 - -
Ireland 1 0,4 2 5,3 I 
Denmark I I l 0 3 1,1 ! 0 I 
·-
Community Totc.l 279 1100,0 
M =Million 
tee = tonnes equivalent of coal 
I Crude oil 
I r.1 
1 tee l 209 
I 
177 
136 
42 
39' 
2 
155 
l 8 
l 25 l 
% I total 
I 
I 26,4 
I 22,3 
I 17;2 5,3 
I 
! 4,9 
I 
0,2 
19,5 
1,0 I 
~ 3,2 
hoo,o 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I· 
I 
I 
I 
Natural gas l Other fuels 
III '/o l I-i ' 'fC I teo 1 tota~ .I tee I tote.l 
I ·- ... , I 39 23,2 
-
1 1100,0 I 
20 11,9 0 0 
21 12,5 0 0 
41 24,4 - -
10 6,0 0 0 
0 I 0 0 0 
37 
I 
22,0 
- -
- - - -I 
- -
' 
- l -
I 
168 J.00 1 0 1 100,0 
.Table 7 
Primary 
e1ectrioi ty 
l-1 I % tee total 
12 20,7 
19 32,8 
14 24,1 
0 0 
0 0 
1 1,7 
12 20,7 
0 I 0 
0 I 0 
The difference::: b::ltween the dc.ta in Table 5 for 1973 ancl. the data set forth in Table 7 as the "Communit,v total!' 
arises from tlo3 roundinG off of the ficures. 
Sou.rco :' Bulletin of Energy Statistics : EUROSTAT - Luxembourg. 
t 
t 
Total I 
' consumption 
1 
lv! I tot~l teo 
I 
I 380 28,4 
257 19r2 
183 13,7 
87 6,5 
I 66 4,9 
I 6 0,5 I 319 23,9 I 11 0:8 
28 I I 
-
100,0 
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2. The events in l~Jl 
Du.ring 1973 there gradually developed a market situation 
which was particularly favourable to seller:::. This \vas due to events 
which influcncecl both tho dcma..'1d and the supply of oil. 
During this year, tbc total Norld needs had increased b~r some 
8 % Hhich \·/as more rapid tha.'1 had. been envisaged : in Japan and in the 
United States the increase Has 15 % and. 4.5 % renp~ctivoly. Jl'aced 
1-rith a serious shortage in do:nestic resom·corJ 7 the natj_onal p:rorluction 
having decreased slightly, and \'lith inad.quate refining capacity, the 
GovernL'lent of the United States authorized an :inm·ca:::.e in imports of 
C!".;.dc oil and rc:fir;ed prod1.w·~s. 'l'hus the United St a.t.f~s for· tho first 
time becaJJie a11 important buyer of crude oil from the 1.ricl.dle East and 
Africa. _As a. cor,sequencc of the restrictions impoGQd by the U. f.l. 
legislation concerning environmental p!·otcction, this e:;.:tra. dc,;-!<:::nd was 
concentrated eJ.most exclusivDly on th-2 m<:·.rket of crudE: oil fr·o,n Africa 
which has a lm.; sulphur content (Alr;eri2n, Li'oyan a11d Nic;erian oil) as 
well as that of J:ight products and middle distillates. 
These productr.1 had lJoen purcha.Bod. by the United Staten p<lrl.ly 
from Europe a11d this fact, together l·;ith a brisk domestic clct·w.nc1 1 d.id 
not fail to cause prcs::m.re on the marl:ets for petrol and ;-as on, 
pa...'l"iicu.larly durh:g the first three months of 1973. r'or tho ulJOlc year, 
the total demand for oil products in the Community of nine incrc;:,sed 
by ab:mt 6 %, the demand i'or cas oil exceeding by 12% that of 1972. 
All tbese events influencing dcrnnnd carne about at a. moment 
t-rhen the supply situation on the uorld market Has relativeJ.y HC:.aJ:. 
This l·:as a.ttri1mtable to several reasons. Firstly, certain producer 
countries, particularly Kt<·.;c.·.it, Li-bya, Nigeria, and Ba}:.rain had reduced 
their production for technical rea.Gons or \'lith the aim of conserving 
their resources, Thus despite tho production effort of Saudi Aral)ia 
and Iran, the resuLting increase in supply 1·taS not entirely a.l,J.e to 
cover the increase in the demand for oil. 
'fhere Here, in addition)l.•arion::.: factors of a, technical and 
economic character Hhich had the comwqucnce of delaying the cl.evelopr·'.ent 
oi' thG capacity of production ind d1 rot ).ons and port f«cHit :i.es for the 
·transport and loadi::l[:; o.:' cru<le oil in certain p:.·o<lc;csr COl~ntY":i.or:. 
These delays Ncre partly due to delays in manuf2.ct ure and del ivcry 
of material for exploitation and, on thA other hand, to the post-
ponement by the oil companies of cort~d!l inventments because of the 
J:> d t · · · h l1acl "'~:ist ed uncertainty concerning conditions OJ pro uc 1011 Hfll.C = 
I 
.. 
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The close balance behreen supply and demand reached its 
crisis point at the tiroe of the vlar bet>ieen Israel and Arab 
countries of 6th to 16th October 1973. 
On 8th October, the oil compan.ies and the six oil producing 
countries of the Persian Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Km-rait 7 Abu 
Dhabi and Quatar) met in Vienna to revievr the r.reheran A::;reement on 
prices of Fobruar-.t 1971. Another meeting betHeen the producer 
countries of the Persian Gulf took place on 16th and 17th October 
in Kuvmit. They decided lmilaterally to fix neH price3 for crude oil 
which were 75 % higher than the previoul:l prices. At the sarue time 
they decided to reduce gradually, b~y 5 1~ each montn, tr,(:ir .p:.·ou.udion 
of crude oil until the Hithdra.v;al of Is:rael from the te1·ritories 
v-1hich j:t had occupied and,further,to put an em1Jargo on exports to 
countries which they considered to be enemies of the Arab cau.se, 
especially the United States, the Netherlands and Demna-rk. 
nd rd On 22 and 23 December, at a meeting in Teheran, the oil 
producing countries of the Persiar1 Gulf decided to increane their 
prices for .crude oil frOin 1st Ja,"luary 1974 by mo1·e than 10()7~. J~.t the 
same time, hovrever, they decided to relax from that date tboir 
restrictions on production but the <ombargo HhG to be maintahccrl :for 
a further two months. 
Thus as can be seen from the exa.rnple eiven in 11able 8, the 
average cost of access to one type of crude oil increased almosJv 
five-fold uithin the space of thr·ec Ronths. 
Table 8 
--
l'.£i9.£. _<~f . .:-A.r:_£_bian li.s:ht crlJde_sJ.}._from ]i..:;-~~-T~~~ 
(in ~ / barrel) 
1.1o~]" - ~6:-;0:73] ~i.::;T~2.C Price 
Posted price 3.01 5.12 n. 65 L~l. 65 
Average cost of 
access for the 2.01 3.39 9·34 9.51 producing 
companies 
-
" --
..,.. .. 
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3. I~mediate consequences of the oil crisis 
The events described above had serious repercussions on the 
national and international economic life of all the countries in the 
Community. The problems which arose concerned principally the availa-
bility of supplies and price levels, nnd it became necessary to adjust 
energy policies to the changes in these t1vo factors. 
The supply conditions had been disturbed for several months 
before the end of the i'lar of October 1973 and the security of supplies 
cf certain countries of the Community \vas very uncertain. All countries, 
'very quickly after October 1973, took measures aimed at 5-uaranteeing 
security of 'i;hoir supplies: these measures included export contr·ols of 
oil products, setting up of stocks, prohibition on the driving .of 
motorcars on Sundays, petrol rationing, v1hich viaS introduced briefly 
in the Netherlands, and bilateral agreements \·lith producer countries. 
Prom the start, the crisis ha.s been regarded essentially as a 
problem of shorta.ce of oil, but as the grounds for fear in this direction 
m:n.·c reduced:~ the problem of price3 7 Hith all its financin.l and economic 
consequence[:>, came to tho forefront. 
In fact the supply difficulties reduced, particularly after 
Deccnber 1973, •-!hilot prices incre<:J,sed in a F:pec-tacular i·w;~. In the 
spa.ce of a feH months, petrol quotations on the Rotterdam market had 
more tha~ doubled, -~hose of gas oil had increased by t1-ro and. a. half times 
an<l those of industri<Jl fuels had increased more than six-fold (see r:l'able 9). 
'l1he domestic prices for oil products did not increase at 
the same pace particularly as they >·;ere closely controlled by the 
Governments in most of the member countries.. In fact, the cost of crude 
oH contributen only partly ~o these domestic prices which are com!josed 
a1co of costs of refining, of trru1::>po!'t, of dintribut ion a~1d, for some 
products, pCtrticularly of indirect taxes on co::1sumption. 
Nevertheless,these prices Here increased severa1 times, 
although at different dates, in the various countries of the Community, 
in order to take account of the increases in costs of Cl~lde oil 
(sec Table 10). 
.. 
'!'able 9 
Q'JOTA'l'IO!S FOR OIL PRODUCTS AT ROTTERD.A!o! (a) 
Feb. Aug. :::lee. April Dec. Dec. April June Aug. Oct. Dec. Feb. June Products 1970 1970 1970 1971 1971 1972 1973 1973 1973 1973 1973 1974 1974 
Normal petrol 23,90- 31,75- 31,00- 34,25- 32,50- 47,75- 74,00- no,oo- 8o,oo- 100,oo- 170,00- 145,00- 153,00 
91 - 92 ffi·l 24,75 32,25 32,25 35,00 33,00 51,00 77,50 117,50 85,00 114,00 190,00 155,00 158,00 
Super petrol 18,25- 26,50- 22,50.. 26,oo- 23,00- 41,75- 64,00- 98,oo- 72,00- 98,oo- 160,oo- 140,00.. 143,00 
93- 99 fu'Vl 19,00 28,00 23,00 27,00 23,50 43,00 69,00 106,00 76,00 103,00 180,00 150,00 148,00 
Diesel oil 20,00- 29,50- 33,00- 30.0().. 27,00- 35,00- 44,00- 65,00- 68,25- 130,00- 165,00- 97,00- 87,50 
20,50 30,50 34,50 30,50 28,25 36,75 46,00 69,00 71,00 140,00 180,00 103,50 91,00 
Heavy fuel oil 
S : 1 %max. 12,25- 25,00- 24,00 22,50 13,50 22,25 24,50 29,25 21,75 33,00 140,00 76,00 67,50 
12,50 27,00 
s r 3,5 % max. 12,75-- 24,50..1 22,75 21,50 12,25 15,25 15,50 18,75 16,25 25,00 130,00 70,00 64,00 
13,00 26,00 
U!1ker C ( extra-hc:avy 
fuel oil) 22,75- 21,50- 12,25- 15,25- 15,50- 18,75- 16,25- 25,00- 130,00- 70,0().. 64,00 
24,00 23,00 13,25 16,00 16,25 20,00 17,50 27,00 140,00 80,00 .. 67 ,oo 
(a) Platt's quotations for cargoes F.O.B. Rotterdam 
Table 10 a 
Domestic prices for certain oil products - taxes included 
in % per m3 
Products Germa.ny France Italy :~ether lands Belgium Luxembourg Pni~t;!d .., Ireland Denmark 
,,~r:.c,-.. ... om 
.. ' 
lu:>er Eetrol 
i 
1.8.73 319,7-363,1 . 309,8 280,1 321,7 326,0 261,4 194,6 '206,8 396,0-396,0 ' 
~3.11.73 217,4-320,4 298,4 306,0 302,9 296,3 239,5 184,4 201,5 385,4-374,2 
30·4· 74 375,3-399,8 359,7 409,9 379,4 354,0 293,2 245,8 268,7 373,6-373,6 
[or:ncl Eetrol 
1.8.73 289,2-337,0 285,0 262,8 310,8 309,3 249,6 183,4 192,8 383,5-381,0 
?3.11.73 251,0-294,0 276,3 289,5 292,8 292,8 229,2 174,1 188,6 371,9-360,6 
~0 .. 4. 74 346,7-367,2 330,9 389,4 368,6 338,6 281,9 235,9 258,0 363,4-363,4 
)ie::;el oil 
1.8.73 I 299,6-325,7 198,0 138,3 161,3 171,2 113,7 182,4 155,2 129,5-129,5 ~3.11.73 I 260,0-290,2 191,2 157,1 172,0 165,3 113,1 178,3 150,7 160,0-128,5 18.4.74 354,9-366,3 213,8 212,8 208,7 215,2 155,9 240,7 213,5 140,9-164,7 
)o:nestic fuel 
1~8.73 73,9- 78,3 71,9 32,8 82,2 86,2- 81,6 75,3 54,9 43,7 94,6- 94,6 
~3.ll. 73 64,2- 67,9 80,4 30~9 98,0 90,1- 86,1 86,3 91,7 41,7 135,2- 96,9 
~0.4.74 126,6-130,7 108,9 71,6 123,9 105r7-l01,5 86,6 
; 
95,3 
I 
90,9 137,5-137,5 
I~avy fuel oil,hie: I ! I mlphur content I 
1~8.73 45,7 43,1 23,9 30,9 I 38,2 50,1 49,8 39,4 60,3-n.q. * ~3~11. 73 39,6 35,7 22,8 3?.,1 41,4 50,9 46,3 37,7 64,9-n.q. )~,4o74 71,6-79,6 63,6 I 55,2 65,7 90!8 53,8 85,6 81,2 108,3-n.q. 
' 
~xch8-~r~e rate 1 ~,= Dr>i FF I Lin'. Fl. BF BF :b :b Kr 24,7.73 2,30 4,04 ! 578,4 2,55 34,82 34,82. 0:394 I 
0,394 4,02 
27, ll., 73 2,65 4,52 604r6 I 2, 715 39,62 I 39,62 0,427 O,lj.27 4,44 I I I I I \0.4~ 74 I 2,45 4,87 ' G34 1 l:~ 2158 I 37,43 37,43 0,411 0,411 5,89 ~ I I _i I I 
~n~ qc ~ not quoted on a public c.xchDn[:''J• 
Tableau 10 b 
Docestic prices for certcin oil products - exclusive of taxes 
in¢ per m3 
~ermany Netherlands! United Ireland I Dcm.11ark Products France Italy Belgium Luxembourg Kingdom I . I 
I I ~e?" petrol 1.8.73 96,7-135,8 97,9 72,4 112,1 93,9 95,3 69,0 77,9 I 139,9 
3.11.73 83,9-122,6 105,8 81,4 108,4 90,8 93,1 68,5 81,9 1150,0-140,3 
0.4..74 :158,5-18016 165,6 183,0 148,8 130,4 136,3 125,4 140,6 I 111,4 
?rma.l es~.e.n,c-2. I ! 
1..3.'{3 l 69,2-112,3 86,0 62,9 102,7 79,8 84,1 57,8 64,8 !129,0-126,9 
).11.73 60,0-98,8 95,2 73,1 99,7 87,9 83,3 58,2 69,8 jl38,3-128,5 
0.4.?4 132,8-151,2 148,7 170,9 139,5 117,3 125,5 115,5 130,6 168,5 
l0s8l oil ·- I .. 
l.~. 73 89,7-113,2 I I 74,5 49,4 88,9 71,9 75,3 56,8 46,4 112,6 1 3.11.73 77,8-105,0 78,7 58,3 104,3 75,7 78,7 62,4 49,8 1_39,1-111,7 I 
0.4.74 150,5-160,8 103,9 111,8 135,3 114,3 117,8 120,3 105,1 
·1122' 5-143,2 
2_rr.e~!Jc fu!l.l I I 
1.8. 73 62,9-66,9 56,6 24,3 66,3 62,7-58,7 60,8 49,3 40,9 1 82,3 I I I 3.1l. 73 . 54,7-58,0 64,4 26,9 82,4 67,7-64,2 72,6 86,5 39,1 117,6-84,3 I 0.4.74 ;110,6-114,3 88,8 63,3 106,5 80,7-77,0 72,3 89,9 85,1 119,6 
\ 
eavy fuel_ oi1 1!1ic;;1 
J.lphur content 
l } .• 8. 73 35,3 36,6 zo,o 29,2 30,9 45,1 44,2 36,9 52,4 
3.11. 73 30,5 30,3 I 19,1 30,4 34,0 46,2 41,1 35,3 56,4 I 0.4.74 64,3-66,1 54,1 48,1 62,7 77,2 48,8 80,2 76,1 94,2 
e.c::1e exch~.nge ro.-!;es l 
s are sot fort!'l in l ·able 10 a. I 
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The considerable rise in price of crude oil contributed 
at the same time to price increases in the various sectors of activity 
throu[;hout the oil industry and accelerated the rate of inflation v:hich 
was already raging in several countries. 
The additional charges which had to be borne in order to have 
access to the same quantities of crude oil as before, had as an immediate 
consequence, an increase in the external debts of several countries of 
:the Community. 
In order to face up to all these problems w-;hich arose from 
the oil crisis, the Gover-mnents of member states of the Community brought 
into operation certain defensive measures \'lhich had an influence on the 
operation and unity of the common market. 
,• 
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4• Rea.cttons of the Commission 
Since the start of the oil crisis the Commission of the 
European Communities had taken several 'initiatives which 11rere aimed 
at resolving,~& a Community level, problems which confronted member 
states. 
At the end of their conference which took ple.ce in Copenhagen 
th th 
on 14 and 15 December 1973, the Heads of State or of Gove~mnent 
asked the Commission to put forward propositions 11 aimed at resolving, 
in a concerted manner, the problems arising from the development of the 
present energy crisis 11 and to provide "arrangements 'I'Jhich will ensure 
that all member states take, on a collective and equitable basis, 
measures aimed at reducing the consumption of energy "• 
On 16th January 1974 tho Commi!3sion communicated to the 
Council six propositions in respect of measures which might be taken in 
the Community because of the oil crisis. These propositions envisaged 
simulta~eous action on transactions in oil products between member states 
and tlith other countries, on the prices of these productD, and on 
measures which were aimed at reducing energy consumption, by such means 
as would maintain, by com:non action as a Cormnunity, the smooth opo~ration 
of the common market. 
In its communication to the Council,the Co1mnission said that 
exchanges of oil products within the Co~nunity would have to be 
undertaken with due respect for the principle of free circulation of 
goods and that procedures uere envisaged. \vhich \tould allo\t remedies 
to be applied in nny cases of difficulties which micht arise in 
member states. It further proposed that abnormal exports to third 
countries which might jeopardize the availability of supplies to the 
Community should be avoided. The attainment of these objectives 
depended on a ready access to precise and homogenous information on 
intra-Community exchanges and on exports to third countries. They also 
called for frequent consultations between member states and the Commission 
in order to agree on possible commercial measures. 
The Commission further proposed to the Council a temporary 
Comm~~ity system for the supervision of prices of oil products and 
subsequently a recommendation of the Council 11a.s addressed to member 
states on the subject of the mz.intena.nce a..11d ho.rmoniza.tion of voh~.:1tary 
measures for the reduction of energy consumption in the Community. 
Since tbese measures Here aimed at facing up to a crisis 
situ.a,tion,the Commission hoped that its propositions might be adopted 
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by the Council for application up to 30th June 1974. In fact 
the crisis had receded somevthat by the beginning of 197 4 and 
the CoQDCil never pronounced on these propositions by the 
Commission. 
The reactions by the Commission to the onset of the 
oil crisis were justified by the outbreak of the war in the 
Middle East and the measures decided upon by the member countries 
of OPEC. It was, at that time, impossible to foresee future 
developmeuts and it would have been improvident not to take a 
serious view of the possibility of a crisis of long duration. 
rrhe impression may perhaps be gained from this report 
that the effects of the crisis on supplies to the Community 
were not particularly severe. Such a conclusion is possible nov1 7 
several months aftervmrds. It nevertheless remains true that 
the end of 1973 and the beginning of 1974 11as regarded by the 
Community, member states, oil companies and consumers as a 
period of crisis ai1d attitudes and measures then taken v:ere 
conditioned by the desire to be prepared for a possible long 
duration. 
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' P A R T III 
Close relationships existed in 
all co-:mtries in the CommunHy bettveen the oil companies and pu.blic 
authorities. During the oil crisis such links beca!lle more e::r.ten~ive, 
particularly in Beleium, the :netherlands, France and. Italy. Sometimes tbe 
relationships are based on laus or regulations such as in Italy and Fra'1ce; 
in other instances the relationship is on a de facto basis. 
Section A below analyses the (;Cnoral relationship beh;een 
the oil 'companies and the nat.i..onal authorities. Section B describes the 
relationship \vhich existed beh;een the oil companies and nation(),l governncnts 
in resp~ct of the resolution of certain specific problems uhich c.:.r·oses~lJ.cll as that 
concerninG the maintenance of tmpplies to certain cl.c:..sses of consu.'liers al1d 
indep<~hitents clurinc the oil crisis. Sect ion C (l_e(),ls with !:J.grecmcn-~s concern inc 
supplir:.>s to certain- national enterprises. 
A. G~:El1AL RELATIWSHIPS B::.::'ri·YS:J.<.:N OIL COJ.il'A1HES AND TJATIONAL AUTHOHITIES 
DliEliKG THS OIL CliiSIS 
---··· -----·----.. ----------~-- ... -.. __ ..... __ _ 
In pursun.nce of a Co~vention elated 12th 1•1<:ty 196~ ,a co:mnittec 
of control Co:nH8 du controle d'elec-~ricit6 ct du ~az ··was establiHllccl in 
Belgium Hith responsibilities fol' submittinG' recomrt1r:ndt:!.tion::; to the Govel'il:ae<"Lt 
in respect of tariffs and distribution arrt>.nt;enents for gas and electricity. 
Before the crisis 1 no such o.rrangemenk existed in respect of oil. 
How::ver there existed. o. Comntlt(),tive Corr.r.n:i.ttce for oil cre(),ted l'Y Hoyal Decree 
of 27th September 1972. At the beginning of November 1973 a furt.her lini.2on 
co~'llittee was created but not as the result of any locislo.tion or specific 
regulation. The president of the cow:mittoe '1-ras the !·:inister of Economic Affairs znC:_ 
members ;mre dra'tm from various ministries t>Tith a.ssociated interests and the oil 
companies. This liaison conunittee '1-:as cUvidecl into thr·ee specialised ncctions 
dealinG respectively with : 
-gas oil, light heatine oil and petrol 
- residual fuels 
- liquid petroleum gas • 
The activities of the liaiGon e>ow:rd_ttee owe rlse to tr.e pul:.lica.tion 
by thr.:: ? =ini:.; ter of a nu:nbcr of direct i vee concc:.'rlin:; ,tor cxc.r.~plc ,reqais it. iv1~ 
proced\l.res and tho maintenance of supplies to independents. 
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But the oil crinis had emphas:izP.d the necessity of a more perma::wnt relationYLip 
betHecr: t~e Government <Uld the oil comp:::.nies. 'I'here <las accordincly crea·~cd 
by ro;ys.1 decree on tho 8th April 1974 1-Lllc; Conite do Concertation ct de Contr01c 
(Offic:i&l Gc:.zettc of the 10th April 197~ ). '!.'he Cowmittce had. as its prime 
purpose the exploration of solutions to problerns concerning the production, t~,c 
supply, iElport, distribution, tra:nsrort, storage, me"rketing and co:::ts of oil and 
of oil products. The Committee i>as ewpoiwrecl to d~al with the problem of 
formulc_-tinc; prices for oil products. 
r.:err.b{·.r;-o.hip of the Cornmittec ;;[~r:; c1raHn from three sources -orgmlizations 
\•rith a ''supervi:'~ory' role (tru.CI.e union::; and. professional associutions), 
organiz-s.tions to be SLlperviscd (refininc and distribu.ti11g companir]s) and pul)lic 
author:. ties. 
Price structure O.ifficu.Uies E'.:,rc cwrtod out by the 1plannint; 
agree!Jle>lt' signed (m 24th July 1974 by th:-J liini<:tcr of Economic Al'fai.rs ar1d 'tho 
Belgi<:m. Oil FeoeJ'Gtion 1 which set up a procedux·e for establishing cale prices. 
(b) 
The relationship b.:::t<:cen the oi.l comp::.n:i.€G an:l the [;Ov.:;rnment has 
to 1950, Shell vld.B the only refining coupc•.n;>· OJ)(orc."oillE in Holland. The 
subsc<qt;.cj:rt cs tablisl11~c;n-G of nev< rr~finer:i ca Dc•Dnt thCJ,t th.:; :Minister for Econowic 
Affairs. ~vas oblig<ecl to contact each of tbc oil cowpani.eD conce!'fwd >:hen he v;id12d 
to disc·:Jss probler.w <:,ffecth!g the oil indudry in HolJ.2.nu as a whole. 
to sir.q:-1 :i.fy these cont~cts, tbe Olio Gonk.ct. Con::n:i.ssie (o.c.c.) Has es·t:Jbli~~hcd 
a,cout 1950 at the invitation of the govcrw::el\·l,. The chairr:wn of the o.c.c. hnve 
aluays been forr.1er director:J of Shell. J\.J 1 the cot.'1pc;JlieG 'tih:i.ch tmaertske 
rcfinin£ in IIollC1!1d are represcnt,_:d on thd o.c.c. 7 th<d, is Shell, E::;so, DP 1 
Chevron r 'l'eYaco I l~obil, Gulf I Compu.enie franga.iso acs pet roles and Petrof'ina 
-v:hich LireG refiner;y capacity. One of the f1.P1<:tions of the O.C.C. is to suuuit 
to the J.:inistEJr of Economic Affairs joint pr·opositions in respect of the 
calculc:::tion of maximum prices. 
During the oil crioir> the mernlhJl'!; of tho O.C.C. in a,grE'ement ;-;i-t...h ·Vre 
organiz.<:<.~J ions for eommercial retailers of oil products, proposed r.::inirr.ura profH 
margim.: for deliveri(;G of o:i.l prod.ucts t'!:rnl.l[.;h th'" RijkslJur(::nu, 1·1hor,;e func-~ion i£. 
opposec}. by the independent oil companies o.1 t'H:: basis tbut they did not p~·rr.1it 
these cor:~pc:,nies to co\rcr their costs of C:i~~tribution. Durinc; the oil crisis the 
.. 
.. 
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companies \>ho \vere members of the O.c.c. cooperated with the Rijksbureau for 
the establishment a.'1d maintenance of 'pools' of oil products v;hich were intendec1 
to provide suppl ics to consto..'!lers and in0epcmlcnt. companies who found theraf3<3l 'Je3 
in particular diffictllties throuc;h the shortage of oil products • 
(c) France 
The French oil industry is rec,'lllated by the La>;-; of 1928. This laH 
orea.nizes tho oil industry a11d casts tho public authorities in the role of 
g-tlardian of the oil companies. This undoubtedly k1.d the effect of creating a 
strong state interest in the oil sector reprec(.!n".;ecl by C .F. P. and Elf Erap but it 
also gaVe rif:c to a cituc.tion fa.voarablo to concsdations behwen oil co:-up::mics. 
'llithout describing in det~cil the Frer"ch lct;iolation, mention wa;y be mao.e of the 
main principlcG toge-~her 1<.rith some inr1]catlon of ho~: this legic:1ation he-,::_; 
influenced the behaviour of the French oil comrxmi.cs during the oil oris is. 
The successive lm·IS ar.d government clecrees a.ffecting the oil 
industry dealt \'lith such n:atters as the ii'lport of crude oil, the Cl.i:stri1::.lction of 
refined products, the eata1Jlish:nent of prices at 1.1oth the refinery an1 o.istribution 
level, the definition of oil products and the contl·ol of quml~ities marle availc.,ble 
for sale on the French m:1rket. Oil co:nyo.nics :i.n rrrtnce participated to sorr.e 
extent in the operation of a state monopol;y 1 a function v1bich hnrl been assic;;1cd to 
them by the Lc:.'.~ of 1928. In effect, the provis:i.onn of the vc,rious lav;::; nnd 
decrees envisage that the right to htp8rt cr-ude oil v<ill be roservcd cxclu,3iYel~· 
to certain named co:np::wies J:Jlw have been granted u1 authori:,;<:::tion \:Ilich is valid 
in principle for ten years. Similarly the ri.e,ht to in!port a.~1d distribut8 
refined products dep:mds on the granL of on a:u.thori~;dion Nhich is valid. for three 
time no limits are fixed in respect of other oil products. 
de Raffinaee, which is a su1.s idiary of the Co:;;pa£'!"lj c Fra.I19ai s.:- c1 cs Petrolcs 1 als c. 
enjoys a special a.uthoriBation for it to distribute anuuall;y 25% of th::o oil 
products intended for domestic COl~GUl:Gptiou Dni to import cor-rGnponrl:Lne; q'J.<.:Ll1tHics 
of crude oil. 
These arrangements had the effect of inducing certain concerted 
practices which Hent beyond the limits envisaged by the legislators. 
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the French national authori tics established· the fact that a syste;a of 
distribu.tion quotas had existed over t1•10 periods, 1960 to 1962 e.nd. 19G8 to ] 9:'19. 
Attempts by the oil companies to increase prices by conccr·~ed action,hov;ever,·,·:ere 
rare durint:; these periods. Such concerted practices concerned sales of ft:.el 
oil to municipal cstalllishments and on the vlholesale market for fuel oils ?.nO. 
petrels. 'l'hcse enquiries,;.;hich covered the v;hole of Frnnce71·;ere the subject of 
an opinion expressed ty the Committee on Cartels and Do:-uinant Positions , 
(Bulletin Officiel des Services de Prix dated 18th April 1973). 
In this ~pinion the French authoL'i ties recor,nh.ed that tho La1-1 of 1928 had 
of necessity given rise to a certain concer-t.ation in the field of distriht,tion of 
oil products. The Committee stresscd,hOi\ever,tha.t t};e restrictive practice:; 
which had bnen detected ha.d gone far beyond the extent necessc:-.ry for the prop(<r 
application of the eovcrnrncnt regulation. That Con111li tt(oe also reconunended that 
no legal ac-tion should bo taken before lst Oc-t::>ber 1973, on condition that by 
that date the public authorities and the oil industry \·JOuld have defined the field 
and the extent to which concerted practices Here admissible in the sector of oil 
products. 
Because of the action token by the French ;mthorities, the Comr.d.csion 
did not deer.:~ it appropriate to introduce formnl proce<lurcc under Ar-L icleG 85 a'tcl 86 
of the Treaty of }"'tome in respect of the concerted pr<:.cticcs r;hich hc...cl been brou.ght 
to light by the report of tho Com.:nittee on Cartolo and Do:.'linant Fo::;Hions. 
To;-;ards the end of 1973, a protocol 1\<18 dr~.\m up by the public 
authoritieB and signed by the oil companies and the trade organizc::timls. Thif; 
pt·otocol and. its ratification by the signatoric·s \Vas publiched on 20th E'eb:r·w,.r;y 197~. 
The object of the protocol was to define tbc co:ornercial practices 1Jllich 1-Jcro 
aumi::;sible in the light of the rule:G of competition under French la>·:. 
So far as the concer·ted practic~;S of a reeional nature o.re concerned, 
in particular those involving the municipal markets in the rec;ion of J:.rarseill·~s 
and Hhich ;-:ere the subject of legal action cor.:.r,1cnced by the French judiciary at 
the ber;inning of 1973, their essentially local character places ther.1 outside the 
criteria for the application of the Treaty of Rome. 
•. 
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{d) United Kingdom 
When it became clear in October 1973 that the production of cru.Jc 
oil would be affected by the Israel-Arab conflict, the Department of 'l'ra.de and 
Industry in the United Kingdom set up an Oil Emergency Group 't-1hich v1a.s charged 
with coordinating government action. At the srune time, the Oil Industry 
Emergency Committee (O.I.E.C.) m1s convened under emergency arrangements for 
dealing with .supply difficulties. I'Iembership of the O.I.E.C. consisted of 
represe11tc>.tives of the principal oil refining and markGting companies in the 
United Kinsdom: several subcommittees \vere formed to deal v-1ith special topics. 
such as marketing, retail supplies and statistics. Ii'ollowing the introduction 
of the Fuel and Electricity (Control) Act 1?73, directions were issued'in 
November 1973 to all companies requirin& them to reduce (leliveries to customers 
of' the main oil products to 90% of the level of deliveries in tbe prcvio:t~ y2ar. 
/ 
The plan for the reorc;anization of the Itc.:.lian oil industry \·;a:-; 
adopted by the Inter~Qinistry Committee of Economic Planning (C.I.P.E.) soRe 
time before the commencement of the oil crisis. Its aims v1ere: 
-· to give a. definad status to the State cornpo.ni~s c:.nd especially to 
Ente Uazionale de Idrocarburi (ENI) and it::; subsidiary; Azicncla Generale 
Italiano. Petroli (AGIP); and 
-to ma.inta.in conditions of competition between a larec n'll.L'lber of enterprise:::. 
The crisis and th0 variow:: national regulnt:i.ons which I:~aintai:r,zd 
maximum prices belovt international levels accelerated the process envisa.t;eU. 
by the plan of reoreaniza.tion and modified extensively the structure of the 
Italian oil industry. Shell Italiana and B.P. Italiana left the market, the 
former being purchased completely by A.G.I.P. and the latter by the I!tonti C.roup. 
The outcome v1as a reinforcement of the influence of the State on the Ite,lian oil 
industry but this was achieved at the cost of heavy losses which vzere suffered 
during the crisis by A.G.I.P. 
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T'.ne neN plan for the reorganization of the oil sector provided for 
the introduction of import quotas for crude oil and a.n incrcaGe of the quantity 
authorized for A. G. I.P. It also envisaged the development of a 
fleet of ·LarJ:crs of E.N.I. u11der the Italian flac. It further cnvisacecl tho 
development of all the oi.l activities of A.G.I.P. and eventually the cxt.e:nBion 
of st<>.te col·ltrcl to the l;hole of the sector concerned. with the distribution of 
oil pro(luct.t .• The devclopr:~cnt of A.G.I.P. in the various fields \vas COJ:J.:::>) der2.cl 
I 
by the State as necessary to ensure the adeque..cy of supplies for the nv.tio:.:Jal 
market. To effect thiB, the plan envisaged an extension of the activities of 
E.liT .I. in the r:;::ctor of th0. procluction of crude oil ei thor by an intens.if:Lcation 
of exploratio:'t activities or by thE, concJ:u.3ion of InNUum and. long-term ft'..tl'Ch::J.sing 
contracts within the frr>J:J.e>:ork of exchanges 1 of 1 inks and of contracts for 
cooperation a.ncl ind'ltstrial assh;t~nce Hith oil producing countries. 
So far as refining is co::"ce::-ned, the part played by international 
oil companie~; H:.-:.s already e::-:.~rer:.el;y- lim:i:ced. In 1974, 7W· of the authorized 
refining capacity Has alrccccJ~· covered by the follo-.Jin.:; cornpar.ieo : 
E.H.I. 20% 
:t.lonti Group 15.1% 
1Ior:teoiso:n 8. G% 
I:loratti 8. 3% 
Rovelli 4.1% 
Garronc -~-4 .p'f. --· 
79.2% 
It can be seen that E~;;so Hac ,and it rema~.nG, the only international 
company of sienificance in tho field of refinine. The ot'her intern.:::tiond 
cor.-::po.nie;_~ 1-:hich exist :i.n ItaJy reprc;:;cn"\, in total iw more than ll.S~; of the 
authori!3od cape,city. 
In conclusion, the oil criGiB modified -the oil policy in Ital,y. 
Befvre the cri~1is the activity of the I~.N'.I. Group constituted a comp~titive 
factor Hith thE: other international grOLl.:t>s established in the country. Since the 
eric is 7 
clc~rly oxtsn~cd. .:.~. ::., ~ $ ~1.~~; occ1~pl0v t}lc role or ~.1. supply age:ncy in r(:Gpect 
of crurle oil both :for its om1 refineries and for :non-intee.rated Italian groups 
v-1ho unC..ertakc .Process rcfini!l0• 
During the oil crisis the relationships behwen the Irish Goverr1ment 
and the oil industry in handling the oil supply shortage and economy :~easures 
Here p-:1rsued on a basis of close cooperation bet:·;cen the oil conp:mies and the 
I<linister for Transport and Po:1er. In addition, regula-tions go",rc:c~ning the 
maintenance of oil reserves >-rare made by the THnistcr. Under Irish legislation 
hOi'lever, the ihnister for TreJlSport and Po~·:er ca..YJ., in an emergency situation, 
control the activities of oil CO;:Jtpanies tf,rough the Puels (Control of Supplies) 
Act 1971. 
(g) 
In normal tirr.os, the clelivery of oil products by the oil indu;:;t:c;y t.o 
traders and consumers is not subject to nny form of let;iG lation but during tho oil 
crisis t1,ro mini3ter·ial decr·ees vrcre issued on 19th ani 27th 1Tove:nber 197 3. 
Both these decrees concerned cas oil, die:>el oil, bottled. gas ana fuel oil. 'l'he 
first of these decrees establish;;d tvm co:n::1ittecs: the first •..:as conce:cncd id-Gh 
the allocation of oil products behwen tx·adcrs and the secor:c~ v:as e::;;tablished 
by the J':1inister of Coramercc -as a ecneral suporvir..;ory body: the latter 1-ms ahw 
cmpov<ered to invcsticatic and act in re::>pect of cor.rplairrts receive<.! from co::-1sumer·s. 
The first decree also contained provisions concerning tho rq;:i.stration by 
suppliers of details of their tre,nsactions in oil prollucts. 
(h) Germany --·--~~ 
During ·~he crisis the Federal Gov0rn.rncnt did not find. it necef:-Sai.'.f 
to introduce any law or regulation concerning quantities and prices of oil 
products. 
The difficulties ••hich nevertheless arose in connectio11 vJith 
supplies i<ere solved tln·ouch close contacts bet\-mcn the public authorities 
and the oil compo.ni es • Enterprises in the oil sector, producers, importers 
and dealers \·1ere r8prcsented on supply com.1ni"ttees •·· 'Infl.ustry' and 'Inporters 
and intermediary dealers'. 
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Several arrangements resulted from this cooperation. For 
some oil products including petrol, industrial and a_ome:.stic fuels and 
naphtha, communication networks were set up by the oil companies to avoid 
disturbances of supply. A voluntary infornation system was established 
under whiC'.h the oil companies regularly informed the 1-Enistry for Economic 
Affairs of, in particular, imports of crude oil and oil productc, refining, 
sales,stocks and selling prices. 
In respect of the supply of diesel oil, priority was given to 
meeting the requirements of indu13try to avoid an adver;;;e effect on the 
employment situation. Supplies_ of light fuel oil to domestic con2:urnern m:rc 
limited to 75% of their normal concumption to induce con::;umGrs to mc>Jce the 
fullest use of their stocks. The oil c01npanies endeavoured to prevent their 
filling-stations from giving priority to regular custoners. 
In addition, voluntary limitation~ v:ere introduced on prices of 
certain products, including lieht fuel oil. 
( i) Luxer.illourg 
Almost all the oil prod_ucts to meet the rcquit·mnents of Luxembom·g hacl 
for a lo:ng time originated from refineries at AntHerp. In 1972 L-uxcm1)ourg 
began to receive soma products fro~ Gcrr.iany, particularly recidual fuel oils. 
The existence of a system of maximum prices for these products in Luxo:ml~ou.rt; 
caused difficulties for some independent corapenies \'~ho o1)tained_ suppl ie8 f'1·om 
Germany. 
Side by side Hith tho;:e rules and o,rrcmgor:1cnts dealinG pd.mc:rlly 
l·Ti th price lcvcln, all the Community cotmtries except Dcn,--n3.rk and Irolru~d 
introduced export licensing systcnm for oil products during the crisis • .Al thout;h 
these licences were theoretically granted viithout restrictions in time, at 
no cost and for uhatever quantity >.;as requested, the control facilities i·Jhich 
they pla.cecl in the hands of the J.rember States in fact inevitably tended to 
segregate the common market. 
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Hence during the crisis,all the member states equipped themselves 
l'Ti th the means to take action with varying degTees of compulsion. It is 
interesting to note that none of these measures really had any .influence on 
trade in overall terms. Greater quantities of products mieht h.:1ve been 
expected to flow mvay from markets Hi th lov.; controlled price::; to markets vlhere 
prices were higher or uncontrolled. But this did not huppen, and. e,lthough 
the ~igures shov1 that imports into Germany did swell in October and Uov8mber 
. 
1973, trade flows remained stable over the flix·-month cris:is period and Gcr~aany 
continued to import the came volumes (99.e% of the corresponding period. of 
the previom:; year) from the samo exporting countries (mainly the l~ethorlands ). 
B. SPECIAL ME.ASTJR~S Al:O PROJ3L:TI1,1S DrJOLVIHG OIL co:.IPJ~;IES A1ID GOVIffir:;}:EllTS _____ ., ... _ ..... __ ........ _____ ,___ ----- --·-·-,.-
DtJrtiNG THE C!UGIS 
·--..... --
In Belgiu.'ll anc\. in the Neth erla.ncln the governocnts asked the large 
oil companies to wake supplies available to consu.ruers \·Tho uere "Lmablc 
to obtain d.eliveries, such as il1depcndcnt cor.1pau:i.es lvho ~wre unn,blo to 
obtain oil proclucts on the national market or by iwportation. From 
the point of vieH of competition,these pools led to very close conto.cts 
betiveen the various compo.nies -.~ho \Jere members of the pools, 1-:i thout 
achieving a complete resolution of the supply problem~ of tho independent 
cor:~panies. 
notices 
The I.linisterial Decree of 6 november 1973 and subsequent 
provided that supplies should be rao.u.e available to incopsndcnt 
companies on the follo\dng basis: 
- 4-9 -
- independ-<:mt compa..nies who \·Jere regular customers should be supplied 
with a m.inimurn of 75% of their reference qi..W.J:ltitie~; 'that is ,the quantities 
which were delivered to them during the corresponding period in 1972; 
those cowpanies tvho had made occasional purchases (on a "npot" basic) 
should receive a minimum of so% of their reference quantities; 
oth"Br cu:-;to.11ers should be suppliC'd with a minimum of LiS;[, of their reference 
quantities. 
llovTever the interpretation of thee<;; provisio::1~~ Has left to tho 
discretion of the large compauic~J and they Hero irr.p1o>n:.mtccl by directives 
of the Liaison Committee of the l1eJ.gian Oil Federation. This Fedc:re,t ion 
set up a pool t-:ith a secret<U'iat Hhich bacl representatives of five of the 
large oil co:npanies: B.P., Texaco, Shell, I:sso and Cdpam (smrjcho-:ron). 
The pool had tvm main functions : 
- to supply independent importers i:ith up to 45% of t1le ql.:.antities they 
had required in the corresponditlg period of the pre\' ions ;year; 
to supply priority customers, nuch v.s horJpi-Laln a.:nd scbools. 
The pool then allocated bctuc•c.:'n He rn·?Htbc::-r;;.; those oro.ers uh ich 
the independents Here unable to n;eet. 'I'he rosul t •·:?.s, for a time, a typical 
sharing arr2-nt;ement of those marketr; 1\/hic:h the inrlep::.~ndenb hacl 1:·ccn forced 
to quit. 
In I-1arch and April 1974 ,the operc,tim-c of this pool l\Z.E~ be.cked. up l)y 
pmvers allovd.ng the aut110rities to requisition procudr.; no as to ucd certain 
very difficult situations facing the independents u.nd priority cu::dor:IJrs. 
AccordinG to information provided by th8 Belgian oil cor::.pccmies, cer-tain of 
these requisitions \·Tere carried out only to a~1 extent vo.rying l'et11ee:r" 15~ a.'1.c1 
.. 
... 
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Hollc.nd 
A state office, the Rijk.sbureau, ·uas set up in Hol1 a..YJ.d by a 
Ministerial Decision of 13th 1To'lember 1973, to organise the countr,y's 
supplies of oil products. The Hijksburcau consisted. of exparts, seconcl.:)d. 
froU~ oil companies opera-tint; refi~erics in Holland., nupportod b;J- admitd:-;;tro.tivo 
staff'. It h'aJJ es::;entinlly an executive boc1y. At the requc;st of the 
. 
]'.linister for Economic Affairs, it dre1-1 up a schc:me of rationinc; and orconiz:)d 
a po()l of oil pro<lucts, contributed by the oil compnnies, from 11hich supplies 
v:ere allocated to meet special demo.nds of consur.:8rs ar:.(l indepenc"1.E·nt · 
distributors. 'l'he activiticn of tho Rijksbureau ceased. on lst Ap:d.l 197 t,. 
•' 
b) Snooial probleu:s ro1atin0 to r;overnment. })rice CO'ltrols 
~.. ...-·- .. ------~-- .. ~-~~-,-----···~·- ... ------~,.,._..-
In certain colmtricf.:l, particularly 13elgiwn, the Hetherla;nc1s ancl 
Italy, one of the effects of the price levels of the various oil procluctc 
fixed by the government \':fas to provoke r.10vements of stocks of crude oil. 
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In the ~£1~~~~2~ a reduction in the production of heavy fuel 
by the refineries Has noticed, due to the consur.tption having dropped by 
considerable proportions in co1~1parison t-zith the prccoding year beca,'..l.ze natural 
gas uus being used as a substitute form of energy. 
The production of petrol increascd,although during the crisis the 
oonsu~nption of petrol on the nationc:l market also diminished by 15~ to 20~ 
in rct.;pcct of the reference months of tho precedinG year follotdng the Dutch 
authorities' rocorrcr.•endations on fuel ccono::~y. Despite the oil embargo 
' dircctei.l against the !Tetherla.r:.ds, a::> a result of pur'c:hascs of lighter oils ;:hich 
gave p, greater yield of petrol, the p:::·od.v.ction of petrol was rnaintaiueo. a.ncl,in 
fa.ct, the proportion of petrol exported. of the total product ion of petrol 
incrcv,sec1 froro 445~ in Jaim<:J,ry 1974 to 56/'{ in I:Iarch 19711· The fixing of do~cstic 
prices in the :i·~etherlancls for petrol a,t a level -y;hicl1 mi.S conzio.er<tbly loiH?r 
than the intorno,t'ional price therefore r;ave rise to a proportional incrons::; in 
the exports of petrol. 
In £.c.~G~~~ the introcl.uction of J,JD,XiL"lUL1 prices s:i.mila.rly influoncecl the 
behaviour of the oil corupanios, leadinG thorn to rer.ucc their stocks and their 
i~ports of cru~c oil. In fact, it is 2,ppur2nt from an anu.l;yr. is of the 
f:i.nancie.l effocts of tho crir:;is on one comp~ny in Bolcriu.m that 
the profits achieved l)y the e,1tcrprisa on the v:hole of its products atk.inud 
their hi.,:,;hest level during the fourth quarter of 1973, then tailed off until 
they disappeared cor:1pletcly and turned iu-to a deficit for fuclc and gas .:>Us 
fror:l t:he begir.ning of 197 4. 
A note from the Oil Federation dated 16 Ja."luary 1974 confirms that 
all the oil comp;:mios found thcmselvc::; in the come situation. At the SCUGG tir.1e 1 
refinery production reduced during the first quarter of 1974 in comparison 
with the corresponding qur.._rter of 197 3 by nbout 26% for petrol, 255~ for cas o:i 1 
a1•1d middle distillc-~tes and 27% for heavy fuel oil. 
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In Italy 1 according to d.a.-ta obtained from four companies, tr.e 
average mo!lthly prices for purchases of cru.cle oil c. :i .• f. W!;lre, l.Jci'or·e the 
start of the oil crisis, largely above the prices fixed by the CIP::i:: (-~11c 
InteN.linistry ConunH liec for Economic Plarming). 
Hoi-leVer, one must ta.."k:o into account the fad that bzcause cf the 
considerable capacities for stocks v--Ihich existed in Ita.l;y, the increa!>C in 
the r.ta::drGurt prices authorized by the CIFE in Ji'ebru.ar;y· 197 /f allo·,·rod the oil 
compc.;.nies to achieve conside.cable profits on the quanUtic:s hell:. in stock. 
Crude oil purcha.sE:d in Ho-.rember 1?7 3 at 23.255 lire por ~onne >JaB c.ccou..nted 
for on· the basis of the price of 45.000 lire es"liabli.shccl by the CIPE in 
Februar-.r 19711-. "These profits i·rcre,ho\·rcver, only tempor<Jr;y becauuc the costs 
of replacing the oil sold. had -to be taken in to Rccoud. T;-;o ir.ternnt iona.l 
enterprise:::: nba.nC..oned their activities en tho Italion ri.arkct - Shell Italiana 
ancl D.P. Italie ..na. The l·1oratti Group incree.sE:d its a.ctivi tics in the field 
of refining zcrviccs for export i:hc:r·e prices l:c:r.e froe. Horaovor,the pricco 
of naphtha, i·Jhich 11ere not subject to mo.xii~:U.'fl price control, increc:,sed. qu.i te 
considerably. The petro-cho:.nnical refincrj.oc, such us those of i'fi ... :mtol'iiGo:.-1, 
recovered tbe increase in price of crude oil on no.phttu. all(l petro-chemical 
ba8cs since they vrere not able to clo so on oil produc-Ls vJhich -v:erc subject to 
maximum price control. AGIP uhich1 by taking up the BP nctiwrk, ho.d incrcD.Becl 
its share of the market, sustained considerable looses dtle to its pa:rch::::.scc 
of crude oil at prices Hhich r1ere too hit;h, toking into accou.:nt the ma::dnu.r:1 
prices in Italy. 
,-53 
This control of prices influenced the structure of the oil 
industry in Italy by discouraging international groupin(i;s Hhich had 
partly given up their place to the ElJI Croup and had abandoued their 
refi:r..i1~g activitioz to Italian compc.nics offering refining services. 
T'11is problem 1vas studied in considerable detail in view of the 
questions w-rhich had been raised in the E'uropec-m Parliament in respect of 
. 
Belgium. The Commission supplemented its invest ~.ga.t ions on this aspect by 
sendi11g a detailed questionnaire to eight 13cleian oil companies i'ho 11erc 
carrying out re:fining in 13elt;ium in the period from the end of liovember 1972 
to the end of April 1974. 
•' 
Tbe Commission confirmed that the total stock::: of crucle oil 
increased up to 30th June 1973 and then thereu.ftcr uere reduced ur1iformly until 
30th .April 1974. Tho reduction in tho lcNel ol' stocks sho11ed r:;orr;e 
relation::hip Hith the increase ~.n the price of crud'; oil and HHh the mail;tonb:rw~ 
of the prices of oil products in J3e1t§:;ium at a lc\Tel loHer tLan the intcrn:1tional 
quotn.tions. 
An anc.l::ch:; of the rcleva.nt data of the eicht companic::; durin&; 
this period in respect of each of the fou.c occt:J.S ions l·:hc:n price incroac:;;:::o \Jere 
authorized by the Belgian Govornrnent, rcvec:.:.1eU. no r: i;nilarity of l:lovemcn ts 
in the stocks of crude oil boloncinc to tho v:o>.r'iOl.w companies -v;hich micht 
have led one to prcGDlne tho possibility of some COllccrtcd practice aimcc1. c:;\, 
gaining profit. from the incrcas e in maxir,n.un prices. 
A positive indication of the existe~ce of a concerted practice 
would have been a collective increase in th'3 stocks o:f crude oil in a.nticipo.tion 
of the increase in raaximu;·n prices of oil Pl'·)~lucts, m1:l tr.en a re(1uction in 
stocks v-rhen the increaoes in liiaximw'll prices had been approved. 
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In respect of tho price increase of 1st Ja.n•J.8XJ-' 1973 
this double movcm8nt is identifiable only in roGp8ct of h:o compa.nie;; out of 
the eight studied.. For tho incr;;D::>os l·:hich Foro put into effe9t on 1st June 
1973 and lst July 1973, this double movem:mt v;as prcse11t in respect of all 
.., eight cornp::mie:::; concct·ncd. For the price inc!'cc;,se of 15th November 1973, only 
c. 
one of the eight corupanien shoiJctl this double movement. For the incr2ase of 
1st April 197,~ tbis cloul)lc moVt;ntE:nt is noted. for· four companieG out of the eic;ht. 
• I It ther0fo:re DeeiiJS that, except for the price J.ncrease 
of lst June 1973 vlhen tho oil comp::.;nies increased. their stocks bcforo thG 
price incrBase and z·e<lnc(,d their stocks \·/hon the price increase 1ecans 
effective, the cor.1pan:i.cs chose rather to attt::mpt, 1Jy reducing their ;:;tockl:; of 
crude oil ,to exer-t pn:~mure on the J3olt;iu.n Go'Jernnv:nt to increase th•) Daxiw'J.m 
prices of oil products. 
Th.c Comr:1ission has fou'!Cl t~1at in a.ll countrie'; opo:ca;l;inc; 
price controlc 1 the oil companies t::Y..crted prc.s:-_:urc on covc!rnments in orr3c:::· to 
h2.Yo prices ac1justecJ_ in line uith the inc:ceuso in the co::d; of crude oil ;Belgium 
movements and. a slo\\'J.(J'\.TJ in impOl"-b. 
other countries th(; rc.::;uJ.at ions icsuod by tho <'..u.thorit i::;~> gave theu norG 
v;hilc other govcrnm::mt::; t1ccided more quicl::ly on -Lheir attitude to roq1.1.ests 
from compo.r>ics. 
JUIH.PJJC£:.~:;~~'·:res CO:JCl~HlTil,TG ~~lJP:'IJI::~S TO CI.;Ti.1,AilJ l7li.'T'lO:·~-/~I.J En1Tl~~PTliSES 
--~----... ---,.q ...... -..... - ............ - .. --~---·- .. ~ ...... .., ...... _..__, .......... __ """' ........ ____ .... __ , ___ _ 
r.Phc Cor..ra:iso ion h3s cxanincd. certailJ supply 
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In rra.nce the Comuins ion hM cx<uninad the contract::: entered 
into by h:o oil cornpo.Die3 n..."'ld Elcctrici te de France. Both comp<:.:r:d.es 
coucludcd u:i.th J.:DF contracts of sinilo.r type for the same duration of ten 
yeo..rs, for the cxcllJ.sive t>upply to c0rtain po\:cr stations. Such contracts 
of exclusivity of supply could give rise to problems ~'lith rega.rd to the rules 
of competition. Their terms uill be the subject of further examination. 
In Jtaly the contract entered into by Bsco and 1-lo?'ltcd.ison fer the 
pr·o·• ic ion of nc:.1Jhtha WlS for a duration of tc:::1 years. It has just c:-:pired. 
The Com:niGcicn Hill exa;ainc the cor~·:lHions on \.'hid~ it has been renci;ed. 
In gcnf}ral, contracts t)etHcen o:i.J. co:npaniec and na.tior.al cntcrp:r·iscs 
1·;m;_ld have to l>0 the object of a mo:r:.s dotailcd. c::.:c::.mination in order to 
d.E::k:r.·!:line 1·:lldbc;r the nature of these contracts lw.s contri1)utcd to some 
sharinG' out of custorucrs. 
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PART IV 
TilE EFYBCTS OF 'llHE CRISIS OH QU!.UITI'.PH~S AND Pil.IC!'.JS 
~----............ -·----
A - §uantitie.~ 
(a) General remarks 
Qne of the items dealt wHh in this chapter uill be supplies of crude 
oil. A number of terms used in the oil industry are used here ru1d a 
definition of these terms and a brief description of the TtJaY in rrhich 
crude oil is acquired may be helpful. 
Before the crisis ,the Oimorship of crude oil in the various producer 
countries depended on a series of agreements concluded in 1972 bet;,reen 
the producer countries themselves and the oil companies or groups. Uncler 
these agreements, known as "participation a.grem11mrts", the compa..YJ.ies 
mmed part of the crude oil. This vms kno-vm either as "conceosion oil" 
or as "equity crude": The proportion of total production accounted for 
by concession oil varied from country to country and from agreement to 
agreement. Before the crisis, for instance, concession oil represented 
75 c;~ of total production in Saudi Ara1Jia. 
Another portion of crude oil production, mmed b;;r the producer stette in 
line vri th its shareholding, Has kno;,vn !3.S "participation" oil or crnde 
and in January 1973 represented 25 1~ of Saudi Arabian production. 
"Participation oil" is further subdivided into 11 b:ridging oil" and 
"phase-in oil". These vJere defined by the particir;ation agreements. 
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nBridging oil" \vas the tor1;1 applied to agreed quantities of. 
participation cru.de oil which producer cou.'1tries >Jere obliged 
to sell back to oil companies during the first three years o.f' 
the operation of the participation agreements (that is, 1973, 
19'(4 and 1975) to perLlit these companies to fulfil, during these 
. 
transitional years, their existing supply corrunitrne:nts. J.n the 
case of Sa,J.di Arabia, 18, 75~·; of the total oil production i·JCtU 
allocated a.s bridging oil. 
"Phase-in oil" v1as the term applied to a.greed ma:ximu.'TI quantitj.es 
of pa.rticip:ttion crude oil 11hich producer countries could roqu.:ire 
the oil companies to buy back from them, if 1 during the pcrioc.l i·rhe:n 
' }' fl 
the producer countries we:co developins- u)hasinc-in) their m·m 
cOimnercial policy, those countries encountered difficulties in 
disposing themselves of' crnde oil 1d.thi'1 those maximwn qu.<:>-ntitics. 
It uas envisascd that the "phase-in" 2.rren[;enent::. ~·muld extend. 
to 1991. In the case of So.udi Arabia, in 1;:!73 3, 75;; of the total 
oil production ~·1as allocated as phase-in oil. 'l'he concepts of 
bridging oil and pha,se-in oil \-Jere not opol~ated. b~1r all the oil 
producing oountries a:r1d inc.leed fell out of use towards the end 
of 19'{3. 
':PlJe balance of particip3.:Gion cru.de oil not ee.n;;arked as brid.cing oil 
or phase-in oil vJas referred to as 11 sta-Ge oil" 1 e. term uhic~J. is 
sOI;-;etimcs also used as an al tern2:tive to "po-.rticipatiNl oiJY. 
These were the concepts tvhich '\'Jere in o::~eration at the onset of the 
oil crisb; ho-.·:ever, the si tua·bion cho,nged rapidly. rl1he propo:r:-tion 
of total oil production attributed to participation oil Has fixed, 
as has been said, at about 25~b a:r1d should have remained at this level 
until 31 December 1977, a:f·t;er which date it Jtias due to be increased 
annually until a lir.1it of 51% '\vas reached in 1982. Hut alre2.d.y by 1974 
produ.cing countries and the proportions of concession oil &.i'ld participation 
oil 1-vere 1 in ·!;hat year, 40}~ and 60J; respectively for the Persian Gulf 
states 1·1hilst the comparable proportio:as for Hi[;erian crude oil beca.1ne 
455~ and. 55% respectively. 
I 
.. 
IL 
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(b) Total Community imp2rts of crude oil 
hl examination of this cannot be undertaken without bearing 
it in mind that a comparison of data relative to t\-JO periods takes 
no account of increased consumption, which, in vieu of the economic 
expansion, it was normal to expect for the period October 1973 
to March 1974, compared \·lith October 1972 to March 1973. 
Nevertheless, subject to this qualification, imports from 
October 1972 to March 1973 (the reference period) can be compared 
with those from October 1973 to March 1974 (Table 11). 
The total Community imports of crude oil \"'ere at sub'stantially 
the same level during the crisis as during the reference period. 
An analysis of the imports of individual countries shov1s some 
variations to this. 
In Germany, imports rose during the first two months of the 
crisis. The rise was due both to the desire of the oil compru1ies 
to shield themselves against the effects of the embargo on crud.e oil 
exports to Rotterdam, which is the source of most German iMports 
of refined products from Corrununity countries (nearly 70 %) , a.nd 
to the attractiveness of the German market, where the level of 
prices allowed the largest profit margin. 
By January 1974, the German market was saturated and imports 
began·to fall off. Total German imports over the crisis period 
were 2 % bel0\'1 those of the reference period. 
In the Netherlands, the effects of the embargo began to be 
felt seriously in December 1973 when crude imports fell to roughly 
50"/o of the October level. By January, ho'l'rever, the supply situation 
in Rotterdam began to brighten as a result of the arrangements 
made by the large international companies to reroute, mainly through 
the United Kingdom, certain quantities intended for their Rotterdam 
refineries. 
Grude oil imports from non-member countries 
'
I I I ~~ 
1
. 1 L -·r= 1 . j Lux~m- ,. Unite~-- T 1 1 . 1community !-~onth ._a_c_rm_. ru_-"'.::r_· ...i•'-Francc -·· -ca y 1.<ether1ands Be g"lUl'll b '(" , I ... re a.11.c:1! Denmarlc r ) 
·-----------'· ·----------:':--- 1 oure; t J.nP"G.om '! 'I --l.,.;;;.a.:.-..;....oo~ 
I
I ! I 1 I' --r--r---r----1 ·-~:-' I-
!1972 Oct 
I 
I 
:aov 
Dec 
I 1973 Ja·t 
I. Feb ·I~J .. :.-· i Total Oct •. t72-;:1ar 
l i 1973 Cot 
! 
I Dec 
llq7.1 Ja..'"l l /' ' Fe-o 
i .. I Total ~~. 773 -Mar 
'73 
'74 
8.282 
9.172 
9.076 
9-244-
8.502 
9-455 
53-731 
110.019 
I 9·346 I :::: 
l 7-259 
I 8.380 52.438 
I 
10.045 
11.697 
lO.!J-54 
12.302 
10.352 
12.547 
67.397 
11.878 
12.548 
10.825 
11.!;.07 
n. 285 
10.650 
68.593 
10.546 
10. ?51 
10.505 
'9.802 
9-389 
ll-041 
62.035 
10.822 
9·937 
10.881 
11.134 
lO.W5 
10.514 
63.294 
, coot 
6.366 
. 15.125 
5·514 
6.332 
5·963 
6.101 
36.,~01 
6.469 
6.438 
3·453 
5.257 
4-686 
5.5G] Jl 
31.812 'I 
3.222 
3.232 
2.818 
2.522 
2.534 
3.437 
17.765 
2:761 
3-358 
3.141 
2.?68 
2. 3t:.V3 
lo082 
15.453 
i 1 Diffc:renc0 ir: ;~ 
,,i 19i3/72 g~: 2i:~ 1~:~ - ~:~ ~:i II - lt~ !,· 
I Dec - 3,3 3,5 3,6 - 37,4 11,5 I: 
j1974/73 Jl".."l - 5,8 - 7:3 13,6 - 17 ,o ! 0 8 
i Feb - 14,6 9:0 6~6 - 2l,4 
11
. - 7:3 
i Ko::r - 11 4 - 15, 1 - 4, 8 - 9 , 7 . - -'SD , 5 
11. ()c'G. ;73-Mar •'{toj. ~~;, 'j " 1. 6 , 1 1 0 2,0 - 12. -·l'--1·3~.0 I Oc~. 172..:1-'Jar ''{_3____ ' · • 
. ! ___ __j ____ ~_ ~----~ 
(t:.) JExcludil'lg Ireland., ~-1here no rr.ollthly r·igures are a-r.rCL:LLo."ulc 
8.788 
8.691 
)1.124 
6.945 
/.888 
9.6l3 
53.049 
U.737 
8.923 
8.895 
9.820 
8.921 
10.376 
58.672 
'1833) 833) 
833) 
1.028 
722 
839 
s.ces 
881 
622 
532 
952 
550 
867 
4.414 
48.082 
50.501 
48.325 
50.175 
45-350 
53.933 
295.465 
54-567 
51.172 
46.504 
50.045 
45.065 
47-378 
294-731 
j ... 
a-. 
0 
I 
,.. 
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Ultimately, Dutch supplies during the crisis ~-re:re 12~61; bel orr those 
of the reference period. 
In Belgium, despite the cmu1try's partial dependence on Rotterdam. for 
su.pplios of crude oil by the Rotterdam-Ant1'1erp pipeline, imports 
developed along different lir.tes than in the Netherlands. 
T~1e fall in crude oil imports only became apparent in February 1974; it 
increased in I~Iarch Hhen the oil companies lost interest in the 
Eelgio..n ·market, 1,;here the maximum p:rj_ces imposed b;y the Uovern~ent did 
not allmv them to operate profita-bly. 
In Denmark, .the em1)a:rgo had the same effects on im:r>orts as in 
the lJetherla...l'lds, but this haci no. pei·ceptible impact outside tlJe 
country since Denmark is not an exporting country. 
On the other hand, the existence of price controls undoubtedly led 
the companies to reduce their purchases of crude oil as in J3eleiura. 
Ite:1.ly, in contrast, import eel "· little more crude oH during the 
(~risis than durine; the reference periocl, the reason being that the 
compa.nics continued to exploit. their Italian surplus refining 
capacity on the export market (Italian exports of finished oil 
products rose by 1;fo over the reference period; see Table 14). 
Ti:1e United Kingd041 also increased Hs crude oil imports, but to a 
r2uch gJ:"eater degree than Italy ( 10, 6<;~). 'l11le roason for this \vas 
that the companies Nere using their British refineries to make up 
for -the telilporary loss of output in Rotterdam caused by the embargo. 
'b'ra.nce v1as able to continue a normal supply pattern, and its refineries 
ran at full ca.pa.ci ty. 
* 
-)(· -K· 
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(c) Quantities of crude oil refined ( Table 12) 
DJ.ring the first six months of the crisis,the volume of crude oil 
processed in Community refineries Has 303 million tonncs as compared 
with 305 million tonnos during the reference pariod. 
The Netherlands and Beleium vli tnessed a sharp drop of 13~~ and 10?·~ 
respectively in refining activity. 
France and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, refined e;re('J,ter 
volumes than in the previous year. 
(d) Supplies to :B..u.ropean companies Hith inadequate sources of 
crude oil 
. ··---· ... ---·-·-··-*-·----~~~---·---------- ~ . --~---............... 
In times of crisis, it might be feared that co;:1panies not having 
enough crud.e oil of their own to keep their refineries runnine 
at capacity viould be faced 1vi-th nupply difficulties. 
On the v1hole, these companies did not suffer from a sho1·tar;e 
of crude oil during the crisis. 
.. 
TABW. ·12 ... 
-..,·-~~ 
--- "~ w - • .... ~---1~--·--"i'~-~--...,1-"-~~~~.?-~r:~,~:;~,~~~~ct.~~~~~~-;:~::-:~·rwu-;i -~·d --r ·· · · · · -~-_ = ·- • 1 ·c;;;;~it;~·=-l· !-Ionth . :c;;>--mOJ_,_-Y !' Franco Italy 1 "1'~~~" l Belgiuf.l ·I ~ · -:.;. 1 T'~ d-~ . J IrelMd '! :Jerurw.:rk .. ,. ( 2.) • I v--'L~ !... I oou.r,_ - l\.-n om ...-! ' -----·-··*-·-~ ·-.. -·-· -·-. ·-~. ---·--, ... ~.~w:~-..~---~,. CL =: • .. -.::.v- ...... -,.~» .... 1 .... ~~ ~~ .,..~~~,. ..... ~;! 
'oco t • 
L972 Oct 9·733 II 10.963 118572 6.568 r 2.860 f 8.728 f - I (730) 51.154 
No·.- 9.587 11.395 10.451 6.033 3.235 9.030 'I - I (730) 50.512 1 
Dsc 9.886 I 11.684 11.399 6.24(L j 3.304 1 9.9C5 (730) 53.153 ' 
L973 Jan 
F;•b 
Mar 
I'ota.l Oct '72- :r.ra.r '7 3 
L973 Oct 
Kmr 
1'-.JC 
r.:ar 
fc-';c.l Oct '73 _ ~.m- '73 
l9B/72 Oct 
I)ov 
D~c 
l974/73 Jar. 
Feb 
l·~ar 
)~-~ 
'73 - l·!ar '74/ .... )ct '72- Ear· '73 
10.c9sl12.ooo 10.362 6.2;1 1 2.111 9.e94 II ..: 874 51..588 
9.205 10.140 9·470 6.253 2.8J6 8.377 737 47.143 
9·926 10.856 10.784 6.117 'I 3·435 - ' I 9·554 I' - 8(10 51·552 58.433 67.038 64.038 37.531 17.842 55-489. (4.731) 30).102 
10.813 12.044 10.993 6.278 2.965 ., l 1o.::::::G 1 - 83o 54.149 
10.145 ll-952 9-893 5.712 3·449 9.534 ! - - 739 51-424 
9.587 12.133 11.297 5.030 3.400 10.211 I - 760 52-418 
9-135 11.681 11.153 5.012 2.560 9-510 775 49.027 
7.826 10.963 9· 788 5.127 2.366 9.185 740 45·995 
8.355 11-293 11.917 5-456 1.363 - 10.233 810 49.427 
55.862 70.066 65.041 32.615 16.1o3 ;s.e99 4.654 1 303.24o 
Dif!'erence in % 
11,1 I 9,9 I - 5,0 - 4,6 3,7 I ~ 17,2 - (13~7) c:; 0 ./7.7 5,8 4,9 - 5,9 - 6,1 6,6 - 5,6 -
I 
p,2) 1,8 
-·3:0 3~8 - 0,9 - 19,4 2,9 
- 3,1 
I= 
4,2) 
- 1,4 
- 9,5 - 2,7 7,6 
- 19,8 21,3 
' -
... 3r9 
- 11,3 
- 3~4 
- 15,0 8,1 3,4 
- 37r3 - l8r3 
- 9,7 1- I - 6,0 - 2,4 
- 15,8 4,0 10,5 
- 11,8 - 60,3 
- 7,1 
I=· I 
- 8,0 
- &.,1 
I 
- 4,4 4s5 1,6 - 13,1 l - 9,7 6,1 - 1,6 - 0,6 - I 
(a) Excluding Ireland, '1\he:-e no monthly figures are available 
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Petro:fina., l·Thich has no resources of its 01-m, had for several 
years been obtainint; supplies from BP Trading under a long-term 
contrect. BP and Pctro:fina 0\-m ai'ld operate the SIBP refinery at 
AntNerp on a 50/50 basis. 
,A comparison during the entire crisis period of BP's deliveries 
to its oim refining subsidiary, Anglo-belge des Petroles (ABP), 
and to Petrofina shoKs that deliveries to Petrofina developed 
in the sarnc Hay as those made to ABP. 
In 1973, AGJP-ENI was prevented, to varying degrees, from eJ\.-porting 
its production of crude oil by certain producing c01mtries,vJith 
Iran blocking as much as 691·; of its production. 
Of nearly 18 million. to:rmes produced outside Italy, AGIP vms able 
to ship onJ.y 10,6 million tonnes thc:,t year. 
During the crisis,the proportion of its supplies accounted for 
by its ovm production fell steadi.ly from 36~~ in October 1973 to 
2S/~~ in Lclrch 197 4. 
Hence, AGIP Has forced to buy more crude oil on the free m2.rJ.r-.et 7 
in other Hords, outside that pad of the market eovernecl by 
y..articip0-tion agreements. It paid a. higher price for the crude oil 
vJ1lich it obtained than that paid by the intc[;rated inten1c..tional 
companies, Hhich have the best supplies of crude oil. The differe:nce 
11a.s bet1-men 10 and 20i~• 
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~.1ontedison had no supply difficulties since it 1vas able to. buy 
on the free market and pass the price difference on in products 
used in the petrochemical industry vlhere there v1ere no price 
controls. 
Judging by the development of stocl~s held by Veba's refineries in 
Germany, vihich rose beh;een October 19.(3 and Harch 19'{47 Veba does 
not appear to have e:;;:perienced · cmy difficulties vdth its supplies, 
Hhich rmre assured, on the one hand, by its contracts with r.Io1Jil f.l.nd 
BP and, on the other hand, by its o1m sources and its purchases 
else>-1here. For these latter purchases, Veba hacl to pay higher 
prices. 
( e) C<?;uantities of refined. nrod.ucts su:o-plicd to -the douo;Jtic market 
... _ :tiE. I. • I__. ........ --~~~._._....,.._....-._-....--~~-..... ~-----
(domestic conmun:;)tion) (see :i\3,ble 13) 
~Phe stability of crude oil supplies, quantities refined and stocks 
held meant that the available quanti ties of finis~1ed prodLwts 
lso remained highly stable. 
Hone the less, supplies of oil in the common m9.rket c1uring the 
crisis VTere 5.6~-b lovmr then those of ·i;he reference period. 
Houever, exports to non-member co-u.:n:1;ries rose by the sa.rne 
proportion. This resulted undoubtedly frora the combined effect 
of energy-saving neasures introduced in Comr:n.mity countries, a 
slight reduction in i·:.1.clustrial activity and the at·i;raction of 
world market prices. 
The reaction of the oil companies to price controls also had 
repercussions on the extent to llhich the d01nestic raa..rkets of 
certain mor1ber conntries continued to receive supplies. 
Domestic supplies of oil products 
Ilonth • ~ !,It:) v ~er-1 Gerr:1o.ny Fr2.nce I hal;y I ~-~ - De:Ln-iwn I I --~ -,-- -t.· ;:J 
~ • 1 nnri s ~:..> • ~----------+~-._.-..;-__ _~ ___ _,_-~'.)c r-- ~-
1 I , oao t . 
11972 Oct I I·Tov 
~ Dec 
' h973 Jt.:l.U 
i Feb : ~ )=~ 
i 
i'l,o'~al Oct .c7.?. - r~.r '73 
! 
j 
i 
Jan 
P.eb 
l,J ....... _, ,... ,.,. ' ~ ... , \ ~.. t.;:,t ! j ~ . ' • c.o..-
1 
- Y..a:- '74 
10.885 
ll.Y;.4 
12.050 
12.389 
11.125 
11.7l8 
69.311 
12.761 
I 12. 03_5 
· 1~. C.J6 
11.024 
7 -7l0 
9-395 
I 63.6n 
8.972 " 
9-587 
10.954 
11.630 
10.32~ 
10.703 
62.168 
10.547 
10.689 
11.738 
10.647 
8.998 
9. 4 1~5 
62.C51j. 
7.835 
7.601 
8.897 
8.336 
8.119 
8.051 
48.839 
7.652 
7.168 
(.876 
(7.752) 
(7-752) 
(7.752) 
45·952 
2.187 
2.386 
2.4C3 
2.482 
2.24-7 
2.:)02 
lt.~. 012 
2.521 
2.059 
2.l43 
1.989 
2.C·:'2 
1.860 
Difference in $S 
2.113 
2-35.9 
2.228 
2.301 
2.283 
2.431 
13.715 
2.320 
2.386 
l.S:.S6 
2.2c3 
2.058 
1.652 
12.610 
123 
122 
210 
v~a 
135 
14-2 
880 
149 
:37 
227 
137 
10 
123 
8.320 1 
9· 017 I' 
::::: I 
~:~2 I 
54· 726 .I 
9.129 i 
9.281 i! 
8o096 
8.708.1 
8.159' ! 
G.9)'J I 
52.:363 l 
.'I (1.660) .. , (1.660) 
(1.660) 
2.028 
1.758 
1.8Lj.8 
1(10.614) 
1 1.847 
1 L£38 
l.t~88 
1.393 
1.172 
1.397 
42.095 
43.876 
47-461 
49.140 
44.852 
46.841 
46.926 
45·453 
44~24') 
43.858 
37 .·351 
40.614 
2)8.9.52 
J 17,2 J 17:6 ' - 2,3 1 15t3 9r8 I 21,1 f 9, 7 I (11,3) llt5 j j 8,0 I 11,5 ! 914 1. 3r 7 1~1 i 1?.,3 j 2~9 (l, 7) 3,6 1 j :i;cc 1- 11,3 I 7,2 I - 11,5 \ - n~o - 10rO I, 8,1 l - 10,6 II(- 10,4) - 6,8 I 
i 
i 1973/7?. O::t 
l 
h974/73 Jc-.n £- n,o I - 8~5 I 710 i - 19,9 - 4r0 - 7,4 ,. - ll,4 - 31 3 - 10,7 I •1~ Fob ~- 30,7 1 - 12.8 i.'. '4 9 5 I - 10~9 - 9~9 ! - 92 1 6 . - 8.0 j - 33:3 - 15,6 I \ 1.:2..~ i- 19 72 \ - n:s , 3, 7 ·.! -::.912 - 33,c 1 - 13,4 ! - G~s l -· 24~4 - 13~3 \ 
i Od '73 - !~:::.r 'it/ I ' j i 1 1' I 
: ·.~{ 3 - 8,2 ' - 0 1 2 ! - 51 9 ! - 10r2 l. - 8,1 I - 11,0 11 - 4 1 3 I - 15,3 I - 5,6 l i Oc'.; '7 2 - K::'..r ! l i i ! 1 . 1 1 
, ___ _____ i._ ___ ..._..~--..;.~----~-,..~-t---,..t-~~·--.,..,-..-...-,.-• ______ i._.....,.._aJ ____ _.. .. .__.. 
/ ' \t~j J__;~:::clttclin~; lrolL·l.J'lcl.: r/itc:rc !JO T!1'J!l-G1~1.{ fit;:l:'CS O~TG n.vo.i.l2..b:l.G 
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In the Netherlands and Belgium, in particular, the drop in 
supplies \'Jas partly due to the reluctance of tho companies 
to supply products at the rather lo\v maximum prices set by 
the Government. Domestic heating oil v1as the hardest hit. 
In Germany, escalating prices in Pebruary 1974 acted as a brake 
on consumption, especially of domeotic heating oil a.'ld dier.>el fuel. 
Quanti ties v1ere available but the deraa.nd was no longer there. 
(f) Total C~mmunity exports ru1d imports of finished oil 
p_rodugj_~_J!:Ee. Ta"t_l!3.:s 14 a . anu.4...Jll_ ____ _ 
'J.lable 14 a (total exports) includes for each Community co1.mt:ry: 
- supplies to ·other Comr!tuni ty countries 
- exports to non-member countries. 
'l1&.ble 14 b (total intports) includes for each Community country: 
imports from other Community countries 
imports from non-member countries. 
'I'he figures given in the column for the Con11·mmity thus cover trade 
\'Tithin the Comnunity (Ta:bles 14a and 14b), Conrraunity exporto to 
non-member countries (r.rable 14 a) and Cornrauni ty imports fr·om non-
mei:~ber countries (Table 14 b). 
Total Comrauni ty exports (to met1ber cotmtries a.nd non-member couutries) 
fell by only 5. 8% in the crisis period cor.1pared vJi th the corresponding 
months of the year before, which demonstrates that the,y v1e1·e hardly 
affected by events in the lliddle East. 
Ho;.Jever, the fall vias sharper in t"l-10 traditional exporting countries, 
the l'Tetherle.nds and Belgiu .. m, \vhich felt the effects of the embargo 
imposed on Roiterct .. ~,!n. 
)V 
;c 
973 
:t 
)V 
lC 
0Tf:.!.J 
973/1972 
:.r 
I 
I 
German,y 
725 
665 
612 
650 
680 
698 
4~030 
1.018 
968 
603 
766 
687. 
1.013 
5.055 
40,4 
45,6 
1,5 
17,8 
1,0 
45,1 
I France 
I 
1o046 
945 
927 
1.ll6 
1.041 
1o002 
6.077 
1.172 
943 
1.142 
1.021 
883 
1.096 
6~257 ) 
12,0 
0,2 
23,2 
8,5 
15i2 
9,4 
3,0 
'l'C'i'."J, l:!!.~?O'l'lS 0!<' ALI, OIL PRODUCTS 
TABLE 14- (a.) 
Italy ~1~et~erla..'10.sl Belgil.l.lft I ! u "t d I I I . L'.L"C3mbou:::-g! · n~ e I Ireland . Denmark . Gommu.n.i ty 
I !Kined~~n~~~--------~~--·------~~~a~)~-----
2~275 
2.371 
2.088 
2~313 
2.135 
1.915 
13.097 
2 .. 340 
2o243 
1.960 
2e207 
2.657 
1.806 
13.213 
3e5f:.l 
3.718 
3.8.!{.1 
3o765 
3~524 
3.709 
3.849 
3.266 
2.446 
2.464 
3.110 
3.453 
18.588 
t 000 t 
1~102 
1~024 
1.395 
609 
1.121 
1.251 
1.,286 
1.152 
1.509 
573 
695 
466 
5.681 
Differenco in% 
1~257 
1.342 
1.455· 
1.314 
1.000 
1.150 
1.767 
1.461 
1.138 
996 
756 
791 
(176) 
(176) 
(176) 
205 
202 
287 
1.222 
303 
207 
207 
226 
231 
155 
10.122 
10.241. 
10.494 
9.912 
9.703 
10,012 
60.544 
11.735 
10.240 
9.005 . 
8.253 
9o019 
8o780 
2:91 3,7 1611i ! 40,61 <12,2) 15,9 
5,4 - 14,0 ',., 51 i 8,9 (17 ,6) 0 
6,1
1
,- 36,3 "8:21 
1
, 2lr8
1 
(17 ,6)i 14,2 
4,6 - 34r6 5:9! 24:2 10,21 17:2 
1. _ 24,4~- 11,7 38~ol 24,41 :!.4,4 7,0 I 5~7 I - 6,9 62,71 l 31,21 46,0 12,3 
25,!· :t '','3-:·:ar ::
1
tli
3
'/ 1
1
, 
:t '72-I~ar 
--· ·------ ---·--·---___1 ____ _, 
1
1 o,~ I 15:9 12,Gi ! - 8,2
1
! I <\81 - 510; 
·-'-1 _____ j _____ .. _____ l ____ j_. ____ _l. ____ [ ____ j _____ ~ ___ j 
L"\ ,.:;. 
' 
'IOTAL Iicl'0'1'20 Oli' ALL OIL PROWCTS 
TABLE 14(b) 
France l Ita]y I HetLer- Be1giurn Luxembourg! United Ireland Denmark \ CoQ.muni t-· 'Jerma..."1.y J l2·.nds 1--i:r..e-~om (a) y 
ill I 000 t 
,.+ 2.727 774 (500) 824 433 I 122 1.814 ~1.035l 8.229 0V 3.266 817 (500) 797 425 127 1.921 1.035 8.888 
~~c 3.821 734 (500) 946 329 203 2.078 (1.035 9.646 
- . 
ill ; 
._i.L" 3.313 ~627) 321 788 647 138 2.158 1.355 9o347 C~b 3.110 627) 512 721 539 144 1.942 1.025 8.620 
ar 3.026 (627) 414 i 619 631 139 1.655 1.065 8.176 •, I 
DT~ ! \ 
C1i '72-i-lar '73' 19.263 4.206 2.747 4.695 I 3.004 873 11.568 6.550 52.906 I 
2.U 
~G 3.988 728 (350) . 1.271 . 924 162 1.219 1.039 9.681 
::JV 3.685 519 (350) 671 I 570 139 983 888 7.805 ?C 3.168 496 369 726 622 238 749 878 7.246 
21..4 
3.!1 2.726 340 246 I 701 580 143 1.043 830 6.609 30 2.862 465 126 5eo 520 108 1.209 636 6.506 ?.r 2.796 342 
I 
309 776 494 116 1.234 619 6.686 
OTAL l ~t •·r3-Har '74 19.225 2.890 I 1.750 4.725 I 3. 710 906 6.437 4.890 44.533 I . 
9J.).iJ!Ill. Difference in % )i, 46,21 - 5,9 I (-30.0) I + 54f2 I 113,4 I 3218 I - 32,8 I 
( 0,4] 17,6 
)V 12,81 - 36,5 (-30~0) - 15,8 34,1 9r4 -· 48!8 ( - 14,2~ - 12,2 I I I ~c 
-
17,1 
-
32,4 I (-26,2) I - 23,3 89,1 I 17,2 - 64,0 ( - 15,2;. - 24,9 
I 
I 
- 38,71-
2HL1~H3 I 
-
17,7 (- 45,8) -23,4 I - n,o - 10,4 3,6 I - 51,7 29,3 c .. n I I 3b - 8,o, (- 25,8) -75,4 - 19,6 i - 3,5 I - 25,0 - 37,7 - 38,0 - 24,5 I I :1~ 7 :5! (- 45,5) I -25,4 25,4 - 21,7 I - 16,5 I - 25,4 1 - 41,9 - 18,2 I 
!t '73-I-:ar '74-/ 
I I 
I· 
;t '72-I-hr '73 - 0,2 - 31,3 -36,3 o,6 I 23,5 3,8 I - 44,4 - 25,3 - 15,8 I I 
- -
I ! 
-
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This reduction in exports frolil. Bcltiu:n and the Hotherle.nds vms 
offset by incroa::>ed exports from Gcrm:?..ny in particular. The 
increase in Gcrritan exports (45'~·~ more in Barch 197,~ than in 
March 1973) can be explained in part by the fall--off in der,1and 
on the domestic market at the end of t!1o crisis in Earch 1974. 
1ill1in car1 also be attributed to t.he milo. vdnter, to th.e fact the.t 
there uas f>Ome consmnption of industrial and. do:nostic stocks aud 
to the end of a period of panic over shorto.ges Hhich had beE-;cu1.' in 
October 1973 and. v1hich, for a nmaber of mol1'~hs 7 he .. d tric;-gcrecl off 
au almonJ.ally l!CO.'TY demand. 
--
1l'l:w su.rn of the total imports of Gonl:f.unity countries fell by l).b)S. 
Houovo:r, Gerr:::<:m imports, Hhich during the criBis period represented 
fi.-3/'J of total Corx;mnity illlports, rem8.ined virtually static as compared 
viith the rGferonce period (- 0.:!1 ~). 
Sic;flif'ica.nt reductions occur·J.~ecl in .G"\,ench, Italian a.'1cl BritiBh imports. 
For the Cmmnunity as a lvhole, the crisis resulted in a clear BJ.oudo\-m 
of trade in oil products, 1·Jith a fa,ll-off in both total e:;.:po:cts ancl 
totn.l imports. 
Durinc;- the crisis the e:xpoJ·-~ing activi tieG of Ro-Gter·da.m a.nU., to 
a lesser extent, Ant1:1erp, uere dra,:::;ticaUy curtc:.iled. 
(g) Intra-Comraunity trade in oil products (see ri:'2.bles 15 a e;ad 
F b) .:!::.:>~------.. .,-. ------··. . ~a.·....-_...._.-~ ...... _... --.. -· ..... ~ 
If ue t::<l~e 197~ as a normal year, ":u se~ that intra-
::·o::;e in J.:;1'(3 CL~:C:_ t1l·~!l 
year::> beinG" affected by a th1'ce-r11onth period of the crisis .l~\ren 
after the e:~.d of the crisL::, corrchn.'.ine effects can be seen. 
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Intra-Communit;y trade in all oil 12roducts 
1972, ].'}'( 3 and 1974 
,, DC• r:t"'4:2i~:r 1111 .Qllll'~ ... ,.,.., Importing 
country_ G_e-:on_qr..y Fr .... Ge- - -I-1-... \ y· .~.'c:hert(j nd_: \1clj~u"' . ' t;oo led_ l-:..tv_-",)ot .... \.lf•) ',(,rwUOr-f' 
t>< 
·~.w:.:::r:~ 
German;x: 
197Z J.leS 2.292 1e.;~9 2.316 
-
1. 71'1 
197) 3-13'1 2.61j 22.161 2.2)6 ;; l.lr~l 
1974 ).C9-l 2.2~6 17.713 1.693 - 1.o·;:, 
l' ranee IX 1~72 1.):)4 ).Ce3 : 8C) 326 - Oo 1973 1.23€ 2.(,;!3 717 211 - 2.,'/ 19'14 1.176 1.4;,G 7:.1 270 - 2.J7 
~ 
526 IX ~~i< 111 'jO 48 - 110 1973 71 562 lC4 1·l6 - ~j 19'14 109 ' ~to9 166 ;~ - ),,1 [X Netherlands 1912 1.5~8 ('7 1. 4SO l,Oq1 - l.C)3 1913 !:97 989 l.O<Jl l.l,ii"! - l.Cl;; 1974 1.017 561 1.028 1.423 - 2.t.;;. 
lllele;1um t>< i':rt2 ~ - 2~0 540 334 3.2t9 - :O.>·t 1973 . 247 \142 269 4.2.)6 ~ 2f~l 197( ))C (17 •' 4bd 4.0 •. Il 5 )l1 
'liL1XClllOOUr8: 
I L>< !~(l l£-0 133 - l£-8 1.017 -1913 121 I 132 - 214 1.211 -1\174 21~ I 71 - 15 1.~02 -
IUn1ted K1n~ om [L WI< - 5S6 1.413 2.928 9.0)6 1.853 -1973 2~9 I 1./,~t, 1.913 7.U5 2. 001 -1~74 3C? I 7C2 1.401 6.2a 1.005 -
Ireland I !~/l 23 
-
19 109 33 
-
<.~·te 
1973 11 48 1s 39 ~) 
-
3· ,}1.~ 
1974(cet!')"- (ll) (..0) (16) (3,) (~5) - u.o,td) 
tion 
1JenlilarK 
l~/~ c:·f2 4! 785 1.7~0 94J 
-
~- '11) 
1973 2~ 185 462 2.)03 1.146 
-
4.111 
19'14 673 144 636 ·2-7-!9 s~ 
-
~.v17 
Gummu .I. 
lY"i2 4·274 6.293 11.41;1 33.714 7.b24 
-
9-4&7 
1973 ).1~7 7-.:~9 8.'(12 3/.119 6 •• ,)3 5 9-921 
1974 3-975 5·~16 7.263 31.646 6.59) 5 9-9f6 
I 
I I I I I i 
I 
I I i I 
I I I : ! I I I ! i 
~--"');)]'-
TABLE 15 (a) 
1000 t 
-
--------
I)~~ 
1rel·~"d ·~_,~ "D~r,na'~k CO"f1"''111\-;. 
-
66 2~.!?8 
-
f·9 Jl. YJJ 
-
>< 2). /13 
-"" 
- 5 t:.::jl 
- -
t..Sl? 
c c ).~-.-~ 
-
-
61>5 
(' 19 92.5 
- -
6SC> 
-
(:l, 7.: 5.£2; 
-
jiJ s. )~'' 
- 5 r). ll;r 
""""'"""""'-r--
- -
4.7li 
- - 5-~0 
-
(' ;.ol9 
- -
1.453 
- -
1. f.'t;:) 
- -
l. ~t2 
tC.j )7 1(,. ~21 
•. ~3 )2 13-3<7 
l,25 24 l~·.L,j 
~ I - ~. :5..:2 3: 3.: ;~ (32' (;,.:U.·"~) 
~ - ·;.,C-3 - ~. 6,!2 - 1:- .. ce; 
·----· 
6~3 242 7 3· 7:1> 
4?3 223 "';":--;)/ 
,;<5 99 (). (1:2 
---
I 
l 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
! 
I ' I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
i 
! I ; 
. -72- T .ABLE 12._W 
Im:E_or-ts o,y: country of oric,in_as a percynta{(e of Community 
imports ot' oil~ "·---
197~ Nr3 ;:;mr-J:ti'"/1!" 
Importing !!.!WTT ....:m.ft'tw"~o~;...'\~f; .. 'f~~et~\nTt'l .. ~ ""1Siii'Uhi11Ur4ti'..tl»i ..i.J.A._}- .i. ~ ;;:- J......... ~ ,J 
........... ,........,F'fi_""'""_,.....,.,':r"'"'~~- ~ 
. - ... ~~···~.y: country GG<""\<l "Y "tro.nc.c. )~q,ly ~klh~,1ur:ls1 l:,«.l-'1'""-~ l!.-u•:"b""''" 1,-,,•.uhi~ lr;: ~ c:- :\ 1..-e-,'l ihQ rlt.-. L c.~"' .............. ·l • 
. ~ 
Germa.•w X 19,2 11,3 8,2 ~6,0 11,2 - 6,1 - (•,"t 100 .1973 "!.CJO ll,> 70,6 7,J - 3 "I - C,J ~!)-~ .. 19'14 11,9 &,6 u3, ·: fi,~ - ',2 - 0,2 }(A.f 
.B'ra'lce !X U/2 21,7 }.)> l?,li ,,2 - 1,; - o,l ~OQ ,, 19"/3 25,5 ::.;,) ~ j ll,tl ~.3 - ~.1 .. - w~ 1974 ).1,1, 3>,3 ltl,9 ·:,o - 7,4 (l (I }(/.) 
~ 
12,8 Ec,~ ~x ),6 19'/2 <l,l - l~,·t - - lC·~ 1913 ., .. / t-0,S j,l·,~ 11 tli - c-,·: 0 2,1 lLi) 
1974 15,9 .:N.4 24,5 ,, . .. 7-0,6 - - l•.f) .... ,o 
!Nether lo.nus XI .i9i2 2'1,2 (,,j 21,, !:•,2 - 18,? 0,4 l, 3 117~ 19'/3 11>,1 !7,') :.J,l ~-;,9 - !0, _, - v,·, :tlt} l~i4 15,6 ~.1 1·:,s ~~.~ - 3.!,l - ll,l :~.) 
lllole;~mn ~ !'{{: v ;,1 n,., 7,1 ~') . .) . 7 :l - - l('• 1~7J 4,1 l),d 4,) 7~'···~ c,l 4,1 .. - 1~(1 1~1lt i·a2 "i•·· Jl.·l ?2,1 t~,l 5,5 .. 0 :I)) 
ll.uxembourg IX l~'i'' lO,tt $',:. - ll,~ 69,6 - - - h'O 19'11 7,2 ":,; - 1.".,7 :r2.,2 
- - -
10.) 
1974 17,5 f ,:, - 1,L 7'i ,o - - - lC.;,.l 
iJnited Kingd pm C>\ ··n~ J,:.. 5,0 17,7 ;,;,'( 11,2 - 3,7 0,6 11)(1 197.1 1,9 11,') 1.),·1 5~,£; 1~.,0 - 3,7 ~.4 l<J.) 1974 3,6 6,9 l3,i'. 61,,; 9,9 -- :,,2 0,3 :oo 
r!-:rt:t"'"al'l-rt""-
0,9 1), 7 4,1 1,~ 93,1 [>( ~00 J.'7i2 - - -19!3 C1 3 1,~ \),') l,~ 1,'/ - 93,tl :r.,n lvO 1974 (ost>:o<a- (0,3) (! ,?) (C,5) (1,2) (1,7) . - (93,i:l) {.t ,o) lt...'•.) tion) 
lf2.cnma~ ~ t--'-'-]91';,- 3,6 l.',j lll,~ 2~,3 1~,6 - ~9.5 - h:O 1973 2,6 2,1 ),4 29,0 13,3 - ~7,6 - 100 19'14 8,3 l,tl 7,9 33,6 11,0 - J"/,4 - jUO 
~~)ffJillll}_i t y_ 
:>,8 8,) 1~,5 45,8 l'j'(.~ 10,3 .. 12,9 v,~ 0,3 1:;o 
1n.l 4,2 9,9 ll,5 49,1 11,2 0 13, l v,7 0,3 it'O 
1974 6,1 s,c ll,l .:s,::. 10,1 0 1~,3 0,7 (1,2 h'f 
I I I 
• 
' 
• • 
I 
., 
I 
i 
I 
I I I 
I 
. 
I 
I I 
I 
t 
I I I I I ! I ' I I ! I I I I 
\ 
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If \ve compare the percentages of each member state of total .intra-
Community exchanges, 1r1e Hill see that they remained ~:mch the sar.1e. 
Changes have o6cured, hmvever, in the sources of supply of a nUJ!lber 
of countries· \vhich import oil products. 
In 197 4, Germany imported slightly less from tbe l'Jetherle.nds a."ld a 
little more from France and Italy. On the other hand, the crisis 
resulted in a reduction of li'rench imports from Italy. rl'hese inports 
had previously been affected to a le1rcc ext<mt by independent Pr~nch 
companies, lvhich, at the behest of the French Government, chc'21.:;ed 
their Gources of supply _and started_ buying from refineries in Jl1 rance. 
On the other ha;nd, Dutch exports to Ito.l;y rose at the expense of 
]'Tench exports. 
The crisis modified trade in oil product,:; behreon the tuo sides of 
the Channel: there vms a1-1 increase first in Du.tch imports fro,r1 the 
United Kingdom and then in British impor·ts from the Hetberla.ncls. 
HovTcvor, the crisis did not have a siG-.rlificant effect on the most 
volumiuous and most comdstent trade floi"Jt export::: from Rotterdam to 
Germany, despite tho slight increano in Gerr.w.n imports from Italy 
and l~rance • 
Quite a pronounced increase \·las seen in Danish imports from Germany, 
marking the nevJ links novT being forged 1)etueen the Danish a:ncl German 
markets. 
Lastly, the crisis resulted in a perma"len".; diminution in the volume 
of intra-Co;rJnunity t1,acle of about 5 ~'h (1972 as compared Hi th the average 
for 1973 andl9'l4). 
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{h) The Rotterdam free market 
The role pl~ed by Rotterdam in intra-Community trade and 
in trade between the Community and the rest of the world merits 
some special observations. 
The Rotterdam market, supplied predominantly by local refineries 
belonging to the major companies, is the source of most intra-
Community trade - nearly 50 % in 1973 (see Table 15 b). 
The market is important not only because of the volume of 
transactions made there, but also because of the nature of the market. 
In 1973, Dutch exports of oil products totalled nearly 42 
million tonnes. A substantial part of these exports is sold on the 
free market. 
This free market can be defined as the market in oil products 
exported from the Netherlands which are not the subject of transfers 
within the same compru1Y or of trade in kind between companies, but 
vJhich require the services of a jobber. Forty percent of this mo..rkct 
is accounted for·by products refjned outside the Netherlru1ds (Italy, 
Belgium, Prance, Germany, United Kingdom, USSR) and sixty percent 
is accounted for by Dutch-refined products. 
Although the volume of sales from this market to destinations 
in countries of the Community is not really considerable since it 
represents only approximately 3 % of the total Community consumption 
of oil products, it nevertheless assumes in a period of market 
pressure, a special importance despite its marg-inal character. 
If the term "free market" is defined as set forth above, then 
20 million tonnes of petroleum products were sold on the free market 
of Rotterdam in 1973. Out of these 20 million tonnes, more than 50 % 
(over 10 million tonnes) v-1as exported to Gerraany (about one third of 
Germru1 i111port s from the Community). Of the rest, bet,veen 5 and 6 
million tonnes were exported to non-member countries (mainly to USA, 
Strlitzerland a..'I'J.d S1veden) and between 4 and 5 million tO!mes went to 
other common market countries. 
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Initially, these latter exports may seem surprising 
because they Here, at least in part, to countries \'l'here maximum 
price \'Tere in force. However, although it vrould appear that the 
importing companies had incurred a loss, these marginal imports 
nevertheless enabled the companies to solve the problem of a 
shor-tage of certain products (e. g. gas oil and diesel fuel), 
which are not obtained in sufficient quantities in the refineries, 
and to avoid producing products for \ihich there \'lOUld have been 
no market if additional quantities of crude oil had been refined. 
The follmving approximate picture cmerg·es fro:n a breakdoNn 
of the products handled on the Rotterdam free marke·t : 
Gas oil, diesel fuel, light fuel oil 70 7~ 
(middle distillates) 
Residual fuel oils 20 % 
Petrol 10 1; 
Total 100 ~~ 
A substc> ..ntial proportion of the middle distillates is 
exported from the Netherlands by way of the Rotterdam free market. 
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B - Prices 
-
(a) Posted price 
As a basis for the calculation of tax and roya,l ty payments due to 
a. producing country from the oil companies,a price is determined 
for concession crude oil -vrhich is knmm. as the "posted price". 
This posted price is a reference value determined purely for 
accounting purposes and may or may not correspond to the market 
price of the crude oil. 
The part played by the "posted price" ~Y:tcl its relation to the 
actual costs{ including taxes paid to the p:roclucing country 
(ttta:x: paid costs"), incurred by an oil OO!i1PW1Y in mcl.:ing a 
ba:r·rel of concession oil available for shipl.aen·ij to its refineries 
can be summarized as foll01·1s. 
1. A nposted price" per barrel or concession crude oil is 
declared by the producing country as a basis for the calculation 
of tax and royalty payments. 
2. From this posted price are deducted: 
the production costs of the oil compa:tw, iacluding transport costs 
to the point of loading ; and 
royalties due from the oil company to the producing country in 
respect o:f concession oil: these royalties, based on long-standing 
a.c;reeme:nts beti·Teen the oil companies and the producing co1.mtriei:l 
in v1hich they opera.te, nmoun·(j to 12, 5/~ of the posted price of a 
barrel of crude oil. 
3. l_l'he sum remaining after this deduction of production costs 
and royalty payments from the posted price is used as the base sum for 
calcula-ting the taxes du.e from the oil company to the producing 
country: they amount to 555~ of this base sum. 
... 
• 
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4. By this stage in the calculation, three items have been deducted 
from the posted price - production costs, royal ties and ta.1~en. 
r1"':'1e total of these three items oonsti tu-tes the tttax paid cost" to 
the oil con}!a.ny concerned of one barr·el of concession cru.de oil. 
:C11 the follo11ing example ( r.rable 16) 7 a comparison is made betvmen 
the po3"t.ell price and the corresponding tax paid costs of one oil company 
in October- 1973 and Jo.nuary 1974• 
/ 
~YE-~ cost prl-2..8 of COf]£8St>,i0!:__9rud.e_c_>l.L ... 2.L.:.tE·!:..JX.E..e~;,SJ...cJE..Jd.elU! 
Posted price (Hew 1 above) 
Costs of production (Item 2 above) 0, 10 
Royalties (12,5/'b of posted price: 
Item 2) 
Base sum for calculation of·taxes 
(Item 3) 
Taxes (55~~ of' 1)ase su.rn above: 
Item 3) 
Total tax paid costs 3.15 
===--...= 
;3/bbl 
0,10 
l~t.4£ 
0 14 ~::Jw 1,56 
4,38 
5,55 
7.11 
====-= 
The cost of access is a w~it;hted average of the prices paid by the 
comp~lies dependine on the type of crude oil. 
I:a t1Je case of conceBsioD crude oil the eos"t is calculated., 
as above, from the posted price. 
}-.l-56 
10,09 
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The price at rlhich participation oil ca.l"l be bousht back by the 
oil companiee is also related to the posted price, ·but in a 
period of short supply it might be above the price cif concession 
oil. 
T'ne posted price '\-las initially increased by al)out 755~ about mid-
October 1973, and >'lith effect from l January 1974 it v1as raised 
. 
again, by 130~~. This resulted in the cost of crlJ.de oil being 
multiplied almost fivefold in tho course of a year: in fact the 
average price of crude oil from the Niddle l!!ast, uhich v1as ~ 2 
per barrel during the third quarter of 1973, harl already 
increased to ,15 9,43 per barrel by the first qu.arter of 1974. 
The average cost of cru.de oil per barrel is tletcrrained on the 
basis of the proportions of concession oil and par·~icipa:tion oil 
fixed by the participation agreement ~vi th the producine country 
concerned. This averq.ge cost i::: norraally used ·by the oil compe.nies 
in determining the price at v1hich crude oil is ff!M.e available to 
companies in their group. 
In the view of the Commission,the complexities surrounding the 
application of the various concepts of participation oil and 
concession oil at the basic stage in the co1mnerc:i.al 9perations 
introduce a factor of uncertainty. It '1·10uld 2-:Qpoar that the aver2-[;<3 
cost determined in this "\·my, on the basis of fixed proportions of 
concession oil and participation oil, ma.y- not ahra;ys correspond to 
·t;he true average cost, as these proportions may not ahw.ys corres)ol1d 
to the actual proportions of participation oil and conccsGion oil tc:.:con 
by the oil companies. It ~-!ill thus be seen "that if a cot1pe.ny inclucles 
in a given period a higher proportion of lo1ver-p1'iced concession oil 
than of participation oil vlhich has been boug1r!; ·bac!< e1t higher prices, its 
avera.r,-e costs i·rill be correspondingly loi-;er. 
'l'he follm·Ting tables (Tables 17 a to 1'( e) relate to a me.jor inter:.'la-
tional compe.ny. rrhey give the costs of concecsion oil a"ld bu.;ybacl;: prices 
for participation oil in l"es:_:;ec-G o:f various t;;,·-~·GS of cr ..1.d.e oil du:r.-i:1;3" 
the period from the first quarter or 1973 to the first quarter of l97L]. 
1
.Pables 18 a a.Yld 18 b sh01:1 7 for eleven types of crude oil acquired b:i" this 
company, a co!nparison of the averase costs per barrel Hi th the pric:es at 
uhich the compn.ny tr0..nsferred crude oil to its refineries. 
.. 
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TJ::BLE 17 (a) 
1 :-;t, ClT.~-~~RT"!:"!R Cost of crudr oil to a major international company 
19?.3.. 
' 
I I 
--
I Bu..vback ori ces 
.. Erpity coat J. 
-·-c:----· 
. I .J \ Average 
Type of crude r--Bri~gin1:} j., -I Phasc-i1~: 
. ', r~ ~ 
-l· Equity/ 
. bvybck (b) 
--;J·--·1 ,rati_o cost 
·--t-----.. -
1/bbl ;{/bbl , %/tbl 
·-
1 1,54 1,94 1,88 
2 1,61 2,05 1,97 
. 
3 1,58 1,99 1,91 
4' 1,83 2,22 2,13 
5 1,80 2,13 2p04 
6 1,72 2,30 2,24 
7 . 1,74 2,18 2,09 
.' 
8 1,63 
- -
' (c) ~.verage 1- 8 ~,60 ,2,02 
-b.9..2 
. 
9 2,37 n 
10 2,27 I\ NA NA 
11 2,32 
·· 9 n<o !l,vernge _- b.ll - -
r'••mge ],-11 (c lt69 
- -
. j 
{a) Defined on page 58 
(b) This company bought no state oil 
(c). \·leighted for quantities bought; see pp. 77-78. 
75% . 
- equity 
•'18."75% . 
(_ bridging 
3. 75% 
- phase-in 
NA 
n
. f./b~-
,63 
{ 71 
s61 
1,92 
J.' 8'{ 
1,85 
1,84 
ls 73 
l.LlQ 
. ____ ....._, .. _, ____ _ 
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:!!JlLE 17 (b) 
2nd QUt.Imm 
1973 
Cost of crude oil to a major im;ernat~ona1 company 
~--=~x 
- -
---
Equity Buyback prices 
'I',I,';P8 ~t'.,.t;,}";i:Je cost 
. . . t;;.l Phac;e-iJaJ BrH!gJ.ng . 
~ 
%./b'..ll ;3'/bbl j/bb1 
' 
1 1,65 2,08 1,99 
2 1,73 2,20 2,09 
. 
3 1,70 2,12 2,03 
4 1.96 2,37 2,?.6 
5 1,92 2,28 2,17 
6 1,85 2,45 2,37 
7 1,87 2,33 2,22 
8 1, 75 .. 
- -
AverafSe 1 - eb b1.?. b11 .?.s Q1 
Buyback Opbo-:1 c· 
---
9 2,55 3,30 3,50 
10 2,1!4 3,13 3,33 
11 2,50 3,19 3,39 
!.verage 9 - 1 }b 
.?J 51 .hn J.dl 
t'~ ,i..:: ra.t;e 1 
-
1~b 
.h§.l - -
.. :t..ll;=r:t'! '!l!:lftQW W...:!i~!~~ 
(a) Defined on page 58. 
{b) i·ieighted. for qUJ.ntities bought; see PP• 77-78. 
(c) Qw3.ntities _buy~ble in excess of contract. 
---. 
Equity/ · 
Crty1:::~k 
r::tio 
% Ntbl 
L% 1,75 1,83 
(.- equity 1,79 
2,05 ( 18.75% 2,00 
- bridging 
1 3. 75% 1,99 
- phase-in 1,97 
1,85 
b.§g 
65/33 2,81 
65/35 2,'{0 
65/34 2,15 
£::.7.§_ 
I 
h22 
_ _, 
.. 
.. 
· Jrd QUAR'l'E..11 
1973 
-
Type of crud~ 
-
Equity 
cost 
-
-
~/bbl 
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Cost of crude oil to a ma~or international company 
~"-
,, Average 
... 
Buyback price:;· 93% PI 01 Equity/ cost 
buyba-ck -
Br·idgi nk~J . ~- Phase-iJ\a} _ ratio -
-~A.--·'f"''o!l".,.... ........ ~ -IQ' 1"' ,.... ... 
- I .1/ubl -~/bbl ''/b')l % ~/bbl ~ ~- .. -
-· -· 
July/August September_ 
1 l, 7.9 2,23 2,12 2,74 ~ . 1,93 -
2 1,89 2,35 2,23 2,83 {75% 2,03 
3 1,84 2,27 2,16 27 7H 
) - equity 1,97 
\ 
4 2,12 2,52 2,40 3t02 ! 1q. 7'3/c 2,24 
5 2,09 2,43 2,31 2,96 
~ - bridc;:i.ng 2,21 
6 2,01 ?,60 2,52 2,98 ~._75;1, . 2,17 
7 2,03 2,48 2, 37 3r00 
) - pba.se-m 2, 1"/ 
8 1,89 
- -
-
2,02 
' 
Average (c) -LJl§. ' 1 - 8 .?.t..Zl ~ b§Q 3~<2'0. 
]}.~~~ (' t. ~d) iO 10 •. • 1. 
9 2,79 3,54 3({4 - 65/33 3,05 
10 2,67 3,36 3,56 - 65/34 2,93 
11 2,73 3,42 3,62 - 65/35 2,93 
: 
-
Ave m f)o1 ) E.J.1. ' ~ ~~ .S.L22. 9 -.1 i(' -
-
1\.verogCJ b.2§ - - - ,?_,13 1 ·- 11(c) 
-
. 
-
a) Defined on page 58. 
b) In September 19'73,the pr-od·.tcing comrtries oct the bu;)·b?.cl: price at 93/:0 of -fhc po::ted 
price, abandoning tl:e b~·ldgin[Jph.s!.:!-in metj10d of calculation used h:i ".herto. 
c) l'reighted. fo!· quanti t:i.?3 cough'\.; sec pp. Tl-'/8. 
I 
I 
4th QUAR'rER 
1973 
'I.;pe of crnclc 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8· 
f.VC!'i-l(;e 1 -· &U 
9 
10 
11 
J ~ .. 1,~ r-:1 , .. ...., 
- ,; __ .. "'lb\ 
I ~· - 1 I 
A '"0 r~:r,l11 
. 1 - 1 I 
~ 
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'!'ABLE 17 (d) 
Cost of crude oil to a major international company 
..... 
"' 
,, ; l -
I Duybac~pric:>s Equity Eq-..tity i 93"/u p~J . buybs.ck cost I ratio 
I 
~ ..... , 
·"'-...... .. 
;t/bbl ¢/bbl % 
' 2,80 ~,25 I 3,06 4,60 7%, -equity '2,89 4,35 3,52 5,12 22.5% 
3,31 4,79 
J 
- buyback 
3,45 5,17 
3-,39 5,03 
2,9:J 4,37 
.. 
.. 2,97 .1.!_46 
-- Op l;io~}c) 113 "'bD,ck 
. 
4,78 5,53 5,73 65/33 
4,61 5,36 5,56 65/35 
4,,72 5,42 5,62 95/34 
4,72 5,45 5,64 
3,24 4,62 
-
--
-
Averar;e 
co~t 
//tlbl 
3,13 
3,42 
3123 
3,89 
3,65 
3,85 
3,77 
3,28 
3,3~...: 
5,04 
4,89 
4,97 
fl-,98 
3,5'( 
(a) l•r 3r•p\G'>.1:·::'r' 1~)'(3 1 the produci~<; ccur:tri cc set t!:c tu,{l':>.c?. p!'ice at 9X~ of tr.s po~:t>:;lt 
pl'ic,··. abandonine ~l:c brid~j;..::jph:H·e--.i.n r:-c-thol o:~ cdc"1latior. uc0J. hitherto, 
(c) Qmntitics buyab]e in excess of contract. 
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.. TABLE 17 (e). 
1st C.Ut.P.TER Cost of crude oil to a mu~or international company 
1W. 
.. I Tax P,ai.d Equi.ty/ 
of cl.'ude I . (a) .. BuybJ.ck price cost 94~ pp - bu;v··l"'ack AVC!\3.g·; T:vT'e 
... 
.. ratio I co~::t . . . 
-~/bbl ¢/bbl 'fo /jbbl .• 
1 7,04 10,86 40/52t3 9,20 
2 7,25 11,16 40/55,2 9,52 
3 7,11 10,94 40/55,3 9,33 
4- '7,80 11,86 40/54 10,13 
5 7,51 11,41 40/53rl 9,74-
6 7,74 11,92 40/54,5 10,1'5 
7 7,80 11,63 40/60 10,10 
8 7,23 10,93 40/60 9,45 
•' 
Average( ) .. 
1 - 8 b J.,.gQ l.h.~. .2.s..1.3. 
9 9,26 1·2,15 65/32,6 10,22 
10 8,99 11,99 65/35 l0f04 
11 9s08 12,07 65/33,5 10,09 
.. 
Avcragl) 
9 - 1 ° 2.rl..~ .llt£2. .!.<1.U 
Averat;e(b) Lj2, ,b1,2J- 2~J. 
1 - 11 
-
~- . 
(a) .Defined on page 77. 
(b) .\'leighted for quantities 'bought; see pp. 77-78. 
.....,~>C;;"·i~~· 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
' 
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(c) Transfer prices of crude oil 
Supplies of crude oil obtained by the oil companies are 
distributed between associated refining companies and a price is attributed 
to such supplies for accounting purposes between the companie~ concerned. 
This price is known as the 11 transfer price 11 of crude oil. It is usually 
settled on the basis of the fob cost price plus a transfer margin (Tables 
18 (a) and (b) ). This transfer margin represents an allovmnce made by 
the company at the outset which is subsequently reflected at all stages 
in. the price of oil products. It is intended, in theory, to cover part of 
the company's costs, but, in fact, it is internal to :the group concerned 
and it is difficult to say 1·1hat its precise function is. Thus th~ 
transfer price is essentially a price fixed by an oil company on the 
basis of its 01.\'11 mechanisms for use vdthin :i.ts 01-m group of companies, 
but it constitutes for the refineries a significant factor in their costs. 
The Commission has compared the monthly Neighted average fob 
transfer prices of eleven companies vrith respect to their refineries in the 
Community for t1.,ro types of crude oil, Arabian Light 34 ° API and Ira.'1ian Light 
34° API l). It generally noted that price levels vary from group to group 
and that the average prices for some international groups (those 1'li th 
adequate or surplus supplies of crude oil) are lo1·TCr. This is explained by 
the higher proportion of cheaper concession crude oil in their cost calcu-
lations. Arnoncs the large international groups, the variations betv1een their 
respective pr·ice levels are relatively slight and are attributable either 
to the sources of the crude oil or to a policy of differentiating the 
transfer prices according to destinations. 
1) On grounds of confidentiality the figures are not included in 
this report. 
1st Q:TAr:ER 1973 1 
! 
I I I M:tr.:;in ?:-.~~,;;fer l 1\Vf:'to....,"l~o I Typ~ of c:".;.de n. ..,., .. (~~ .... n. .. -................ f""""' I ;3/bbl --· I prj_cc -- J•"'-'"{t) 
--- l co;;t ?1./tol ! rlf"·l I I ,-~c,o.::;·l .::.·_oc l /'~-)~: i I I I I 1 1.63 -:-.34 1.97 1.75 
2 f 
I 1. 71 +.39 2.10 1.83 
3 i 1.67 I +o37 2.04 1.79 ; 
4 I 1.92 +.29 2.21 : 2.05 
5 I 1~87 +e27 2.14 2.00 I l 6 I 1.85 +o49 2.34 1.99 7 1.84 +.37 2.21 1.:n 
8 1.73 +.28 2.01 1.85 
I 
·\.rc T'-3 ce: 1 -8 I +.36 2.05 1.82 1.70. I 
! L-
I : 9 i 2.37 +.75 3.12 2.81 
10 I 2.27 +.8o I 3 .. 07 2.70 
'I 
' 
" 
ll ~ 2.32 +.80 3o12 l. 2. 75 i 1 
l I I .r:..~~ .. er~ge 9 - • 1 I 2.33 I +.78 3ell 2.76 I' I I I I A-.-crage 1 - 11 { 1. 78 ·h41 I 2.19 1 .. 95 I 
(a) See last co: 1J.r:n of Tables 17 a - c. 
-- ---
-
2:1d Q.U.lt .. ~~~~ 1973 
I 
: 
l1;:::'8"'S""'"' 1 Averat;l.,_} !·7-:l..rbir.. - ,,._ 4. ...,.._ 
. -;3/'c.bl 1 prlc<: ! cosL 
, .. _1/bbl -· !. "7/bbl -
l 
I 
I 
I 
+.35 2.10 I 1.93 
I i +o42 2.25 I 2.03 i +.38 2.17 1.97 +.34 2.39 2.24 +.30 2.30 2.21 i +.51 2,50 2.17 +.37 2.34 2.17 
I +.31 2.16 II 2.02 
i 11 
+.38 I it 2.20 2.00 
+e51 I 3.32 3.05 
+e57 3-27 I 2.93 +§57 3o32 2 .. 98 
I I +.55 3~31 2.99 l I I +.40 2.35 2~13 
TABLE 18 (a.) 
-
3rd G,UATITER 
I !·furgir-
' <} ;-.· 1 f1 00 
+.47 
+.55 
I 
+.52 
+.53 
+.45 
+.71 
"+.55 i +o4'i 
c 
3 
+.51 
+.82 
+.88 
-:-.89 
+.87 
~.57 
1)73 
I 
Tr;"J.:J::;f.t;!r 
p:=-icc 
1/nbl 
2.40 
2.58. 
2.49 
2.77 
2.66 
2.88 
2,72 
2.49 
2.51 
3.87 
3.81 
3.87 
3e86 
2.70 
I 
i 
I 
co 
\J1 
'l' lffiL~~ 18 (b) 
4th Q.Ulu~TER "0'"7? 1..; 1 J !::;t QUARTER 1974 
-
. 
r ft. VC Y'~.[;t~ ,.,/ . 1' r::t. n ~-1 fer .",:-~,.. ....... t·-~ !.S:~~r&ii: Trc:.;1~fcr I !a). ~.·~ rt:_;J..n ...... - .. 1,~'-'.:l,.J T~:p:; of c;ol:dc C<)::;~. rf lb' ' _ pr:..ce ~,...,,.j.. 1 . p::.~icc . ;;/ O.l . \_-v • ..-"' ~;'bbl I ''I\', f_,f(~"".;_,l_.. ' f -::ct. I! slb-bl I • ({ /i--1-, l ! - ! 7·; ' • .•. 
-+- • 
-- 1 I 
1 I 3.13 +.23 3.36 9~20 -.35 8.85 I f 2 I 3 .. 42 + .. 24 3 .. 65 9e52 -,,t,O 9 .. 12 3 I 3~23 +.,20 3 .. 43 9 .. 33 -\939 8 .. )4 ! 
' 
4 ') "9 .)o0 +.18 4o07 10.,13 - .. 42 9.71 
~ . 3.65 +.14 3 .. 79 9o74 - .. 36 9.38 ,., 
6 3 .. 85 +o29 4 .. 14 I ., ~ • '=\ -.42 J ~:~! .LV,J.:., .. 7 3" 1'( + .. 15 3 O::l? I 10.~-.47 ~,;-8 3.,28 + .. 20 3 .. 43 9c45 -~42 _9 .. 03 
I 3 .. 31 +.22 ! 3 .. 53 I 9n43 i -~39 I 9.,04 :._ .. _rcr~ce 1 ~ 8 
-l - j -I Q 5 .. 04 +.71 5 .. 75 10 .. 22 ' + 1 .. 16 11 .. 38 "' 10 4o89 + .. 68 5o 57 10 .. 04 + 1.,02 11,06 I 11 4,.97 +.73 5 .. 70 l~c09 J ·}- l.,08 ll,J.7 
-
~ 
---
I 4.98 I I !'..Vn!'"A~e q - 11 + .. 72 5 .. 70 10~13 + 1.,01 lle23 - I J 
11 I - I ~l~Jo:!"'abtJ ~ - 3.57 +.30 3.,87 9 .. 53 - .. 16 9c:37 I 
a) See last col:J.r.m of Tab::!.es 17 d- e. 
• 
• 
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Analysing the Comrnuni"ty countries indivtclu.ally, it 1.-lill be observ·ed 
that the prices of tv10 of the majors \'.rere the same v1hatever 
the destination of their crude >vithin the Community. The pricen of another 
three display differences from one country to another which are due to 
overlapping of the prices applied during each month. 
The prices of one of the large international compa,.'!ics differed. 
substantially beti·Jeen the countries of the c o;mnon market. Accord.ing to t'r.e 
compo.n;r concernccJ, the reasons for these differences relate primarily to the 
prcvn:il ing conclit ions on tho various Ille.:rkcts • 
. 
The prices paid by two European companies, Nhich have inadequate 
suppl i:)S of cru.c.c oil under tho ir ovm control, "\.·Jere, on em average, 10-20% 
.· 
higher than tho:.:;e paid l'y large intcrnat ional compa2.1ies. 'rhe differences 
were sometimes even greater : Arabian Light, February 1974, Germany, a 36 ~'b 
difference; March 1974, Italy, a 31 % difference. 
Overall, l':i th res pee-L to the t;-;o types of crude studied, 
price cliffcrcnccs betHcen e;roups and ·betH88Yl co1.wtries reflect l1oth 
differences in the compa..rlics' supplies of crude oil and ccr·~ain diff'erenc'-;~.; 
beh.reen concli tlons existing in tho various cou."ltrics. 
These differences betueen trw1c:1fc·r prices arc in a Hay arbit:::·ury a~1d. C!.o 
not reveal stra.tegics bein.r; pr-actised. uy each g:c-ou;:. Nevertheless, the transfer 
price system does permit some apportionment of income from one country to a~10ther 
or from one continent to ~other in pursuance of the policies of the groups. 
(d.) Crude oil Prices for cert,ain Europeru1 cor.tEanies lAth inade_qu.ate s~plies 
of crud.e oil. 
The supplies of' European companies \·Thich are short of crude oil were 
• studied in more detail for three companies in Belgium and Italy. 
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In Belgium, an independent company obtained its supplies 
from a large international compa1zy under a basic contract v:hich set 
prices by reference to the latter's production costs plus a profit 
margin. 
The invoiced prices paid by the independent company vrere 
lo-v;er ~han those invoiced to the subsidiaries of the. large international 
cpmpany. 
In Italy, no system of transfer pricing for crude oil is in 
operation by the large companies v1hich operate refineries but ivhich do 
not belong to any of the large international oil eompanies. To afford 
some comparison l-Ii th the transfer prices applied by the large interna·-
tional companies, some information is given belm·J on the import prices 
for crude oil in Italy. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
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The import prices for crude oil paid by tuo Italian companies 
were bazed on the monthly notifications in the''Istituto Centrale di 
Statistica" ("J:.rrivi di I·:aterie, Prime e Prodotti Petroliferi"), in l\ihich 
the fob costs of each t;ype of cru.cle oil were also quoted .• However·, these 
do not refer ·~o the day of loading but are based on an averaee of all 
qu.antit.ies iEl}:orted in the course of a month, so that thcr:e prices cannot 
l)c c.o;nparod exc:tctly Hith the transfer prices charged by other compe,nies. 
It can n<.::vertheless be f:lecn that the hm cOJr,_panies puid higher pricBs than 
the major international companies, ospecia.lly o.s they bought more on the 
free market. 
A compa.rioon of the average prices of these tv10 Italian companies 
for t1"1'0 of their main types of imported crude oil shovTS that up to July 
1973, the crude oil prices of the companies varied only minimally bet\vcen 
ec,ch other, al-though one of the companies shoNcd average priceo which 
tended to be ~wme.,:hat hir,;·her than those of tho o-ther comp.:~ny. 
Fro:n September 1973, hm·:cver, the pric~s pn.ic1 by the firr~t company ..,.Terc, 
in gen-eral, sit-o-nificantly greater than those paid. by the second, and the reason 
for ·~his may be associated. ;-;ith tbe differinc co:nmcrcial motivn;tionn of the 
h;o cort~panics. One company operates the 1;10re ur.ma.l commercial pol icy of a 
1m'&e integra'L·;;d oil company, iha.t is, purclta:s ine cruie o:i.l vli th the intent ion 
of producing from it a lG-rc;e runc:;0 of oil products for tlh:tribu.tion throue~h 
its mm neh;o.cks. The other company, on the other hand, purchases supplies 
of crude oil primarily for the production of. basic material for further 
processing in the chemical plants of its o~m group • 
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The first company, Hhose refinery capacity greatly exceeds that of the 
second company, concluded supply contracts on a long-term basis in an attempt 
to ensure adequate supplies of crude oil for its refiner;>· prot"Tallli!Jc, c:n.i 
the oper&.tion of the price escalation clause::; in such contrar.ts resul teo. 
in the application of the si[,!1ifieantly hic,hor prices from September 197 3. 
On the other hand, the second company did not rely on long-term contracts but 
tendecl to purchase its supplies of cr-ude oil in smaller qua."ltitics c:w:1ci at 
tines v:hcn H could obtain them at a lovJOr price; it therefore avoided 
the effect of price escalation clc;.uses in contracts. 
.. 
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(e) Prices for oil Er~ducts 
The previous sections of this part of the report dealt with the 
pricing of crude oil. 'l1his section considers prices at sulmequent stages 
in the chain of production and distribution of oil products. Itlvill 
deal with the factors 1-l"hich are taken into account in deter;:1ining transfer· 
prices for refined products and liill analyse the applicatio;l of these 
factors in the method adopted by some major oil companies .:.·or the calculation 
of prices. 
·Oil products 
.... ' 
' . 
' . : ( ' ~ ~:·, ~ 
_,·,,· 
•',' 
are distributed by oil companies mainly along 
'"'{c. ,, ' 
;.'>' .. ' '_ ::, '. ,' : .. · t·\, < ·" • • ' {. < ":- 1'': ',, 
·, 
··;· ,l·, .. 
- consumption on the domestic market of the coUntry in which the refinery 
is situated; 
- d.istribution to companies in the same oil group in other countries 
- sale to third parties in other•c£mntries. 
1. Prices on domestic markets 
So far as the first route is concerned, the introduction of 
price control in several countries of tho EEC meant that th~ prices of 
refined products on the domestic market were no longer subjJct to the 
normal market forces during the period of the oil crisis. In some member 
states (in the Netherlands, for example) only the price to the customer was 
controlled, but in other countries (for example, France) the controlling 
regulations extended ·to the ex-refinery prices of products -~-well as to 
the prices to the consumer. One of the aims of this latter~form of price 
control was to permit a viable margin to the independent dt'3t):'_ibut.ors . .o-f'--
oil products, and, whilst the extent-"o:t'the ma;~i;~s- ~~ailable1~b 
distributors was fre~tently criticized, nevertheless it helped to reduce 
the severe difficulties whioh,;w.ere encountered by independent distribu·tors. 
~ ' • ' I 
,, 92 -
Imposition of maximum prices for the consu.-ner proved 
effective in controlling the upward spiral in the costs oi' oil products 
during the oil crisis but also injected a degree of unreali·~y into the 
market for oil products in those countries. Thus the pl'ices fixed for 
certain oil products often bore no relation to the actua: costs of th~ir 
production, given the increases in the prices of crude oil. 
Direct comparison of prices between the different countries of 
the Community is.difficult because prioes are quoted in the d'ifferent 
t, ; : .~~!·,,:, ' ' ' •' t ::' '' -',~,· ' ' ' r" \ j'. \' •' ',' ~· ('' t' ' ' ' ~. ', 'I I t ' ' 
·curfencies. o:f'·."the . 6o~tvies': conoer.t1ed:;.and pm"'i ty ,_of· currency oh~ged., 
ae~e;al···t'ime~ ;d,i:t:ing· the ,i~1~iod· under revi~w. :In addition,. no uniform 
. .,uhit of quanti·~y 'ls. U:sed~·· . It i~ ne;ertheless possible to .describ~ the 
domestic pric~ situ~tion in the various .countries of the Community. 
Netherlands 
So far as the sale of oil products on the domestic market is 
concerned, maximum prices were authorized by the J'.rinistry of Economic Affairs 
'II\_' 
on the basir; of proposals submitted by -the oil companies acting through 
the Olio Contact Commiasie. The Ministry had thr; right, if it was of the 
opinion that certain price increases seemed excessive or v;ere otherHiS(') 
tmacceptablc, to request tho oil compani0s to modify their proposal::: :'or 
price adjustment. The regu1 at ion concerning price::; for oil products \·ras 
issued on 22 January 1974. 
Maximum prices •vere proposed by oil companies on the basis of 
the following factors: 
- fob price of the product on the international free market compiled from 
Platt's Oilgram (see page 114) in the follot-ring proport~Qnn: 
.,c ,--J 
-2.5% Gulf of Mexico: spot cargoes all ports 
~ 25%. cargoes fob Italy 
- 25% barges fob Rotterdam 
- 25% ~~/Rotterdam/Amsterdam (see page 113) 
:JJ :-
These percentages may sometimes vary, depending on the product. 
.. · 
Product 
~ Date 
Superpetrol 
HBO I(light 
heating oil) 
Heavy fuel 
oil 3500 
" 
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- price of sea transport, based on the AFRA tariffi * 
- transport insurance and transport losses; 
- taxes; 
- . margins of profit for importers, distributors and retailers. 
Table 21 shows, for three products, the market prices which 
were in operation, compared with the maximum prices authorized by the 
Dutch Government; prices are expressed in Dutch guilders • 
.. '-
,· ' 
' '' ~,' ( Table 19 ___ _ 
,. 
Price on the Rotterdam biaximum price Difference free market 
15.11. 22.01. 04.02. 15.11. " 22.01. 04.02 15.1:: .• 22.01. 04.02 
1973 1974 1974 1973 1974 1974 1973 1974 1974 
HflL!OO lit res 
-
94.24 103 •. 50 105.26 83~50 38.70 88.70 10.7ti 14.80 16.56 
Ill_' 
46.03 .:)7.13 35.55 26.50 26.50 26.50 19.53 10.63 9.05 
HflLl.OOO k~ 
163.23 278.52 273.69 90.40 90.40 90.40 72.83 183.12 183.29 
The difference between the market price and maximum price \vas, 
in previous years, generally small. However, on 15 November 1973, the 
difference for heavy fuel oil was already 72.88 guilders.,~r tonne and it 
reached its maximum level on 22 January 1974, when it waE>"i88.12 guilders 
per tonne. These figures show how prices soared on the Rotterdam free market 
during the crisis months. 
The dealers' margin for sales from filling stations of petrol and 
diesel fuels was also detef:IMined by representatives of the oil indust.ry in 
cooperation with BOVAG (Bond van Automobiel-en GaragenbeQrijven) and-accepted 
by the Government. On the other hand, ?O fixed margins of profits existed• 
for light and heavy fuel oil. 
* Average Freight Rate Assessments (see Page 113) 
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As, in the Netherlands, maximum prices were fixed by the 
Government only at the level of the conswner, no controls applied to 
the ex-refinery prices. Distribution margins for the retailer for petrol 
and diesel fuels were fixed as a result of agreements reached beh;een the 
oil companies and the trade organizations. They \vere therefore accepted 
rather than approved by the Dutch Government. T\.;o results emerged frorn 
this absence of controlled prices at the refinery level. Firstly, th€re 
was a considerable variation between the ex-refinery prices operated by 
the oil companies due in particular to the different markets to which the 
products were destined. A further result was the difficulty encountered 
}>Y.:· ~ndependent who~e~~le' de~;Lers, _who op:erat~d ... e~clusiv:el~ -~n --~_!l~,]!E!!~~~~~~~t 
~h~n ce'r:tain oil'. companiei;J. fi'xed. th'eir ex~r~finecy· ·prices so close .to the ' 
~ ! I• • ~ < ' ' 
1 
' 
0 
•' r ~ 0 I ' f, ' ' 'I, , 
0 
\ ' ' 'o 
0 
I :' " ' • 1 " ' ' ' ' 
1 
. maximum prices that the margins to the wholesalers were excessively· reduced. 
The calculation of prices in order to fix maximum prices at 
the consumer level >vas based o~l''the price structure drawn up by the Belgian 
Oil Feder at ion (Federation Petrol iere Belge - l"PB). Naximum prices were 
fixed for oil products by a ministerial re£U.lation dated 29th Ju~1e 1973. 
+ 
+ 
+ 
net price ex-refinery 
tax on oil products 
gross price ex-refinery 
margin 
additional zone charge 
rebates 
+ VAT-
T ... ,., 
-"' ~} 
market price to the consumer 
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The net price ex-refinery was obtained by assuming that the product had 
been imported as a final product -the system described as 'import parity•. 
This system takes into account the following cost items: 
-minimum price fob Carribbean Sea or Gulf of Mexico, according to 
quotations in Platt's Oilgram (see page 1~4); 
- sea freight, based on AFRA, by "medium-range" tanker for the .distance 
Aruba/Cur3.9~~-:-AntwerP. ; , 
- charges for duty and inspection. 
The margin must cover the cost of distribution and delivery to 
the consumer. When sales are made without intermediaries the margin is 
retained_ by the oil company. 
The additional ?,One charge is necessary to cover the transport 
cost from refinery to the dispatch depot. Thor~ are three zones : 
- zone 0 covers an area of 15 km around Antwerp; 
- zone I comprises the rest of the prmrince of Antwerp, East Flanders, 
Brabant and Tessenderlo; 
- zone II is the rest of the country. 
The investigations confirmed that during the crisis, the maximllin 
prices were respected and that the tariffs operated by the oil companies 
corresponded to these ma.'Cimum prices, including the trade margins • 
.,2;). 
It was noted that, from 1972 to the middle of 197 4, tho margins 
of the distributors becar.1e progress~yely smaller. l~~ the middl~;:;F~f 1974, 
they were equal to the margins fixed by regulation, so that it was no 
longer possible to offer rebates. 
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Frnnce 
The regulation of 30 June 1945 (Ordonnance No. 45-1483) 
empowered the public authorities to fix prices for goods and services. 
Besides petrol and gas oil, since 1973 light and heavy fuel oil for 
domestic and industrial use were also subject to the price system called 
"regime de cac1re de prix" imposed by the Government. TLc intermediary 
trade does not establish its ovm price list and sales conditions but sells 
on the basis of the price lists of the trading associations, which are 
obliged to submit the price lists for each category of product to the 
appropriate authorities sq~as to enable the authorities, if they wish to 
raise 2~ objection, to defer their entry into effect. 
Formulation of the price lists is complex and L> based on strict 
'\ 
provisions. The price determination starts with the ex-refinery price, 
i'l"hich is fixed by the refineries, u.nder Government supervision, takine 
account of the follmdng i terns : 
1:,• 
intcrnat ional quo tat ions for -o i.l prod.ucts on certain m 1rkc ts (price::; 
fob Ca.rribbean according to Platt's Oilgran); 
sea transport, based on &~A; 
- cost of insurance and port dues. 
Except for this common base, the pattern of pricing .is different 
for each cater;ory of product even though the same elements of the market 
price for conswners remain the same (trade margins, taxe:j including the 
fee to the French Petrol Institute (IFP) vlhich is in the nai.ure of a levy, 
and rebates). The French market is split into zones, w~h involves 
local ex·tra charges and predetermined transport costs from the nearest 
refinery. 
T ",., 
--"' \~ 
• 
,. 
. ! 
' ' . ,~: . 
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Spot-checks of invoices for domestic sales confirmed that the 
invoiced prices were in conformity with the maximum prices laid down b;y 
law and that rebates beca~e increasingly smaller towards the end of 1973 
and the beginning of 197 4. 
The lavi introducing a new method of calculating official maximwn 
prices in connection with the new system of taxation was introduced 
retroactively from 1 January 1973. The former system of 'import parity' 
was replaced by the .concept of costs of production. Three levels of these 
cost13_can,be dist,ingtiished.- cost of raw material, refining costs and cost 
•.'. ': ·: ·.. . ', ' .. , . . . ''1'. . . . ' 
of distribution.,· .. The cost of -raw material is the average fob price of the 
,' - ' '1, ,,· 
i~ported . crude 'on' plus the average. transport cost. This price is 
apportioned between the final products according to a system based on the 
API scale for viscosity of the crude ~1. Typical refining costs for 
refineries with full cycle are apportioned between the diff~rent oil 
products. The maximum price as fixed by the Comitato Inter.ministeriale 
Prezzi (CIP maximum price) is applicable for the whole country without 
regard to the location of the re.:(',:i_nery or depot anr:l include3 the processing 
tax (imposta di fabbricazione) as well as the profit margin for the retail 
trade. 
The tra.."lsport costs are fixed by the Comi tato Interministeriale 
Prezzi and applied by regional price committees (Comitati Provinciali Prezzi, 
CPP) within the limits fixed by the Comitate Interministeriale Frezzi. 
It may be mentioned in this connection that all the oil companies 
protested against what they claimed was a totally unrealistic price 
situation lasting for several months owing to the fact that during the 
crisis there was a time lag between the fixing o'f new maxii'fl'lihi'·prices for 
oil products and the impact of price increases for crude oil. 
i' T ..,,., 
_./'- ~~ ':lJj-
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Luxembour~ 
Because of the Belgiru1-Luxembourg Economic Union and the 
fact that the great majority of petroleum products com~ from Belgian 
refineries, the regulations in these tvJO countries are largely the same. 
The Law of 30 June 1961 empowers the Minister of Economic Affairs 
to determine prices which must not be exceeded under penalty ,_of sanctions. 
A price office is entrusted with supervision and may, if necessary, 
examine the. bookkeeping an{l~ inv~ices• As'. in ·Belgium, any ,price increase 
·· ·may be-prop~sed by the oil oo~pMie~. on the bMis or the "import parity'' 
system. 
'\ 
For a long time - in fact, up to the start of 1970 - these 
provisions hardly applied, since the raarket prices 1-lere ahmys belo1<r the 
maximum prices. At the end of 1970, however, the lilinister rejected the 
proposals of the oil companies aml froze the maximu.'Il prices in the belief 
t.,._. 
ttat ·Lhe proposed increases could be made up for by dispensing >vi th tr·~ 
discounts previously granted to custow')rs. 
• 
• 
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Denmark 
The oil market in Denmark is supplied by private enterpri8es, 
mainly the Danish subsidiaries of international oil concerLs. Their 
predominance is more evident on the market for light products than on the 
market for residual oils, where independent suppliers and r~ few major 
consumers make up an appreciable portion of the market. 
Until October 1970, control was based on the Monopolies Act in 
" the form of a standard calculation system set up under an agreement betvJeen 
the Monopolies Control Authority and the three largest oil companies in the 
Danish market. The calculation system did not include heavy fuel oil. 
1\1\ . ' 
From October 1970, prices of oil products came 1"lithin the 
provisions of the Price Stabilization Act and from April 1571 those of the 
Prices and Profits Act, 1971. The stru1dard calculation rules of the Prices 
and Profits Act resulted in lovwr selling prices for oil products in 
Denmark than in most other l·lestern European countries. 
In November 1973, the oil companies rrere grru1ted an exemption from 
the Prices and Profits Act in order to reduce the negative effects that the 
relatively lor1 selling prices in Denmark might have on the supply of 
oil products. By the terms of this e:x.emption,the oil companies were 
permitted to calculate their selling prices on the basis of .. ~Y:rrent 
replacement costs for crude oil or impor·ted products instead""of the costs 
actually incurred. This . arrangement is maintained under the ne\-r Prices and 
Profits Act 197 4·· ', t}.': ':l~k 
;it i l' 
* * 
* 
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Ireland 
As Ireland is completely dependent on imports 1 \vhethcr cruc.e 
oil or refined products 1 prices are basically dete·~mined cy the 
prices on the international markets. 
Since imports 1 ref::nir.z and distribution are "1andled by 
pri •.rate enterprises 1 these devise their mvn pricing policies and 
set their sales prices wittout direct state intervention. 
However, price>'}~creases have to be approved by the Department 
of Industry and. Commerce, after applications have been. examined by 
the National Prices Commission. This latter body, vrhich includes a 
inember appointed by the Association of Irish HousevJives to repre::>ent 
.. 
consumers 1 makes recommendations to the Department of Ind,wtry u.:1d 
Co~mercc after each application for a price increa~e. The examin~tions 
are cased on the folloc·ri.n[; sri terion: the ir:.crcase must not e::-.ceed 
the amount of the tmavoida::;le and pr::rmaner:.-t rise in costs inC1..lr~ed 
II._· 
tz" the applican-t compcny. "":.t the end of 1972, the Depa:::tm~mt 
decid10d 1 at the r:1J[gcE:tion of the iTational ?rices '~or:1:1:is::>ion, t~-:at 
no wholesEJ.lP. pric!: vii t.hm.~ t ta~< for oil proclucts vJ01...ld. '::Je :>er:::i tt "d 
to e;~ceed the correspond i.ng price charged by tLe s·1bsU.ia"y or 
a:-;sosiated compan3' in the ''outer zones" of tl:J.e "Cni '.ed. £:in,~dom. In 
the 2l>scn0e of a subsid.iar;:t or o.r;sociatcd co.np:::tny, the li..:i t H01~ lrl 
bn tho standard ..-:holesale price posted. f:1r t1w "o1'.ter zcnes" of tLe 
United Kingdom. 
United Kingdom 
Up to 1973 the prices for oil products were de~irmined solely 
by the oil companies. In spite of its holding in B:'itlsh Petrole'Jm, 
the state took no action in this area. 
,. ' 
The market, therefore, was a free one, but th-'ee lar ,;e int<",...-
national oil compani,~!st· accounting for over 60% of tot~~ sales, 
exert a strong influence on the trend of prices. Consurr.r'rs · prz.,:ed 
only a marginal role and then only i::1 negotiating i:tdividual cont~'act~. 
.. 
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There 1.,ras no official tariff, nor wo.s thero any obl::..gation to pul,- is!:.. 
prices. Tte oil companies did, hoHever, compile pr:ice listc at regular i ,ter-
vals and these were published in the specialised journals. Disco~;!l ts <rcre 
gben on the listed prices. 'rhe size of the d:Lscount varied Ni"th the size nf 
the order, ter::1s of deliv·ery and tlle m:::,rket situation. 
T'rom 1973. cofore any price increas·'l fo-:' oil product::; can have effecJc' 
tbe oil co;~.panies are obliged to o':Jtai.n authorization from the Price 
Commission 1rrhich pays particular attention to the mart.;ins. From D0cembcr 1973 
to December 1974, maximum retail prices vrere fixed for motor fuel. For. other 
oil products the. system ~f.:P!'~~±:. -~ppro~~· ... by the Price Commissibn remained 
··in force • 
.. :~ ..... , 
'·' :' .. • . :; . t:. ,:: .· ... :_ . ' ' ', . •' . ; .. ,· . ;.·:,.;,'1.~:·· <·y·.:;·~ .. ::.'-.· ·, :,\ :;·_\ .. : ~.- '''·. ", . :···:J< ;': -) : ,,_" .;·.·::i ' ... ' 
;.,-. , . :· . .. .~ · .. By, reason of .·the very st;r:uc"tu±-e or· .. suppl-ar·;· :it ·catt;-.be·: safd .. thh:t! tliJ.:s, ·i:·; : 
;,_._.l;,-~.t :~.·~11,,',.:1 ;,~' ._. ... ' .... ,,~:·. :.:.:,.·_···: '•''' .· .. ~·····,.l ,'.:':'' . .-·.·.:~-., .. ·-~ ·,.: ... :::'·. _;.~·~··1.';~_·: '' ·' .. •.::-"'' 
':is: a llo.mogeneoun .market 'vihere' price differences are slight given'·: similar 
. . . l- ·---------~·... ' ' 
. condi tiona of consumption •. 
Germany 
In Germany, the only market en which a b .. rge numler of suppliers 
&cti vely competed 1vi th each othe;r.\1. prices varied considera'bly 'bot·r:een su~J­
rliers, from ona region to another and £'rem one period to c:;.not:wr. 
These differences are illustrated in Taolos 20a. to ~Oe. 
Even for a homot;eneous prodt:crt like petrol, \vhich lG nlso homogcr oous 
:rom the distribution and utilizG.t.ion point of 'TiO'I'J 1 tho P'"ices of the l:J..rge 
international oil companies to -their diE::trilntors varied f:..'Om l4C to 240 m/ 
ri3 in Dec8mber 1973 and from 2W to 330 Dl·Tfr,13 in r.:~trch 197;. 
Price differences for other oil products vwre less stri1:inr; l:u:t none-
theless appreciable. It is also interesting to note that \•il1.ile prices to 
independent dealers allowed them a substantial margin in O~~~bcr 1973, this 
v;as gradually eroded O'Ter the crisis period to become negative on many 
occasions in :March 1974,at least fo!_'~ ~i .. ght fuel oilf.~·~ 
Emerging from this review of the domestic prices for oil products is 
the fact that in those couni!r;hes which introduced maximum ~)rice regula-ti 1ns 
nuring the oil crisis, varying degrees of concertation existed between~oil 
companies in so far as they p<>.rticipated thrOl1t;h their tra-le o::ssocia.tions in. 
the fixing of maximum prices for oil products on their nattonel market (~ 
,;ven in the submiscion o: proposals to the public authori tizs C'Onr-ernin~ 
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ThGre are in addi t.ion, Ni th the posGible exception of Italy, ce.::·-' _,i:.1 
factors u::::ed in the determination of prices, such as Platt's Oilzr-?.m 
quotations and, in the case of Delr;ium, the Aruba/Curagao-:~...'1hrerp freicl't 
rate, \-lhich are not "!"<:alistic in so far as they reflect notional 
the actual costs involved in the p1'ocbotion of oil products. 
rather than 
TableslO a ancl b 0f Part II of the report list conf'umP.r prices, both 
inclusive and exclusive of taxes, .:;.nd reveal that one of the ma:n cons8-
quences of the disparity bet\•reen tl1e price policies of th( member statc·s 
was the extreme difference l:ctween the prices practised ~ n t:-:e ~ountri e~ 
of the Comm,_mi ty. Thio necemmrily distorted competition, al thou.:;h it is 
impossible, over the short period of the crisi-s to assess the rea.l effect 
of this on production and tf&de. 
On 23 November 1973, the domestic price for heatine oi 1, inclusi·re 
of taxes, Has $31/m3 in Italy ann $913 (over 30af; higher) j_n tl1e Netherl:mds. 
'\ 
On 31 April 1974, the dome8tic prjce for gas oil was ~1501/m3 in 
Denmark ann $360 (23o% highe.r)in Germany. 
·l,\_' 
.. 
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.. Dietrib!ltion channel,_l!l ~~ar/iaonth .. _ c_ ~ u~_-:P ;L n_ 7, __ . 
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._ 
A B c 
(a) 
Distributors under 
'73 Oct. 157 ,oo 140,80 162,90 
-
own brand name Nov. 171,00 149,70 180,35 
Dec. 192,00 166,10 202,Q;) 
'74 Ja!'lVo 191,00 169,50 195,33 
Feb. 279,00 259,20 257,40 
1.furch 277 ,oo 259,50 263,60 
- Independent ' -'13 Oct. 120,00 132,96 139,15 
Nov. 144,00 142,57 185,81 dealers 
Dec. 155,00 .159, 70 183,32 
~ 
174 Janv. 155,00 160,74 189,39 
Feb. 245,00 260,58 255,88 
March 247 ,oo 258,23 258,61 
Jfajor conSUIIIers '73 Oct. 152,00 147,50 149, CJ9 
162,20 
\ 
Nov. 155,00 202,07 
Deo. 159,00 174,60 219,79 
'74 Jamr. 157 ,oo 185,50 196,70 
Feg. 247 ,co 270,40 262, err 
? . 
~!arch 257,00 264,80 269,41 
. ;) 
(&)-Average 1p:t:i.ce- - : DUsseldorf & Ma:nnheim 
(b)'Aurage price : Karlsruhe, Duisburg & lngo1stadt 
r:w 
-r 
E ~ F 
(b) -·-
'• 
186,00 145,06 
204,90 166,78 
226,40 181,71 
240,40 - '192,57 
311,50 .·- .·_264,65 
311,30 263,14 
._ 
160,83 130,33 
176,64 . 143.,21 
202,42 ·15~46 
220,45 168,79 
284,79 250,66 
285,56 251,70 
., 
134,66 228,59 
176,73 200,33 
205,79 210,23 
202,84 228,41 
296,69 308,82 
271,68 282,39 
I 
~able! 20 a 
H I J 
207,30 202,00 127,82 
220,70 218,10 140,16 
244,70 241,30 142,41 
243,00 238,20 156,55 
332,10 326,00 222,48 
328,90 323,20 235,02 
-
138,00 134,06 . 
-
152,30 153,14 
-
160,30 164,19 
-
160,00 177,58 
-
250,00 251,51 
-
250,00 252,83 
-
154,60 137,15 
-
170,70 142,49 
-
196,20 171,38 
-
183,50 179,91 
-
273,50 254,85 
-
268,90 262,60 
K 
2Cf{' 30 
220,70 
242,20 
256,00 
312,40 
327,30 
126,40 
143,00 
155,10 
. 
160,50 
244,50 
246,10 
153,20 
165,90 
180,30 
196,70 
273,20 
271,80 
·, 
1-' 
0 
VJ 
'I 
' 
i 
SuPEif PETROL , .. ~::~ ~;; ~:' 
Sal ee. pri oea in Germw.j.J!!xolJ.tsive_::ot:~;#~)-;7':.::-f;:: ·:·: 
DMLm3 . \~;:~~~-~-; 'l'able 20 b 
-~ ~ ·~- ·' -~,--
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·' 
.. •,, 
-- ' ._:-,:~ .,,..... ,_- .. _-..... -__ :,_ ' -~ 
_ Tear/~onth c o ur p: a ri i' <:-~f:. "~" _Distribution ohannels 
A B c E; :~ .-7: -._: F H I J K -~-~-:~~~~~~ 
(a) (b)' ~· ~ • • >{ .- :_=~ .;··: ';-~ I 
Distributors tmder 173 Oct. 214,00 196;30 184,68 214,'06· .:.~10,91 273,20 267,00 113,79 273,20 
own brand name Nov 233,00 205,60 229,61 268,90, 231,90 285,90 286,30 199,37 285,90 
. . ' Dec. 256,00 218,50 261,82 292,20· '245,86 308,60 308,60 203,02 307,70 I 303~30 fi ·; '25~·;92 '. !74 Jan . ., 252,00 227,30 256,10 307,50 304,20 214,:oo 321,90 
Feb •. 344,00 316,70 347,69 374, 3o ·1 ·'--331,63 397,80 391,50 287,15 382,00 
Marsh 340,00 313,70 338,15 ~;;;rt v·~~;;i 395,10 388,10 295,65 393,70 Independent - '73 Oct. 179,00 180,08 177,17 188,00 173,06 169,40 i -dealers Nov. 192,00 ! 193,11 239,10 - 205,60 196,76 202({0 Dec. 208,00 213,80 254,19 260,83 ~. }Oj, 72 - 219,30 210,46 204,10 
-
- I 
'74 Jarr •. 208,00 215,03 I ?49,20 276,86, -218,71 - 219,00 217,03 217,40 Feb •. 298,00 314,87 I '306,57 357,47- ': :296,52 
-
309,00 299,08 301,00 
March 302,00 313,20 309,98 350, 71; ~-~_298,41 - 305,00 296,94 304,30 .. 
" 
-·· F~6a~21 ~ ~jor oonst1111ers ''73 Oct. 200!00 203,50 194,54 175,94' - 213,10 184,01 212,20 
Nov. 215,00 I 216,40 258,61 243,90 . ' 227,06 - 230,70 204,55 226,20 
Dec. 219,00 228,90 283,74 278,8~: . :' 242,82 - 256,20 217,96 240,40 
'.: ... -" 
'74 Jan., 217,00 242,50 264,10 301,60. - ·e-~).,38 - 243,50 231,78 263,80 
Feb. 307,00 325,20 316,98 358,70. -~.342,30 - 333,50 305,73 334,80 
I-< March 317 ,oo 321,60 321,84 363,60' :'-.:;3?.5·, 50 - 328,90 309,20 335,70 
~ -
. )Average price: Dusseldorf & Mannheim .. 
.}Average price: Karlsruhe, D.dsb1ir{t & Ingo1stadt 
- :-::.··-:·· 
-.-. ~-~~ "';. 
LDiM:MJmtiQil 
. L. ~~~!·~- -- . 
~'Distributer• 'Iinder 
701m br&lad:---. -_ [-_---- -.- - -·--- --
---
-~,Indep~t 
7.4ealers 
ill&jOr OorlBUmers 
I. 
,. 
'73 Oct. 
Nov. 
.. neb. . 
174 Jan , 
Feb. 
March 
'73 Oot. 
Nov. 
Deo. 
'74 . Jan._, 
_,Fee. 
~l<'.a.reJl 
'73 Oct. 
Nov. 
Deo. 
'74 · Jan • 
~Feb. 
'•1ol'a.ro;tl 
1 ~ 
210,00 
224,00 
246,00 
255,00 
350,00 
340,00 
157 ,oo 
195,00 
208,00 
220,00 
305,00 
270,00 
182,00 
206,00 
214,00 
224,00 
302,00 
270,00 
162,10 
197,00 
224,80 
226,60 
270,90 
261,80 
151,87 
189,90 
204,39 
212,83 
268,35 
249,80 
(a) 
177,09 
240,09 
272,63 
246,52 
265,31 
244,25 
174,02 
266,80 
266,02 
249,21 
259,98 
259,18 
168,10 203,35 
214,40 280,33 
. 229,60_ 303,34 
240,00 
290,10 
273,00 
275,87 
279,33 
261,75 
· (a) Average -priCBOiisse1dorf &' r4annheim 
._ ..:J 
177,00 
226,00 
256,00 
266,00 
310,00 
290,00 
177,00 
224,00 
26~,00 
(. 
273,00 
271,00 
257 ,oo 
184,00 
211,00 
170,00 
221,00 
261,00 
291,00 
(b) 
236,80 172,79 
271,40 206,36 
306' 30 - 228_,49 
329,10 
386,20 
391,10 
237,20 
310,61 
286,18 
191,46 . 153,3~ -~ 
234,20 178,87~ 
303,79 199,17 
305,08 
396,~ 
257,02 
212,16 
286,26 
-272,65. 
188,54 -. 174,44 
247,02 204,44 
284,29 220,97 
250,47. 241,84 
296,36 . 316,89 
257,86 290,71 
I eo Averrl.se.J»'ri*Karlsru.he, Duisburg ci Ingo1sta.dt 
173,20 
207,80 
230,30 
250,02 
313,00 
. 286,00 
170,80 
243;56.") -
333,30_ 
342,80 
248,40 
269,50 
293,60 
305,60 
382,80 
383,00 
173,40 
186,70 
202,20 
216,40 
299,40 
259,40 
196,20 
199,50 
207,40 
220,40 
301,10 
264,90 
165,47 
205,22 
205,94 
232,40 
286,80 
246,71 
159,08 
186,42 
202,06 
213,37 
288,56 
251,30 
159,42 
183,69 
198,23 
223,28 
295,69 
278,50 
251,00 
268,20 
280,80 
310,30 
361,90 
391,80 
152,70 
189,40 
204,40 
222,60 
254,10 
243,10 
173,20 
207,80 
230,30 
244,60 
312,70 
292,10 
I I 
Liarrt' FUEL on 
_Diettibution \ xe~/m~~li --ehazmela A . -
Distributa:ra unde:r '73 Oct. 
own brand. =-• Nov. 
Dec. 
'74 Jan. 
Fe "b._ 
~t)h 
~depend,• '73 Oct. 174,00 
dealers Nov. 198,00 
Dec. 202,00 
'74 · Jan •.. 210,00 
·:Feb. 265,00 
' 1-fu.rch 243,00 
-
Major. consmmers '73 Oct. 
Nov. 
De:6. 
'74 .... Ja.."' ~~Feb· 
..... ~ . 
March 
- - ) ~ 
Sales prices in ~ ( axollllli:r..::~~~~~) 
DM/m3 
-- . 
::~· C? ~ tV!?if~~~:!i- __ _ 
B c D E. :-·-,.- F 
(a) (b) ..... _ 
-
184,10 188,52 200,00 .. --i\--180, 71 
219,00 259,88 252,00 : ·<' _207 ,89 
230,60 266,48 256,00 ' ,, ·;·:: 214,56 
. , ~. 
227,40 253,88 255,00 ~~:·--;< 233,40 
232,50 248,0} 253,00 
·-
: 301,57 
244,30 239,36 243,00 -~" ::~ .255,30 
J•• ,'r 
178,54 223,58 197,00 191,22 -~ 169,78 
207,42 268,91 269,00 265,62 -- 189,36 
228,81 296,98 - 278,00 309,02· .. ,195,37 
222,35 255,84 273,00 278,51 :~_ 210,39 
246,55 254,26 226,00 .. 259,22 . ' 276,63 
240, J.O 242,43 249,00 237,77 '· '. 285,79 
206,50 203,77 _-:: 174,60 240,71 210,00 
243,20 305,82 270,00 253,98' .. 189,19 
247,90 309,42 260,00 290,62 - ;_ 204,17 
" 
245,90 327,71 265,00 285,66- -.. 228,18 
289,70 276,43 270,00 278,86 . 303,69 
261,20 249,52 252,00 251,20. 257,93 
, (a) ~vez:age P!'ice l DUsseldorf &: 1\Ian,'l..'l-teim 
(b) Ayer&g. price a Karlsruhe, Duisburg & Ingolstadt 
., 
Tabiei20 .d 
f 
! 
H I J K 
185,04 196,60 177,46 187,29 
222,43 201,80 209,16 235,62 
242,92 205,90 213,43 253,4~ 
250,02 222,80 233,16 257,6t 
266,51 289,50 270,73 245,79 
244,95 245,50 238,23 238,17 
-
208,30 176,27 191,99 
-
212,30 215,62 243,58 
-
207,60 213,95 265,10 
-
224,40 231,14 263,47 
-
291,40 270,72 240,98 
-
246,70 237,05 237,4d 
165,71 204,20 175,89 183,14 
225,34 207,70 200,83 260,49 
263,68 217,20 214,27 282,35 
258,77 249,30 222,98 267,20 
283,86 312,00 286,84 I 244 91 260,61 260,60 248,66 1 
l 
mavr FOI!iic ~ (ea. 2 ~ s) 
~, Sales prices in Oel'!!!!!Jl (exclusin ot(ta:i:es._} 
D!IILt 
·c o _m j»_.a__i¥4~{;¥_;;:: -~ -~ _ \ !!!:i~l1U()J1 '!'tt&r/mo#th \ o e a 
·~ ·-
-- A B c D E F- ~,;.-; G 
......... 
(a) (b) '•<:;-"--';' .. 
' •• ~: ... ""'! :* 
· Dietributors unde 
'13 Oct. - 58,co '70;~_[: ' --. '.~ 
"'own brand name ·Nov. 
-
77,00 ' 96,8-o- : ~ -
-- - "" ~ - - Dec. 
-
114,00 - 126;92·_ :t~-~ -
-i. ! 
'74 Jan. - 133,00 139;4~ :~-. ~- -
Fe.b. 173,00 194,59_,. " 
- -
Mareh 
-
176,00 194,21; .. _ .. ~ -
-:·::j.~ . ~· .,_ -. 
Indepe:gdent_ '73 Oot. 54,61 66,83 53,00 47,22 '-. -p -
·dealers -, Nov. 77,76 90,46 69,00 73,87 
- -- ·~r ;t~ -Deo. 109,63 121,26 10!5, 00 109,69 ' ..;, __ ':_~_,... 
' -
'74 _;Jan. 135,99 126,26 129,00 143,81 
-
._ 
-
" :F~-. 175,56 180,02 177,00 178, 3'6 .,\ 
-
Ma.lt:h 113,01 177,74 178,00 113,29 '' -, 
-
.. 
--
~jor oon81DDers '73 Oot. 70,00 '56,01 67,32 61,00 55,80 66,46''- --~--83,97 
Nov. 80,00 84,27 101,36 84,00 73,48 8~,50:' 
Deo. 101,00 119,62 127,82 126,00 110,55 107,75 : 89,22 
- _.,_,.. 
'74 ,-Jan, - 128,00 144,41 143,97 138,00 145,07 134,96· " 
-;.~ 174,00 182,35 186,80 183,00 179,70 188,lf.: 183,93 .. ,Feb. 
March 174,00 179,68 189,23 180,00 172,45 184,~5 - -__ 189,21 
--
r&fiwr. prt~eoJDtisse1dorf & f·Iannheim 
(~) "AVerala price a Karlsruhe, Duisburg &- It:tgoletadt 
) 
'l'able 20 e 
-
H I J K 
- -
82,08 56,26 
- -
83,38 72,31 
- -
102,32 102,11 
- -
136,20 144,81 
187,57 176,91 
- -
- -
183,28 175,57 
56,99 78,00 56,54 54,33 
66,94 82,00 70,97 74,94 
107,62 109,00 107,16 111,18 
126,23 129,00 132,70 154,08 
170,39 179,00 177,15 18'7, 57 
168,85 179,00 171,06 176,96 
62,90 79,00 60,54 57,86 
88,23 83,00 88,46 67,49 
110,98 110,00 102,24 87,78 
137,13 130,00 116,00 111,88 
175,70 180,00 156,98 158,53 
183,05 180,00 154,99 166,83 
. 
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2) Transfer prices for oil product::> 
The Lnpact of t.::-ansfer prices charbed by a company for oil products 
on the price o.t whic11 those products ar0 actc1ally sold on the market in tl'le 
country of destination should n;)t be overest-imated. H'hilst it -.:::J-..:2-d 
undoubtedly be preferablP. for the pror:enures for the calcu.lati.::Jn of transfer 
prices -l;o be more readily seen to bear a rt:lations!"Iip with U::! ;:;.ct1~o.l costs 
-i_ncurred by r.n oil co:npany 1 these proceflurcs remain ::msentia: l~r r1o:.J~ :>tic 
to each oil group and, more particularly, to the accountinG procedures 
between the various companies involved within that group. They were not 
seen to have a direct relationship '"i th';tlB final selling price for oil 
products by any company in any1~ountry of the Community, ever. Germany, 
where no controls on the prices of oil products were imposed by the 
Government. Indeed, as will be noted later, the transfer prices for 
petrol of one company to an aoso~iated company in Germany were above the 
prices at wh:!.dt that corr.pc::.ny sold petrol' on the German marke". 
'I'he system of determininc t~1e prices at which o:J. prod.lCts are 
transferred bet:1een comp.:.nies \-:i thin tre so.mc: oil group in d~ fferer.t 
co~ln::ries 'ta-ri.es considerably froffiu()ne group tv another : son e oil 
co:-;;p.:.nies vc.r;; their mm ::;ystem further 1 according to geogro.; hi cal areas 
>ri thin their fiel~ Jf O.£)<-.rations. 
OnfJ r. :....Jor international comJlill:..J' invcctigated (Company I) ';.:.n.::o its 
tro.nsfer prir,es en prices ::.mo'~<m as "supply pricGo" i-Jhich an us:::d for all 
prcduct::; covered ':Jy the enquiry with the ezception of naphtha..':'hc:::::: "suppl.· 
prices'' are partly calcula-'.;ed b;y refE.:rc:nce to the; rolovant q·. oto::tions in 
Pl:,tt 's Oile;rr.m (see later) but o.lso to.kc in~;o account the e· ctE of crude 
oil, freight charges and refining costs. 
( ) 
-·~d-
Anotter compazzy Company F referred to its transfer ~+Jces in Europe 
as "Channel zone" prices until January 1973 and based their calculation 
exclusively on the relevant qt·.otations" contained in Pt~;t' s C'ilgr13:t:ltJfi:'ron: 
J aLuary 197 2, a syctem k.llO'!-m as "mixed export parity price" ~r.mP) rep laced 
that of Channel zor.e prices and was applied to all transfers of oil products 
to companies in the oil group ;b:fl· Company F, with the exceptbn of certain 
deliveries to Belgium and to the Gerr.1a.'1 armed forces. The ME:' can be 
described as a"composite price" since 25% of it was based o .. the Platt's 
Oilgram quo' ation for that prod.uct a:1d the remaining 75 ~ wo.; rdated tc 
yet another factor called the ''term price''. This term price ;.as i tcelf d.rcsn 
from several cost items such as the price of crude oil, fr,eight, refinin~ 
_Q.Q.";ts and co!3j;..§ __ o_:[' storage. 
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::·eferenr:;s ~-:G-s ;r;ad.e -!;o Platt's ·)ilgr::.:n cr:otn7.ions .:1nC:. t8 co.:;t;:, of crude 
.':..:.'1. i<:lpression o.: ti;c complcxi -'vy o: tho calc~.;.laticns npp~icd. to 
outain tlw tr·c..r1::::fcr :price may be c,ained frorr. tl10 follo-;-vi.~1L e:·:ar:rpls, 
"'l.ich sets out the proce:i1.lre of O!le international con.pan.y (company I)l) 
. .. . . Iri :~he ,ca.ser of_ ~:his. _company, the s~pply prices are agreed 
~dn't'ti1~r~and<a~p-ly :'to: -~e-ii~~~i·~~'(·cihdd::.6ri ·gn(i,' afte'r;the ftjtst .da.Y,,'ofl': 
~~ch'. 6·~i~nd~~ -m~~ili·~ ~:1~esF ~t~· d~~i ~e~; f~om a.ri a.gre.ed p$-~cen~age .of,.: a~ 
ali-in cost price plus a percentage of a spot price. 
"The all-~n cost price is arrived at 1t;y 
(A) calc1.·lat.~ng the fob cost of one tor..no of J..:rabia.n Ligh·'. c:r·u·.:e oil 
~o::lpt...ni·:;G :;...;::; l:c.:.lli;' t::a fc..ir a~~d coin,l~srcid,l f,ri(:o :='ul:., ... £7 C!1 ~~l~ 
tvren,t,/·--~r.:.rr: of -~~uc pre;:;edin&; ::.ont~ 2)by -!;he appropri~ .. k tc:.:rrel/ 
l) In -~1:: ... ~c::~ vJ~::.ch f~:)llo,·Jc, s·)i:-10 t,J .. ;c::; ~.).2 C:':J.d~ oil, n£y .. Cs o:f por-ts 
and ::-·~ 0d.ttc~:::; !:~\'""C boen roplar:c~.l l;y 111..:.~-.1).:-rs, for ra.::..co!'. · o7 
c011f:.:"] en ti~l.i tJ-. 
2) r~~ht? i:cr~."l ''iJI'G8ed.ine;'' d"!011th ~8 :i.£.:0C: iil :his p!'OC0iUrG l.; : .. !.te:-';rc-:e:i 
as t3::..n~ -~~-:·? ce..len,_:_lcx !Tlon Ll1 prior to ~ll:tt i'c; ~J:ticl1 Ct .. J sapp~y :p:!. ... iG~ 
is 'oe::.!~[; calculated. 
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ac bcillG ·:l1~ f~ir C~Yli cornmerr:'.i.:l:!. p:c·ic: ..:~lillb :"'. ~!-'-;; t~~c1r~~7"-tl1ir::l v-£' ttr; 
DT''2Ce'1.:.nrt :7ton"t!1 1"' ~-"c <>.,.,..,~opri .,..t,., 'o···,·rel 1to'~··" ~,.,c-'-o.,. T·;'h~ ,..·. ,-nl ""'"' nt::r:_ t>r-1 r:0 
... ...... /._t) ~- ... C·,t-;;•1 -'-'"' v """"' ...... I I .:...a..i.- -"-~ ....... , . -·~- ........... ~.,.·.I- - ---
~D) addint; to ";h0 7'ol;) cost of one tmmE' of ~~':t)e 2 cr·xle the uppropri de freicht 
fro:n Port ~..,r loading 2 to ~:otterdarn 1 t[:u.s r.-rri·v-ing at ::1 C a;.-~ -:-' cost of t."'J 
i~a~lt;e) vess•)~r> applica1Jle d.urine-, the precedine month; 
(2) cu.lculatin£: t.he C and 1' cost o: a re:prcsen'l:.ativs _t~nne of crude oil at 
Rotterdam by adding 70% of the·C and F cost of Arabian Light crude (as 
calculated in D) _to 3o% of thetcC and F cost of Type 2 crude oil (as calculated 
_in D);. 
(F) calculating the all-in cost of the product yields (derived·fro:n distillation/ 
platforming) of a representative t_o!Me ·M_~rude._oil a:t Rotterdam by a4ding 
~4. 50 (as rc_precenting the coct of processing plu::. a reasono.ble reh:rn on 
capi till) per tonne to tho S o.n . l --;: co::r~ of :;;. repreccntativ~ tonne of crude 
oi! ~s cet c~t in E. 
1 I 1 ,_• 
l. ,.., '7'"'l r~r ~·'"~i~:_t ; . ,, 
... 
.:.... 
~ y1 j • ...,, . " " 
") r: ~,t 
" 
,. 
.J• :J. ), . 
' 
3c:: r··.r ,, .. 
'+· ) . _.~,-
t: -,Q ry·1 .. •• 
.• /. .:;_, .. . -',-
r.:. , r- rvr1 
" 
•• ·~ . .J..; • .....,, ' 
~·8-fil'~cr~/ fv.c:!. " ~(")~~ s. ,.y-/ ,, ,, 
-' 
::ottorda.:l bH quottl.tion c:~fc:;tive th~: lc~:timo o: thl? prc~ec .:..nc :no~,th; 
2. :::.driL1g tv;;e-t~1-2r the r';}st~lt ....-alues, t.>~-;1s t:r•·:~~.v:i.n[; at the v<;~(calculat~:i e:t 
Platt's Rotterdam Lows) of 0.95 tonne of productc der~~ed from l.O 
tonne of crude oil; 
3. the so-called lis·t prices are arrive"cl'at 1 '-;I :::rJltipj~;{~G tl-,; Plat~~~ Lo1·: :.f 
each p:roC.w~t by t 11e r::..tio of all-:i.Yl crn<:le ~ost (as under ~ )/·r-a.l!.:.c :>f yi·::lcl 
(aa ~entior.ed 
.- 112 
The 3po-: p:~icc;.r.; D.re t~.c app:#OJfrietE; ?!.a.+t's :~ot' .. c::--c1 3r.~ I..,o-r cr .. ~J"":~J~iOllD 
C -f'~~-+l'~rf"i n{::,~ +he ll1..L;P"'(~ of +'!.lr _""..,.... ........... ,.. ... ,;,.,,.,. 1""\r"'\'Y'..$.."', 1("'-r,-:, 1"'4 l\ II ..,.""c;,;\..,..u \.: •• _r; ..... .:. >J .. ,.. ~-'-' ..... ~•·- "'-"""V l:'"'".._,_,....,..~,...._ __ ... L) "~'"'J.J.u .... '"""'""';,... '-~•' • 
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Freight rates 
The value to be used for the freight rates factor is 
generally based on the indications of the costs of shipments 
of oil known as Average Freight Rate Assessments (AFRA). These 
indices are established monthly by a group of shipping brokers 
operating from London who take into account the frei~1t costs, 
on both a long and a short-term basis, effective during the pre-
vious month. Spot purchases as well as fixed tenn contracts are 
, . I r 
taken into consideration as are the costs of shipment by tankers 
operated by the oil companies themselves. The AFRA freight in-
dices are grouped according to the classification of the vessels. 
" An example of the use of AFRA freight indices has been given 
above in the internal procedure of Company I for deteJmining its 
supply prices. This stipulates that "the appropriate i.'reight rate 
shall be the AFRA rate for ,LR 2 vessels applicable during the 
preceding month". (LR 2 = long range vessels class 2). 
The AFRA scale is expressed in US dollars per long ton. 
AFM quo tat ions 
The AFM prices for diesel fuel and petrol are established 
by the Aussenhandelsverband fur Mineralol, a group of independent 
importers based in Hamburg. Quotations are published by AFM week-
ly on the basis of the range of prices at which its m~~bers have 
concluded transactions for various types of diesel fuel and 
petrol. Although the AFM quotations are published in Pi~tt's 
Oil gram (see below), they are perhaps less accepted for use by 
the major oil companies. Unlike" Platt's own qup~~tions, whiq~: 
are subject to daily cross-checks, the AFM quotations, being 
compiled weekly from a smaller number of transactions, tend to 
be less representative•·' ' 
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Platt's Oilgram quotations 
Platt's Oilgram is a daily oil price recording and 
reporting service by McGraw-Hill Publications, whose main 
office is in New York but w·hich has agencies and associated 
companies throughout Europe and the rest of the world. Among 
its daily topics are, for example, the prices at which trans-
actions in oil products have been made, including, so far as 
Europe is concerned, bulk prices for car~es fob Italy and 
.. r ( 
for barges fob Rotterdam, for a range of oil products. 
• 
- 115 -
Unlike other world-wide commodities, such as copper or sugar, 
the pric8s of oil products are not quoted on any international ex-
tensively by oil companies in determining their transfer and sale 
prices. Governments have also taken the quotations into consideration 
when determining their prices for oil products. 
The basis of the pricing service consists of the acquisition 
of information about transaptions not only of the major oil companies 
but also of independent dealers and brokers in principal oil centres. It 
has been assessed that the majority of the information is obtained from 
major oil companies. In Europe, the Platt's Oilgram Pricing Service has 
an office in Brussels from which, ea1h week, contact is made with a 
number of oil firms, dealers and brokers in the Netherlands to obtain 
recent prices for transactions in oil products together with some im-
pression of market trends. The information thus collected is trans-
mitted weekly to New York. Ever,i day the coordinator of the infor-
mation in New York telephones to some ten oil companies and dealers 
in the Rotterdam area to ensure that the information is as up to date 
as possible. A similar collecting service for information about oil trans-
actions operates from London. Information about transactions in Italy is 
obtained in a similar fashion. 
Apart from quotations collected from their ovm sources, Platt's 
Oilgram publishes the AFM prices for petrol and diesel fuel. 
As has alre~y been seen, one of the steps in the determination by 
Company I of its transfer prices requires the percentage_y~elds of 
certain oil products to be multiplied "by the appropriate· Platt's 
Rotterdam Low quotation effective the ultimo of the preceding month", 
and 25% of the MEP price operated by ·compa.rw F wa.l:J>~a.sed on qu6t~ations 
Platt's Oilgram quotations-,~n C<l.lcula.ting the base costA from which 
the NWE price was determined (see p.l09), and this had the clear effect of in-
creasing these base costs and accordingly the NWE price. Thus the base 
costs in December 1973, bearing the influence of Platt's Oilgram quo-
tations, were almost 15% higher than they wouln otherwi~e h~ve been. 
- 11(-i-
Tables 21 and 22 show the breakdown of the base costs of Company A 
and Company I, together with the effect on these costs of the use of 
Platt's Oilgram quotations. 
Comparison of transfer prices for oil proa_ucts 
In the course of the enquiries, the Commission requested from 
oil companies the average monthly prices at which they exported oil 
products to their associated companies in other countries of the Com-
munity. 
For super petrol (see Table 213), whilst very slight variation 
is to be found between the transfer prices charged by Company F,for 
example, other companies show a tendfincy to apply prices which are 
distinctly higher for certain countries than for others. 
In the case of Germany, the transfer prices charged by one 
company for super and regular petrol were higher than the prices 
charged by its subsidialjT on the German market. 
!/ 
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Product: Petrol-super Transfer prices (group internal deliveries) Table 2l 
~ per tonne ex-refinery 
----
-
""" 
Supplying country Country of c om p any 
dntinetion }) 0 j) ~· 0 :i J 
Oct.l2:ZJ~ 
Netherlands Germany 73.40 91,)8 
Belfe;um 57.92 65,25 £0~7:; 
Bni e~ngdom 6f,.31 -- ---- -- -" eD,-<4 
enma --~ _£<1,45 - -----
-BelgiUm" !fatherlands 48.- 79.35 
buxembourg 8),27 65,- 7)•, T! 63.6~, 
enmark 5~',10 
United Kingdom Ireland 62,- 60,1< 
::_! 
Nov.12n~ ". 
Netherlands Germ~ n.~5 
! ~lfi:Fnngdom '19,-/81,- (7,-63,.66 93,24 
Belgitun enmark 
72,02 
Netherlands 55.- I 79.5C 
Luxembom 83,16 '(( .- F .• Ci.,$2 C:9 11R~ United ngdom 6~.66 
United Kin~om 7~.- B:.,f 2 
Dec.l2,I~ Netherlands Germ~ 125,·· I 11:;,;.3 Belgium 
"f 
tl,- ?0.,?.4 
Belgium N:etherlands 601 - 91,72 Luxembourg e.;,1s 95,- 95,"l3 ?;,Of; 
United Kingdom. Ireland 92,f·O 
Jan.l2Z~ -
Netherlands Germany 81.5'0 Tl,-· 11,9,5& 
Belgium Netherlands ~ 15:1,- . -ff~f:8°H~gdom 85,29 110,- 96,57 81,3~ oo,65 
United Kingdom Ireland 110,90 175,97 
Feb.l27&. 
Netherlands i:~~ l.J ),(6 l70.[·!. 
Uni fed Kingdom 
E2,-
121,,~0 ,.,_. . . . ... 
Belgium Germ:l 1Di: 1 21 Nether ands c159, .. 1 39,(2 
United Kingdom 
Luxembourg 11"1.75 nq •.. 13,,, .. ~9 f-b,62 
Ireland 109.~0 
Mar.l2:Z~ 
Netherlands Germawr 115.- 1?.~,€2 United Kingdom 159,52 
Denmark 139,4) 
Belgium Netherlands 159,- 16~,9-l 
Luxembourg 13).07 126.- 157 t46 136,.77 
United Kingdom .Ireland ll8,20 142,41 
NH.: These are monthly average prices, so the raising of transfer prices during 
the course of a month could explain slight differences among common market 
countries • 
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As regards the transfer price of gas oils and light fuel oils 
(which have not been tabulated because the variety of definitions 
from country to country makes comparison difficult), a con-
sistently higher price to Germany was noticeable for most oil com-
panies in respect of comparable qualities : B in October and November 
1973, C in November 1973, F, G, H and J all offer examples. 
In respect of aircraft fuel, in his review in September 1974 of 
the state of the world air transport industry, the Director General 
of the International Air Transpo~ Association (IATA) said that un-
'"f'-
til 1973,1the costs of fuel had represented about 12% of the total 
costs of the airline industry but that t~is percentage had risen by 
July 1974 to over 25%. By that time the cost of aircraft fuel had in-
creased over threefold from its level~before the crisis, and because 
of the huge quantity of fuel consumed by aircraft, the airlines' total 
operating costs had soared as a result of the escalation in fuel prices. 
He went on to suggest that aircraft fuel had been priced at a higher 
level than was necessary, particularly as compared with other oil 
products. The Commission noted this situation and observations which 
had been made elsewhere expressing concern at the effect on the air-
lines, particularly on their prices. No formal complaints, 
however, had been made to the Commission by individual airlines about 
their situation concerning supplies of aircraft fuel. Contact was made 
with the European Airlines Research Bureau, the organization represent-
ing the collective interest of European based airlines, in the hope that 
it would make a representative comment to the Commission on behalf of 
its member airlines on a~y problems which European airlines were ex-
periencing from the point of view of supplies or prices, but it did 
not do so. 
The Commission subsequently decided to include aviation fuel among 
the products covered by the supplementary questionn~i~e which waa}sent 
out to oil companies during the course of the inquiry. Besides confinu-
ing a steep increase of price during the oil crisis, the resulting data 
shows a considerable disparity between the prices at which aircraft fuel 
was sold: this difference applies not only between companies but also 
between countries of destination. Thus, in November 1973, whilst delive-
ries were being made by Company F to Germany at a price of ~74.15 per 
.. 
·• 
9' 
-
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tonne, the prices charged by Companies H and J we.re ~138 per tonne and 
~101.61 per tonne respectively. Again, in December 1973, deliveries were 
made by Company I to Germany from a refinery in the Netherlands at the 
then particularly low price of ~40.11 per tonne, whilst deliveries to 
the same destination from refineries in the Netherlands were made by 
Company H at ¢'185 per tonne and by Company J at ~113.83 per tonne. On 
several occasions during the oil crisis,Denmark appears to have re-
ceived aircraft fuel at prices which were significantly lower than 
the prices charged by the same oil group to destinations in other 
member states. In Decembe~fl973, for example, Company I delivered 
supplies to Denmark at ~7 · per tonne whilst its charges to Belgium and 
the United Kingdom were ~94.19 and ~91.62 per tonne respectively. And 
again, in February 1974, the same c~mpany provided aircraft fuel to 
Denmark at a price of ~84.99 per tonne whilst its deliveries to Ger-
many, Belgium and the United Kingdom were invoiced at ~94.80 per tonne, 
~94.33 per tonne and ~114.24 per tonne respectively. 
Commenting in September 1975 on the effects of oil price increases 
on the operations of international airlines, the President of the Inter-
national Air Transport Association accused the oil companies of being 
unfair to airlines and indicated that studies commissioned by IATA had 
shown that the increases imposed by oil companies on the prices of jet 
fuel had been about 10% higher than the increases for other oil products. 
The contracting and supply arrangements between airlines and the oil com-
panies are themselves sufficiently complex to constitute the grounds for 
a separate inquiry, and this and further discuss.ions with the parties 
concerned would be necessar,y before any firm conclusion can be based 
on the differences noted. 
0 
~. ' 0 
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It is difficult to offer general conclusions about the systems of 
calculating transfer prices which the Commission encountered during 
its inquiries, because of the variety of procedures involved. Some 
companies, notably Companies A and I, operated a system of transfer 
prices which was based on a standard price applicable to all countries 
in the Community and to which differentials were applied to reflect 
particular market situations. Company A applied differentials to take 
account of transport costs to destinations outside the zone to which 
its basic transfer prices related. Other companies recognized that 
some account was taken of·~he market situation in the countr,y of des-
tination, and this would explain, at least partially, the higher 
transfer prices to Germany, which, apart from being deficient in 
refining capacity, had introduc_ed no price controls for oil products. 
'\ 
The accusation of absence of reality can be levelled at several 
aspects of the system of calculating transfer prices. The product 
yield used in the procedure of Company I for the calculation of its 
supply prices does not necessarily relate to the percentages of each 
product produced from 1 tonne of crude oil by that company but to 
the average yield expected from a typical refiner,y with an average 
capacity of 180,000 barrels per stream day (that is, about 9 million 
tonnes per year). Company A,at one stage in the calculation of its 
transfer prices, uses a yield of nine products from 1 tonne of crude 
oil which is representative of the European consumption of those pro-
ducts rather than of its own sales or of the yield actually obtained in 
its own refineries. Similarly, for freight costs, in the calculations 
AFRA quotations take the place of the actual shipping costs incurred 
by a company. 
"\·· 
.• ll •' 
The inclusion of quotations from Platt's Oilgram is another factor 
in the calculation of transfer prices which does not relate to a com-
pany's own situation. In fact, during the oil crisis the price~·given 
by Platt's quotations largely reflected the conditions on the inter-
national market since the oil market of Rotterdam (from which, as has 
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been mentioned earlier, much of the data for the compilation of 
Platt's Oilgram appears to be obtained) is geared to the exnort 
trade. The absence of maximum price legislation in Germany during 
the oil crisis meant that high prices could be achieved for trans-
actions, and these were reflected ultimately in Platt's Oilgram 
quotations, which themselves \"lere used as the basis for further 
transact ions. 
It is understood that the prices passed to the Platt's Oil-
gram organization may inclu~ prices in respect of transactions 
which are expected but not yet concluded. Moreover, it is not 
known to what extent the data passed by the oil companies concern 
transactions within their own group, but in this connection it is 
" worth noting that even the major oil companies often use inter-
mediaries for their transactions and thus the exact nature of some 
of the prices passed to the Platt's Oilgram organization may not 
be known. 
Ever,y effort is undoubtedly made to ensure that the data used 
in the compilation of Platt's Oilgram quotations are absolutely up 
to date, but the actual criteria for interpreting the data given 
and the means of determining the daily quotations are unknown, as 
indeed are the sources of the information themselves. 
It seems likely that the ultimate decision as to the level at 
which the daily quotations are to be fixed rests with the coordinator 
in New York, who doubtless takes account of market trends when 
anplying his judgment to the interpretation of the data. 
It might be said, of course, that the Platt's Oilgram ~tiotation 
is regarded only as a guide in concluding contracts in respect of oil 
products and that the final prices a:re. determined of!';,,·if basis of ~~~ual 
agreement between the parties, taking account of the state of the mar-
ket and the transaction concerned. Nevertheless, there remains no 
doubt that throughout the stttdies undertaken by the Commission into the 
oil sector in Europe,extensive references were found to the use of, if 
not actual reliance on, the quotations contained in Platt's Oilgram.and 
that such frequent reference to this publication raises some real pro-
blems concerning the correctness of prices. 
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3. Sales to third parties in other countries 
The sales by oil companies to third parties consisted mainly 
of bulk sales to other companies in the market and to large independent 
jobbers which were made either on the basis of a firm contract or as 
spot purchases at the market prices. 
Because of the special nature of the German market with its 
inadequate domestic production of heating oil distillates and prices 
which were not subject to official regulation, exports to Germany of gas 
oil are of particular interest. 
In view of this, Ta:bJ~. g~ compares the following: 
·· :-~· .. ;... prioe~:~Qharged by., two·1~nd~ende;q.t Dntoh, deaie~'S (Compa.n~es ~Nand p.) ¥1·._,·., 
. .......... ~:-~ .. :·'. \i';"'l:. ,·· ~·· .. ;·:,'•'5\'.:~·.\.j'',' :~:~l-::,::\.ir•,\'.:_'',·~ ~~:::J,)\' r .~,t.' ,.';/',.• ~8~ -~; (,·.·~~-t·~' 
: ':'*:.::./tor· .. deli-veries· t'o.;Gerl:ri.at;I;VJ~ ;:···~· ...... (:.:b,., . ~:- ". ·· ;-~i:; .. ·:·: ·'- · ·· ·· ' · ;,,(:;' 
',' ' ' ' . ' ' ., ' ' 
-the prices charged by Company A (an int~rnational company), for 
deliveries to a dealer selling to the German market. The price is 
described by Company A as "Average Platt's low (Platt's mean) 
Rotterdam for 30 days prior to the 15th of the month prior to the 
month of loading plus 35 centel'; 
the transfer prices which Company A charged its own German refining 
subsidiary; 
the Platts' Oilgram quotations. 
As the table shows, Companies N and 0 were the first to 
increase their prices when the crisis began, by approximately 4o% 
between September and October 1973, broadly in line with Platt's, whereas 
Company A raised its prices much less. 
<LA.S OIL 
Exports to German,;y 
I Company N Company 0 
I I I Quantity Price Quar.ti-zy /;ice 
' (tormes) (~/tonne) ( tonnes) (~ onne) 
i 
I 1_91.1 
July 5 900 76.54 1 887 72.35 
· Aug11st 18 253 67.04 4 626 65.19 
September 15 848 80.65 2 411 73.95 
October 18 637 114.34 . 5 643 104.65 
I November 23 109 126.45 8 522 155.~8 
.I December ' 8 093 148.62 1 704 175.46 
" I 197:1 I January 23 668 126.28 8 794 115.58 
February 11 234 108.67 I 3 599 108.92 
March 
---< 9 094 ~."' 105.45 I 3 847 106.25 
--
' 
i~pan;y A 
Quanti~ (t_onnes · (~?t'?~e) 
2~.400 .60.14 
30:j400 67.82 
36._8oo 71.56 
29.200 ~ 73.12 
-. ,.. 
25.,000 86.39 
24t500 141.18 
. -
24r.6o0 204.8o 
24~600 152.56 l 251000 108.71 
Table 24 
Price charged by Pla-tt's 
Company A to Rotterdam 
group companies 
in Germany (~/tonne) 
51.60 70.96 
70.18 
77.67 
1/10-76.60. 16/10 
81.60 
117.68 
181.70 
99.0 175.84 
118.0 125.61 
I 100.64 94.0 98.94 I 
! 
I 
I I 
1-' 
1\,) 
V1 
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These differences between prices charged by Compa.2zy A to a 
dealer selling on the German market, on the one hand, and those of 
Platt•s and the independent dealers, on the other, were due to the 
interval related to the date of the Pla.tt 's Oilgram quotation specified 
in the supply contract between Company A and the dealers selling to 
the German market. 
The differences between Company A's transfer price and 
What it charged to a dealer selling to Germany were due to the 
different manner in Which Platt's Oilgram quotations enter into the 
calculation of the two prices: the price to the dealer selling to 
the German market is related al.~st entirely to Platt's Oilgram 
. quotations, l'Jhereas Platt's influence on transfer pricing is, as we 
have seen, muoh less. 
'\ 
Table 25 illustrates, in respect of super petrol and 
heating gas oil, the disparity between two companies' (A 1 s and I 1 s) 
transfer prices and Platt's Oilgram (mean) Rotterdam quotations. 
It will be observed that the transfer prices were always 
below Platt's and that the gap widened during the months covered. 
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From the information and trends set out above,it can be 
seen that the transfer prices of crude oil or of oil products had 
virtually no effect on market prices at the time of the crisis. 
Where there are price controls, the result of a market 
crisis is that market prices tend to align themselves on the maximum 
controlled prices. 
Where the market remains free of controls, prices tend to 
float up to the level of world market prices. They tend to follow the 
pattern of the highest prices, Which are those either of the more or 
less marginal quantities of crude bought at higher prices or of 
refined products purchased on the world market. 
Variations or differences in transfer prices in each of 
these two situations have n9 effect, except on the balance Sheets of 
the international subsidiaries of the companies. 
Ultimately, it is in the terms under Which the various 
companies supplying the market obtain their supplies that the factors 
governing price levels in times of crisis, as in times of market 
stability, are to be found. 
As regards crude oil, the major companies, Which for a 
long time have had an almost exclusive control of Middle East oil, 
have established very close relationShips with the producer countries 
and, despite the gradual disappearance of concession oil, still benefit 
directly or indirectly from privileged purchasing conditions in 
countries where production costs are in any case the lowest. With 
respect to crude oil then, the other companies are subject from the 
outset to a handicap Which is felt at all stages right up to the 
finished product. 
- 129 -
The result is that When there is pressure on the market, 
companies other than the majors exert as much upward pressure on 
prices as the majors themselves. 
Since these are also companies which are partly state owned 
and Whose market position the state therefore has an interest in 
strengthening, government price controls inevitably take account of 
their situation and preserve conditions in Which they can continue to 
operate profitably. 
In some ways, the resulting price levels help to provide 
the large international companies with higher profits then they would 
attain in a real market economy. 
As regards refined products, as soon as the market begins to 
become restricted,the fact that dealers seek to acquire marginal 
quantities at world prices also has the effect of forcing prices higher. 
To sum up, in times of crisis, prices tend to rise to the 
highest level without any apparent relation to the internal transfer 
prices of the companies. 
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The German market, the only one in Which supplies and prices 
remained genuinely free during the crista, provides a good illustration 
of what we have just said and enables a number of comments to be made. 
Estimate of origin of supplies on the German domestic market 
(1973)1 ) 
Origin 
German refineries of the large international 
companies 
German refineries of non-German European 
companies and American independents 
German refineries of German companies 
Oil companies refining in the Netherlands 
Rotterdam free market 
Imports from other Community countries 
(excluding Netherlands) 
Imports from non-member countries 
Percentage 
35% 
........ 
7o% refined 
in Germany 
l) Total consumption of oil products in 1973: 137 million tonnes 
One particular feature of Germany's supplies of oil products is 
that only 7o% is covered from refineries in Germany, the rest being 
imported. 
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These imports came from the following four sources in 
somewhat similar proportions: the large international companies 
refining in the Netherlands Who transferred oil supplies to their 
German subsidiaries, the Rotterdam free market, refineries elsewhere 
in the Community and non-member countries. 
This supply structure also explains the way prices are 
formed on the German market. 
As soon as the market experiences pressure, these prices 
inevitably have to fall somewhere between the cost of products refined 
in Germany by the large international companies and the cost of 
imported products paid for at the higher world market prioe. 
It can be assumed that approximately 2o% of German 
supplies are obtained at prices fairly close to the world price. These 
products, handled mostly by dealers, are sold at this high price on a 
market where actual or feared Shortfalls provoke customers into buying 
regardless of price. 
These quantities, marginal in terms of volume, in fact 
determine the market price since other sellers or intermediaries 
naturally aim to profit from the same price in their sales. 
Hence, at times of crisis, German market prices have tended 
to be similar to world prices. But the movement of prices is not uniform: 
there are exceptions in individual regions, and this explains the significant 
price differences throughout the crisis recorded in Table 20. 
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The German example thus shows that transfer prices are 
economically meaningful and reflect product costs only When the market 
is in a state of long-term equilibrium. 
It is this disparity between real costs and transfer prices 
which gave rise to accusations against the oil companies that they were 
operating price systems which were so complex that they could cover up 
any form of manipulation. Indeed all the systems which they operate 
certainly do lack clarity and logic, permitting uncheckable 
calculations to be made. 
If in one way or another transfer prices were to determine 
selling prices, and in certain circumstances and on certain markets they 
could be a contributory factor, the ~ they are formed would have to 
become much clearer. 
It is equally regrettable that When national authorities 
are determining prices, the bases of their calculations are not more 
closely related to reality instead of appearing to bear little relation 
to real costs at the various stages of production and distribution. 
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PART V 
THE INDEPENDENTS. 
As the introduction to this report recall~, the press release 
announcing the Commission's decision to inquire into the conduct of 
the oil companies explicitly referred to difficulties facing the 
independent::::. 
Part II of the report referred to the Commission's classification 
of the oil companies i!'lto three categories: 
(a) the large integrated companies operating on a worldwide 
scale; 
(b) the integrated oil companies of \';hich the activities tend 
to be concentrated in one or several member states; 
(c) smaller companj_es importing and distributing oil products 
and in some cases owning refineries. 
This classification does not make it clear what the Commission 
meant when it referred in 1973 to the "independents". 
The Commission's preoccupation at that time was the survival 
of small and medium sized firms, most of whose turnover depended on oil 
products and v-Ihich were independent as regards supplies, distribution 
and prices. 
Hm-Jever, this definition is both academic and inadequate. 
Large numbers of enterpricec have long-term contracts covering varying 
proportions of their requirements with this or that large international 
company. Are these enterprises independent or not? In concluding 
these contracts are they not giving up their freedom of source of supply 
by the very act whereby they seek to secure their supplies? 
Moreover, this definition takes no account of the vital 
differences between an importer/wholesaler and a retailer. There 
are probably some 60,000 dealers in oil products at all stages in the 
Community, yet only a few hundred of these are importers/wholesalers. 
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Unlike API in Italy, most of the independent companies have 
. 
neither their own refinery nor direct access to refining capacities. 
Others specialize in manufacturing or regenerating lubricants. Some, 
such as Bulk Oil, actually operate as jobbers, importing and selling 
o:.J.. 1-•rc,luci.;.:;. But the vast majority of the independent dealers 
simply sell industrial and domestic fuel oils and sometimes petrol. 
It goes without saying that the interests of these dealers 
vary just as widely as their size, line of business and sales volume, 
which can range from several million tonnes in several countries to a 
few thousand tonnes in a single area or city. 
Nevertheless, although these independent dealers generally 
hold rather modest market shares, taken together they account for 
approximately 2Cf{G of the distribution of oil products. 
The situation varies from one country to another. Apart 
from France, where prech;e ;:;tatistics exist, it is difficult to obtain 
an accurate picture of sales by the independents. 
This being said, the trade associations estimate that in those 
coQ~tries where the independents do a sizable volume of business 1 they 
accounted for the follo~Jing market shares in 197 3: 
BELGIUM 
Diesel fuel and heating oil 
Heavy fuel oils 
Petrol 
I JET HEHLAJ'.'JD ;3 
Diesel fuel and heating oil 
Heavy fuel oils 
Petrol 
5% 
at least 
1Excluding Germany, for which the Commission has no figures shmving 
the independents' market share. 
l<'RANCE 
~'l'ALY 
-
- 136 -
Domestic fuel oil 
Heavy fuel oil, excluding 
supplies to Electricite de 
France (EDF) and Societe 
Hationale des Chemins de 
Fer Fran9ais (SNCF) 
Petrol 
Domestic fuel oil 
The role of the independents 
2Z% 
1a% 
Before 1971, supply of oil products exceeded demand on the 
\·JOrld market. Prices were depressed. The large and medium-sized 
independent companies absorbed the surplus and helped to keep supply 
a!ed demand in equilibrium. In order to dispose of their surpluses, 
the refineries were willing to sell to the independents at relatively 
low prices. 
Their lower costs and their ability to obtain products on 
favourable terms enabled them to compete actively with the large 
companies. 
Hence, over the last twenty years or so, the independents 
'dere able to set up di::;tribution networks in parallel with those of the 
large corr.panies, to build up stocks and to acquire their o-vm means of 
transport. They v1ere VJcll adjusted to the requirements of light 
industry and domestic consumers. 
The independent manufacturers of lubricants launched new 
br~nds, thu2 stimulating competition on this market. 
At the 11arious stages of distribution the independents 
carved themselves out a substantial share of the markettside by 
2ide with the large companies. 
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Thi2 is not to say that the independents had no problems 
before the cricis. 
Ov1ing to their relatively modest size the independents feel 
the effect of regional, \veather or economic variations more than the 
large companies, and likewise competition from other energy sources. 
They also suffer from the burden and cost of compliance with national 
or other regulations which are felt less by companies which are 
financially and administratively more substantial (controls of all 
kinds, compulsory storage, anti-pollution regulations, technical 
barriers to trade, etc.). 
supply. 
From 1972 up to early 1974 demand was beginning to exceed 
Countries with inadequate refinery capacity, such as Germany 
and the Scandinavian countries, became obliged to pay higher prices 
for their supplies. Refineries no longer had the slightest problem 
in disposing of their output. 
This was when the independents began to run into difficulties. 
Only a small minority of them were able to take advantage of the rise 
in prices by making profitable export deals from Co~~unity refineries. 
For most of them the problem was to cupply their distribution networks 
on competitive terms in order to defend them against their larger 
compet it oro. 
The crisis only exacerbated this situation- sometimes to an 
extreme degree. In Belgiumtthe independents - particularly those 
depending heavily on imports - were in serious trouble, with only 50% 
of their requirements supplied. 
Those which had their principal market in Belgium were offered 
products at pricen higher than the maximum Belgian prices. Several of 
them managed to obtain supplies, particularly in ¥..arch and April 1974, 
only as a result of government requisition orders. 
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One of the big independent companies operating in Belgium, 
1r1here it had crude oil refined and :::old its products, also had very 
serious problems owing to the high prices it was obliged to pay for 
crude oil and to refining costs v1hich were increased because of under-
utilization of hired capacity. 
'l'he :.:;i tuation in the Netherlands was similar to that in Belgium, 
thouch aggravated to an extent because distribution margins -v;e:re not, 
as in Belgium, fixed by the authorities at the same time as maximum 
prices. ~'he action taken by the Rijb:;bureau lrJas not enough to put 
.cigr.t irl all cacc;:; the precarious si tuat::.ons in which the independents 
fou~d themselves. 
Certain independent comp.::mies vlhich were exporter:::; ,however, 
mQdc substantial prof'i ts. For example, light fuel oil bought by an 
i.-1dependent in December 1973 from _one of the large international 
cor.tpanie:::; at Fl. 28.39 per 100 l. HaG sold to Germany at Fl. 47.57. 
Opportunities such as that resulted in some of these exporters 
increasing their storage capacity in the Netherlandl:.' above the level 
corresponding to real requirements in normal circumstances. The 
re~ml ting burden of finance charees v-Ias too heavy, and the large 
i~ternational coupanies acquired some of this capacity. 
In France certain independents which were normally importers 
had problems in November 1973.. A circular distributed in November 
1973 assigned to the Union des Chambres Syndicales des Industries du 
Petrole (UCSIP) the task of preparing a plan for supplying those 
companies which nov1 found it impossible to import. The plan fixed 
the level of supplies to these independents at 75% of reference 
levels. The result of this system was that during the crisis the 
cor.~pa~1ies' market chares \vere frozen, as '!riere those of their distributors. 
This system ceased operating in 1974 and the independents \</ere urged 
to secure their supplies by negotiating contracts direct with companies 
having refining operations in France; such contracts __ )TQtl.l.d .be.-less 
ur1certain than some import contracts which were sensitive to price 
fl11ctuations on the world market. 
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.. 
An Italian ministerial circular dated 8 October 1973 laid down 
that supplies of heating oil were to be held at 80 % of their 1972 level 
. 
and furnished by the same distribution networks. The oil companies opposed 
this. Provincial committees (official bodies headed by the prefects) were 
set up to organize the distribution of these products. A ministerial 
instruction of 23 November 1973 announced the decision to grant distribution 
rights only to companies nominated by refiners. The reason for this was that 
the previous arrangements had given rise to some disorder on the oil product 
market by compelling refiners to make supplies available to dealers v1hose 
traditional sources of supply lay outside Italy. Naturally enough, the 
Italian oil companies favoured the distribution networks which were linked 
to them and which sometimes received more supplies than they could normally 
handle; on the other hand,certain independents received little or nothing. 
Normal channels of distribution were consequently disrupted. Some consumers 
were not supplied, and there even sprang up a black market in heating oil. 
'l'here tvas no attempt to regulate. supplies on the petrol market, and 
companies refused to sell petrol to the independents, resulting in the 
temporary closure of hundreds of petrol stations. 
Moreover, the reduction in distribution margins fixed by the Comi tato 
Interministeriale Prezzi (CIP) both for petrol and heating oils affected the 
independents more seriously than the integrated distribution networks. 
Dist r·i but ion margins 
1 January 1973 20 February 1974 
Heating oils 3 % 1.1% 
Light fuel oil 2.6% 1.1% 
Heavy fuel oil 3.6% 1.4 % 
Another result of the limitation of the prices of oil products 
by the CIP was to reduce the trade margins of the coastal depots from which 
the independents obtain their supplies. The function of these depots is to 
import oil products, mainly from the USSR and France, to regulate these 
imports by means of their storage capacity and thus help to keep the market 
in balance. During the crisis they found it difficult to cover their operating 
costs. This made it even harder for the independents to obtain supplies. 
The Commissiort will continue its examination of the conduct of the 
companies >vithin the provincial committee system and its effects on supplies 
to independents during the crisis. 
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Generally cpeaking, wherever price controls existed the 
independents fOQ~d survival difficult during the crisis. The reduced 
margin between prices invoiced by refineries and maximum prices often 
failed to cover distribution costs fully, and in view of the price 
levels prevailing at home it -v;as not practical to obtain supplies from 
abroad. 
It is impo:3sible to ectablish accurately how the r~tructure of 
the trade v1n.s changed by the crisis. One estimate is that the number 
of enterprises which went out of business, including those which 
became bankrupt and those i'lhich were taken over by another company, was 
no higher than a feH hundred in all categories for the v-1hole Community 
"(only one per cen-1, of all the companies). In the end, given 
market trends in recent years, the number of importer/wholesalers 
which are truly independent cannot be more than one out of hm. 
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C 0 N C L U S I 0 N S 
The enquiry announced by the Commission on 21st December 
1913 covered the period from October 1973 to March 1914- the period 
marked by the oil crisis stemming from the armed conflict which 
broke out in the Middle East on 6th October 1973. The enquiry's 
findings and conclusions as to the behaviour of oil companies during 
this period do not necessarily apply to the situation which obtained 
before or after the crisis. 
The purpose of the enquiry was to examine the behaviour of 
oil companies in the Community and assess it with regard to the rules 
on competition set out in the Treaty of Rome. The Commission's 
investigative powers extend to all member countries, but the enquiry 
has also produced important information relevant to matters outside 
the Community, notably the formation of crude oil prices in producer 
countries and also the transfer prices charged by oil companies in 
respect of crude oil sold to their refineries and refined products 
sold to their distributing subsidiaries. 
The sudden pressure on the market for oil products, its 
impact on the price of these products and the uncertainty as to the 
gravity and duration of the crisis, rapidly produced within the 
Community a supply situation in respect of oil products which 
obliged the Commission to ensure, by the means of direct action 
available to it, that the situation was not being exploited by the 
oil companies in violation of the Treaty's rules on competition• 
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The Commission's apprehension was justified because of 
the specific structure of the market in oil products, which is 
controlled by a small number of large international companies 
distributing a limited number of homogeneous products obtained 
from the same raw material to which they have privileged access. 
In proportions which mqy var,y, all these companies purchase their 
oil from the same sources, often from enterprises in which they 
have a joint interest, at prices which are broadly similar for 
a given supply point. They load the oil at the same ports and 
ship it to the same destinations, where they manufacture the same 
products under the same conditions and, at the same refineries. 
Whether in the case of actual joint ventures, exchanges 
of refining capacities or transfers of products, the large companies 
are linked by an extensive network of relationships which, even 
if there are good historical and economic reasons for them, 
constitute none the less a factor in strengthening their solidarity 
and consolidating their position. 
The Commission will remain alert to the possibility that, 
by forging more and more of these links, the companies might create 
together a situation which would limit the scope for effective 
competition. 
Alongside these large international companies, there is 
a smaller number of integrated companies, also with refineries in 
the Community, which, to a var,ying extent, depending on their 
requirements,have access to supplies of crude oil, but atgenerally 
higher prices. 
Finally, as regards the supply of oil products, there are 
the independent wholesalers, who, in normal circumstances,are able 
to play an active and effective role, in that they are in a position 
to obtain supplies from the cheapest sources and to ask lower prices, 
thereby introducing a significant element of competition. 
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During the crisis, not only aid the large oil companies 
continue to enjoy access to sources of supply on better terms 
than their competitors but their market position was reinforced 
by the relative scarcity of supply and even more so by the fear 
of real shortage. This situation harboured increased risks of 
restrictive practices involving supplies or prices, notably 
market sharing, abusive price policies or the elimination of 
less well placed competitors or independent dealers. These were, 
incidentally, risks which the authorities in member states were 
concerned to limit by measures appropriate to the national 
markets. 
Once the threat of a shortage appeared, the conditions 
of supply were serious affected not only by the onset of the crisis 
but also by the attitude adopted by governments towards this threat. 
In most member countries the refining capacities cover 
requirements. The authorities in those countries took steps to 
control price increases and to restrict exports of refined products. 
However, for reasons ste~ing both from its economic tenets and from 
an appreciable shortfall in refining capacities in Germany, the 
Government of that country chose to rely to a large extent on the 
free interplay of market mechanismes to make up by imports the 
shortfall in national refining capacity. 
The varied policy approaches adopted within the Community 
by the several member states and the differing national measures 
implementing these policies affected the oil companies and explain 
certain facets of their behaviour in member countries. 
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Assessment in the light of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome 
The Commission has examined whether the changes in the 
respective positions of the parties economically involved, did not, 
during the crisis, lead to restrictive or unfair practices by 
companies as regards supplies and prices or towards independent 
dealers and users. 
Assessment of the facts was often made difficult because 
the authorities in most member states pursued a short-term oil 
policy which meant that they had to involve -either themselves or 
through their trade associations - the oil companies in determining 
or implementing national objectives. 
This concertation between companies obviously resulted in practices 
which, although they had the blessing of the member states, could 
not avoid having som~ impact on competition and were therefore apt to 
fall within the relevant rules of the Treaty. 
Subject to any conclusions to the contrary which the Commission 
may reach, when it has completed the action which it intends to take 
(see point 5 below), the findings of the enquiry are as follows 
(1) The dominant position of the oil companies 
The whole of the report shows that the structure of supply was 
not fundamentally different during the oil crisis from what it 
had been previously but - bearing in mind the relative scarcity of 
oil products - insofar as certain oil companies had at their 
disposal the bulk of the crude oil produced, and transported and 
refined it, the position of the independen~and even of some of 
the less powerful integrated companies was undermined. Nevertheless, 
at the same time,refiners in general saw their position strengthened 
to such an extent that, collectively, they acquired a dominant 
position on the oil market. 
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In view of the scarcity of oil products and since dealers 
and consumers were, as a result, unable to rely on other suppliers 
even in their own countries, each of the companies with refining 
capacities in a given country thus became the sole and imposed 
supplier of all dealers and consumers who were its traditional 
customers. In the context of their collective dominant position, 
each of the refining companies was, therefore, in a monopolistic 
position towards its customers. 
A dominant position was created for the supplier in respect of 
these traditional customers, due to the collective dominant 
position of all refiners on the entire national market. Such a 
situation existed in all member states except Germany. 
The definition of what constituted a company's traditional 
customers gives rise, of course, to some difficulty. In the 
context of actual problems raised by the crisis, the Commission 
has taken the view that a company should have considered as a 
traditional customer, any buyer who, in the twelve months prior 
to the crisis, had in some way or another been its customer. 
It is on this basis that the Commission made its assessment 
of the companies' behaviour in this field. 
(2) The supply of oil products 
The information gathered on the overall supply of crude oil 
to all refineries in the common market shows that the contraction 
in supplies was the result of production cuts ordered by the pro-
ducing countries and of their embargo directed at the Netherlands 
and Denmark. 
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The Commission's investigations did not reveal the existence 
of any practices forbidden under Articles 85 and 86 in the arrangements 
for supplying the Community with crude oil. All the oil companies 
experienced difficulties in their own supply systems in the oil~ 
producing countries. Some of them, with a lesser proportion of 
concession oil at their disposal, experienced greater difficulties 
than others in supplying their refineries. 
The integrated companies which had no crude oil resources of 
their own or whose resources were so inadequate that they had 
concluded supply contracts for crude oil with the large international 
companies, continued to be supplied on the basis of contracts. 
By the same token, the Commission was unable to establish that 
there had been any agreement between oil companies in Europe, within 
the meaning of Article 85, to restrict deliveries of refined products. 
This does not contradict the fact that, locally, dealers or users had 
to face major supply problems during the most acute phase of the 
crisis - problems which were caused mainly by a steep rise in demand 
on the part of anxious customers and by interruptions in the rhy~hm 
of deliveries by the refineries and wholesalers. The national 
authorities did all they could to remedy this. 
(3) Prices 
The transfer prices charged by the large oil companies, whether 
for crude oil or refined products, relate to transactions between 
firms in the same group, that is to say, they are internal prices 
determined from tax, financial and economic considerations peculiar 
to the enterprise itself. Where such transactions are purely internal 
in their effect they are not caught by the rules on competition. 
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However, the Commission could not rule out the possibility 
that certain internalpractices in respect of transfer pricing 
mieht be indicative of an agreement or a concerted practice 
between the oil companies if they revealed coordinated behaviour • 
Nor could the Commission rule out the possibility that a policy 
of high or diversified transfer prices,applied to subsidiaries in 
countries where the authorities do not intervene in the market, 
might constitute an element of abuse through its effects on selling 
prices where the company in question was in a dominant position. 
As a check on their behaviour among themselves, the oil 
companies' respective transfer prices, for both crude oil and 
refined products, were compared. This showed that all the oil 
companies had followed their own line and that the transfer prices 
of crude oil in particular, though differing very little from each 
other, nevertheless did reflect the differences between the supply 
situations of the various companies. They also reflected the 
differences between the price polioies pursued by the companies, 
some of which charge the same transfer prices to all their refining 
subsidiaries throughout the Community, while others vary them to 
take account of conditions on national markets. 
In view of the highly diversified supply arrangements in 
Germany and the market economy which prevails there, no oil company 
was able to abuse its position through the transfer prices it applied 
in transactions with its German subsidiaries. 
An analysis of the various systems and levels of transfer prices 
did not reveal any concerted practices among the oil companies. 
In respect of the selling price to consumers, the fact that 
most member states set maximum prices made concerted practices 
between the oil companies impossible inthese countries, once the 
prices had been fixed. 
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It might have been thought that in Germany the 
oil companies would have come to an arrangement among themselves 
to increase their profits on the German market. Yet the trends 
taken by consumer prices on that market was the work of all the 
economic factors involved in making up that portion of Germany's 
oil requirements not covered by refineries located in that country, 
in particular importing dealers, who,faced with the threat of 
shortage and in the absence of prices fixed by the Government, 
accepted the level set by international demand. 
Of course, the prices asked by importers and by the 
subsidiaries of the large oil companies in Germany were all gravitating 
towards this level. In a market where there is little variation 
between products and where prices move very swiftly, consumer prices 
may temporarily assume a variety of levels from one company or region 
to another, but different price levels for the same product cannot 
be expected to obtain permanently throughout the market. 
In any event, the Commission discovered no agreements 
between companies in connection with this aspect. 
It is its view, however, that as certain systems of 
disseminating international prices, such as Platt's Oilgram, may 
have an effect on price levels in Germany or on any other free market, 
it must give attention to the operation and effects of these systems 
and, in particular, check whether the information system used by 
Platt's Oilgram might not result in prices being published which 
do not correspond to the whole of the actual quotations. 
An attempt may be made to estimate the excess price 
paid by Germany between October 1973 and April 1974 as compared with 
countries where the authorities set maximum prices. The Commission 
estimates that for those six months,the excess price might have 
been in the order of one thousand million dollars for a consumption 
.. 
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of sixty-four million tonnes of oil products, i.e. an average 
of about fifteen dollars per tonne. This may seem a large sum, 
but this additional expenditure on Germany's part is more than 
offset by the advantages which it has traditionally derived 
from its position as an importer of refined products bought 
at cheaper prices on the world market, the periods of depression 
on that market having in the past been considerably longer than 
the periods of pressure. 
(4) Independent dealers and users 
During the crisis the independent companies 
experienced such difficulties that, in some cases, their very 
existence was threatened. This was particularly true where the 
level of maximum prices prevented the iadependents from buying 
freely and squeeze~ their margins to excess. 
Many small and medium-sized firms, engaged solely in 
distribution, have tried either to cover themselves against a 
recurrence of the same difficulties or to sell out. 
The second alternative led to the buying up of a 
certain number of medium-sized business by the big companies. 
Other firms concluded long-term supply contracts with the refiners 
which give them a large degree of security but deprive them at the 
same time of genuinely free access to the market. 
Nevertheless the total of such transactions was small 
in relation to the total of dealers in oil products in the common 
market, estimated at around 60,000 wholesalers and retailers. 
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The crisis thus brought_about structural changes 
in the oil business which are reflectedJnot in a noticeable reduction 
in the number of firms,but in the existence of new relationships 
between the oil companies and a certain number of wholesalers. 
Nevertheless the Commission discovered nothing in this development 
indicatir.g abuse by the oil companies of their collective dominant 
position. 
On the other hand, the Commission has examined cases of 
presumed abuse of an individual dominant position by certain companies 
in respect of independent dealers who are their customers. 
The Commission takes the view that, during the crisis, 
all the large oil companies were in an individual dominant position, 
at least in respect of their traditional customers, who had no access 
to suppliers other than those with whom they had done business. 
A refusal to sell to such customers can constitute an abuse forbidden 
by Article 86 since it may affect trade between member states, which 
• 
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is certainly the case when a sizable purchaser/dealer is in 
• danger of beine squeezed out of the market, a development 
which would mean appreciable change in the pattern of supply 
for oil products in a substantial part of the common market. 
The question might even·be asked whether, in a 
crisis in which state intervention, in particular, produces a 
degree of fragmentation of the market, companies in a collective 
dominant position should not be obliged,according to their share 
of the market concerned, to supply in reasonable quantities and 
at reasonable prices to buyers who, before this fragmentation of 
the market, obtained their supplies from other sources. Such an 
obligation would have the effect of maintaining the competitive 
marketing structure which existed before the crisis. 
(5) Further investigations decided by the Commission 
Following a complaint of refusal to sell1 the 
Commission is continuing its examination of a case which m~ 
involve an abuse of a dominant position under Article 86 of the 
Treaty of Rome. 
The Commission ascertained, in respect of certain 
· products, the existence of specific market situations and price 
differences which justify closer investigation. 
This applies to kerosene and naphtha, on the markets 
for which there are oligopolies of both suppliers and buyers. 
The Commission has decided to carry out enquiries 
in the following sectors under Council Regulation No. 17 : 
(i) jet fuel (kerosene), with the airlines; 
(ii) naphtha, with the chemical industry; 
(iii) 
(iv) 
the use by oil companies of references to Platt's Oilgram 
quotations; 
public supply contracts with electricity companies. 
* * * 
.. 
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It also emer~es from this report that during the crisis 
the dissimilar actions by member states were aimed at the urgent 
introduction of measures and gave the impression of an "every man 
for himself" approach,which was scarcely in the Community spirit. 
During the same period, because of their international 
standing and experience, the oil companies made an important con-
tribution to alleviating for the countries of the Community, the 
serious repercussions on their supplies of the decisions taken by 
the oil producing countries. 
This same crisis served, in fact, to highlight how 
effective and indispensable their influence is, and to bring 
home to economic observers and to the general public the power 
wielded by these larce companies and the limitations of any 
attempt at state intervention. 
'l'his povler flows from their historical and privileged 
links with the oil-producing countries, their ownership of tanker 
fleets as well as most of the refineries in the world, and the 
integrated character of all their activities. 
But the producing countries have progresively effected 
a tran:;fer of po\..rer to their own advantage. The successive attempts 
to reduce concessions and gradually to take control of operations 
have seriously eroded the oil companies• position in the producing 
countries. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
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Nevertheles~ they retain almost exclusive control of 
supply routes, refining and distribution facilities. 
In view of these developments,the consuming countries 
1-1ill require to pccy more attention to both the economic and political 
terms attached to their oil supplies. 
It is therefore essential, in the light of present 
and foreseeable circumstances, to achieve a better balance 
between the roles of the public authorities and the oil companies 
respectively. The companies are complex agents whose economic 
value is unquestioned but whose role must be better defined. 
AGainst this background, mo·st member states have 
already embarked on a systematic rationalization of their relations 
with the companies. This ranges from an organization on a legal basis 
of the li'rench type to consul tat ion machinery as set up in Germany. 
'rhe differences betv1een these systems are indicative of different 
economic approaches but also reflect specific situations. Regardless 
of the procedure adopted, there is not a single country which has not 
expressed the desire to see more clearly into the particular aspects 
of the oil business which affect it and, if necessary, to exercise 
some influence. 
All the industrialised countries of the world have 
displayed similar concern. 
Forms of international coopQration have been introduced 
but they do not themselves provide an answer to the Community's wish 
for a policy of its own, capable, should the need arise, of affirming 
itself independently and of counterbalancing any influence which might 
be contrary to its interests. 
Nor does it relieve the Community of its obligation to 
exercise some supervision of the oil market to ensure that the rules 
on competition and the free movement of coods are being observed. 
The oil crisis will have served to stress once more the 
vital necessity for the Community to develop a common oil policy. 
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